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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Today's home-buyer faces many different choices to satisfy his 
financing needs. The amount of the loan, as well as the length of the 
mortgage and mortgage rates play an important role in this decision making 
process. 
The key to successful home buying is to get a favorable mortgage 
loan. Since the end of World War II, numerous changes have taken place in 
the mortgage markets. New and innovative financial techniques have 
provided for new challenges in managing the interest-rate risk for the 
lender, and also have allowed for shifting of such risk to the borrowers of 
mortgage funds. These alternative real estate financing tools keep 
mortgage markets continuously alive and mortgage lending flexible. 
However, vast developments of new techniques inevitably make mortgage 
markets more complex than before. For inexperienced home buyers, the 
various mortgage choices could be confusing- The "good old days" of going 
to the local savings and loan association and getting a "standard" real 
estate mortgage are gone. Today, successful real estate transactions 
depend largely upon having a clear understanding of basic financing tools. 
Interest is the price of credit, loanable funds. The level of 
interest rates is determined by the interaction between the demand for and 
the supply of credit in the loanable funds theory framework. As the supply 
of loanable funds exceeds the demand, downward pressure would be exerted on 
interest rates. Excess of demand for loanable funds over supply would 
result in an increase in interest rates. When demand equals supply, the 
interest rate remains stable and is called the equilibrium interest rate. 
The equilibrium interest rate changes only if the supply (sources) of 
credit, the demand for credit (uses), or both change. 
The sources of funds include personal savings by the households, and 
business savings in terms of undistributed corporate profits (retained 
earnings) and capital consumption allowances. Moreover, the Federal 
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Reserve System can increase the availability of credit through expansionary 
monetary policy including open market purchases of U.S. government 
securities, lowering the discount rate, and lowering the required reserve 
ratio. The government may also be a supplier of credit if government 
revenues exceed its spending. Finally, an inflow of foreign capital would 
increase the supply of credit. 
The users of credit include households who borrow to finance the 
purchase of real estate and consumer durable goods, businesses that borrow 
for investment purposes, and government borrowing to finance the budget 
deficit. 
Interest rates rise in periods of tight credit, if personal and 
business savings decline or when the federal reserve system follows a 
contractory monetary policy. An increase in the demand for real estate 
loans, consumer durable loans, or investment loans would also cause a rise 
in interest rates. 
Moreover, interest rates are also affected by the rate of inflation. 
The inflation rate—a continuous increase in the general price level as 
measured by, say the Consumer Price Index or the Gross National Product 
(GNP) deflator—affects the purchasing power of the dollar. As prices 
increase, the purchasing power of money declines. To protect themselves 
against this decline, lenders of money will attempt to add an inflation 
premium to the pure rate of interest. Since forecasted inflation changes 
from time to time depending on expectations on various economic activities, 
lenders need to make adjustments in the inflation premium and hence change 
the stated nominal interest rates. 
Mortgage rates are determined following the same line of reasoning, 
although in the real world several different mortgage rates are offered. 
Instead of a single market, we can think of several markets each using the 
interaction of supply and demand to come up with a particular mortgage 
rate. 
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A number of specific factors are also responsible for differences in 
mortgage rates. Among others, marketability, taxation, administrative 
costs and differences in risk are important. 
Marketability affects mortgage rates. For example nonconforming 
loans—large loans exceeding the limits for loans that can be purchased by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—have higher rates than conforming loans, since 
they are more difficult to sell in the secondary market. 
Mortgage rates are also affected by taxation laws. State and local 
government bonds—municipal bonds—are usually exempt from federal taxes on 
the earned interest, hence offer relatively low rates. When the funds thus 
generated are used to finance home purchases by individuals,the resulting 
mortgage rates are relatively low compared to conventional mortgages. 
Mortgage loans with longer maturities pose a greater degree of risk 
to the lender due to the higher degree of uncertainty involved in 
predicting a more distant future. For example, the possibility of changes 
in interest rates is larger over a longer period of time. Lender of long-
term funds are, thus, subjected to larger interest rate risk and generally 
require a higher rate of return. Finally, the efficiency of the lender 
will lower administrative costs, thus lowering mortgage rates. 
The interest rate of a real estate loan affects the monthly payment 
of the borrower. As mortgage rates increase, the demand for real estate 
loans tend to decline as people are priced out of the market. 
Subsequently, the demand for real properties may also fall. Moreover, any 
rise in interest rates would cause a decline in the market value of 
mortgages, hence results in capital losses for investors who own mortgages. 
A decrease in mortgage rates on the other hand is the cause of capital 
gains in secondary mortgage markets as their value appreciates. 
The future direction of market-driven interest rates is clearly 
uncertain. It is necessary for a lending institution to estimate future 
interest rates, and their uncertain effect on the volume and pricing of 
loans before any hedging attempts are made. 
4 
In addition to the economic uncertainties involved in interest rate 
changes, there are political uncertainties of when official, federal 
government-administered interest rate changes will be made. With the 
deregulation of the FHA rates, the VA rate is currently the only 
government-administered mortgage rate. Politically inspired interest rate 
actions tend to occur quickly or even lead the market to change the 
interest rates in a direction that favors the consumer/voter. With an 
increase in market rates, the politically managed rates may lag the market, 
creating huge discounts for borrowers of government administered mortgage 
funds. 
Statement of the Problem 
In the 1970s, the level and volatility of interest rates started to 
increase. As a result, savings and loans associations whose assets were 
primarily long-term fixed mortgages, while their deposits were mainly 
short-term, felt a financial squeeze. As rates on deposits increased, 
their profits declined. 
Interest rate risk to the mortgage banker is synonymous with the 
price risk. Price risk is the potential change in the value of the 
mortgage product because of future changes in its sale price. Changes in 
sale prices reflect the movement of long-term interest rates. The primary 
creators of price risk are interest-rate volatility and the uncertainty of 
the future direction, timing, and effect of interest rates. 
A number of strategies were devised to reduce the interest rate risk 
exposure for such financial institutions. Included among them, are 
portfolio insurance, the buy-write strategy, the standby option, and the 
various types of adjustable rate mortgages.' The goals of this study 
include the understanding of basic characteristics of the more popular 
mortgage types available in the market, and the examination of choice 
' For a complete discussion of these and other hedging examples see, 
Kevin Commins, "The Eight Best Hedges," Intermarket. August 1986; 17-23 
determinants for the borrowers of such mortgages. Since these mortgages 
were designed to provide greater flexibility for both borrowers and lenders 
in meeting their needs, the understanding of them may prove useful when the 
hedging demands of the mortgage investors are considered. 
One of the more popular mortgage types for both the borrowers and 
lenders, for different reasons of course, has been the adjustable rate 
mortgage, ARM. The investors in mortgage funds have relied heavily on ARMs 
as a tool of controlling interest rate risk of their mortgage portfolios. 
The second goal of the current study is to present alternative hedging 
strategies utilizing financial futures and options. The structure of each 
market and the empirical results of hedging mortgage portfolios with 
futures and options will be examined. Finally, the above mentioned hedging 
activities will be used as comparison means to analyze the difference 
between the fixed and adjustable mortgage rates. 
The study begins with an in-depth look at alternative financing 
tools, chapter 1 examines the characteristics of each mortgage type, along 
with some advantages to each. An extensive literature review is conducted 
in Chapter 2 to explore the determinants of consumer demand for the two 
most popular choices—the fixed rate mortgage (FRM), and the adjustable 
rate mortgage. The significant borrower and mortgage characteristics that 
may affect a borrower's preferences are identified as, among others, the 
FRM-ARM rate differentials; the level of FRM rates; the relative variances 
of the inflation and mortgage rates; the covariances between additions to 
real wealth and the sources of change in the inflation and mortgage rates; 
the degree of risk aversion; income levels; availability of co-borrowers; 
and the expected housing tenure. Moreover, additional review of the 
literature is conducted in Chapter 2 in an attempt to understand the basics 
of mortgage pricing. The techniques that are commonly employed in pricing 
mortgages are the simulation or the Monte Carlo method and the option 
pricing principles. 
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The study continues with an analysis of alternative techniques 
available to lenders for hedging interest rate risk. Starting with the 
1960s, borrowing short term and lending long term created serious 
financial difficulties for savings and loan associations as well as other 
mortgage lending institutions. One problem was the general upward trend in 
the levels of all interest rates which forced the S&Ls to pay higher rates 
of interest on their deposits while continuing to receive constant rates on 
their long term loans. If an S&L tried to liquidate its long-term loans by 
selling them, capital loans would result since it owned a long asset that 
earns below market rate of interest. Investors would not be willing to pay 
face value for such a loan. The S&L lost whether it chose to keep the loan 
or to sell it. 
Until relatively recently, there was little that S&Ls could do to 
hedge the problem of a yield curve that shifts up or down. The 
introduction of variable-rate mortgages in 1981, however, allowed such 
institutions to better match the maturities of their assets and 
liabilities. On the other hand, they could not at the same time benefit 
from lower interest rates as when they owned FRMs. In other words, as 
market rates declined, the value of the S&Ls asset would not appreciate 
since mortgage rates were also adjusted downward. ARMs eliminated the 
possibilities of capital losses as well as the gains. The risk of owning a 
FRM is then the probability of rising market rates only. The existence of 
such one sided risks would seem to warrant the use of financial futures and 
options in the mortgage market. 
Various types of financial futures and options are thus examined 
including Treasury bond futures in Chapter 4, and options on T-bonds and T-
notes, options on interest rate indexes, and options on T-bonds futures 
contracts in Chapter 5. Moreover, the theory of hedging with financial 
futures is reviewed in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 examines the Black 
options pricing theory. 
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Chapter 6 begins with position diagrams for the basic futures and 
options strategies. These diagrams are commonly used to study hedging 
outcomes, and will be employed here as well to analyze four hedging 
choices; short-futures, sell-calls, buy-puts, and the synthetic futures 
position of selling a call option and buying a put. The return 
distributions for the hedged and unhedged mortgage portfolios are then 
found mathematically and are used for the empirical study of this chapter. 
Mortgage and futures price series for the period 1983-1991, as well as 
option premia for the same period are employed to compare the mean and 
standard deviation of returns for the unhedged position to those of hedged 
portfolios. Chapter 6 concludes by the presentation and discussion of the 
results of the empirical study. 
The second empirical study, performed in Chapter 7, is aimed at 
testing a hypothesis about the difference between the fixed and adjustable 
mortgage rates based on the cost of hedging FRM portfolios with put options 
on financial futures. A simulation study is performed by generating random 
changes in interest rates similar to those faced by the institutions 
holding only ARMs. The results of the hedging alternatives under this 
simulated interest rate environment are presented and discussed in Chapter 
7. 
The examination of the results suggests that put option hedging of 
the FRM provides for a situation similar to hedging the interest rate risk 
by offering ARMs. It is then proposed that since the same function, 
hedging interest rate risk of the FRM, may be performed by either of the 
two strategies, the cost difference between the fixed and adjustable 
mortgage rates should not be higher than the cost of hedging with put 
options on financial futures. The cost of hedging the portfolio with put 
options represents the "conversion cost" of turning the interest rate risk 
structure of the FRM portfolio similar to that of an ARM. The FRM-ARM rate 
differential should not exceed this cost. This hypothesis is tested in the 
last part of Chapter 7 by comparing the difference between the FRM series 
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and a simple ARM constructed as the sum of three-month Treasury bill rate 
and a margin of 1.5 or 2 percent to the cost of hedging the FRM with put 
options. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the results of the study and provides concluding 
remarks accordingly. 
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CHAPTER 2: MORTGAGE TYPES 
The instruments of home financing have undergone a vast evolution. 
In the 1920s and earlier, the available mortgage instruments were of a 
short term nature, with relatively low loan to value ratio of 50-60 percent 
of the total home cost, and were offered at high mortgage rates. 
The arrival of the Great Depression in the early 1930s resulted in 
the crash of the real estate market, and the federal government realized 
the need to stabilize the residential real estate market through 
legislation. The Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933 and the National Housing 
Act of 1934, established private home ownership as a national goal. The 
development of the long-term, fixed-rate, self-amortizing loan as a key 
tool in the revitalization of the American real estate market was led by 
the Federal Housing Administration. The "fixed rate mortgage" thus 
developed served as the predominant financing tool for nearly half a 
century. 
A typical fixed rate mortgage assigns the borrower a certain fixed 
mortgage rate and hence a fixed monthly payment for the life of the loan. 
With each monthly payment, the loan balance declines and more of the 
payment will be applied to the principal rather than interest payment. At 
maturity, the loan balance will be approximately zero. The equal monthly 
payments of a FRM loan are calculated according to the following formula 
L(J:) 2.1 
PMT = 
1 - (1 +  ^J-12N 
12 
where L is the loan amount, i is the annual mortgage rate, and N is the 
term of the loan in years. For example, a $100,000 mortgage loan at 12% 
annual rate and a term of 30 years, requires a monthly payment of $1028.61. 
Total payments after 360 months will be $370,299.60, of which $270,299.60 
is the interest portion. 
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The exact remaining portion of the loan after a number of payments 
have been made may be found using the following formula: 
BAL(k) = [1-(1+ i)k-12N^  
i Ï2 
12 
where BAL(k) is the balance of the loan after the kth payment. In the 
previous example, the balance at the end of the 120 months is $93,417. 
The monthly payment is composed of interest and principal. During 
the early years of the loan, only a small portion goes toward principal 
reduction. In other words, for many years the monthly payment is consumed 
by the interest expense. Since the interest portion is tax deductible, it 
is important to find the exact interest payment every month. This is 
accomplished by multiplying the balance at the beginning of the month by 
the monthly interest rate (i/12). For the example above, the first months 
interest payment is $100,000 x (.12/12), or $1000. Thus only $28.61 of the 
monthly payment will go towards principal reduction. The balance at the 
beginning of the second month will be $99,971.39 and the second months 
interest cost will be $999.71. 
It is important to realize however, that although the loan balance 
remains quite high for many years, no negative amortization occurs because 
each monthly payment does in effect lower the loan balance and eventually 
the loan will be exhausted. 
The key advantage of a FRM is the fact that monthly payments remain 
the same until the loan is paid off. This "certainty" of the future events 
create peace of mind and a sense of ease for the borrower, hence has a high 
value for the borrower in the fixed rate mortgage, entailing a premium. 
Also, as the loan balance declines with every payment, the owner's equity 
in the property rises. Moreover, with declining loan balances, if the 
property appreciates in value, the equity of the home owner increases 
further. Finally, for assumable FRMs, if the mortgage rate is lower than 
11 
the current rates, sale of the property may be sped up and its value may 
increase. 
The major disadvantage of a FRM is that borrowers may not benefit if 
interest rates drop. Due to the high cost of refinancing, obtaining a new 
FRM at the lower rate may not be economical. By the industry standards, a 
drop of at least 2 percent in rates is needed to make it financially wise 
to refinance a FRM. 
The level and behavior of mortgage rates gradually changed until the 
second half of the 1970s, and in the latter years of that decade and early 
80s, tremendous adverse effects were observed. In the 15 year period 
ending in 1979, mortgage rates doubled from 6 to 12 percent, and by 1981 
they had almost tripled to 16 percent. With the high and volatile rates of 
the second half of the 1970s, and the mismatch between assets and liability 
durations of thrift institutions, a financial squeeze was placed on such 
firms. 
Financial institutions involved in mortgage lending could finance 
their long-term fixed interest rate mortgage portfolios with their typical 
short-term deposits as long as long-term rates remained above short-term 
rates. In situations of rising interest rates, however, these institutions 
could face serious financial problems because they have to pay higher 
interest rates while receiving the same fixed rate on their mortgages. 
Moreover, any attempts to sell some of these assets would lead to capital 
losses due to lower value of mortgages resulting from higher interest rates 
(Marshal and Colwell, 1985). 
The volatile interest rate climate resulted in a great deal of risk 
to both borrower and lender. It was common for mortgage rates to move by 
one percent point between the making of a loan application and the time the 
loan was closed. High and volatile interest rates combined with the rapid 
inflation in housing prices, made it all but impossible for effective real 
estate transactions subject to a reasonable amount of risk. A group of 
non-traditional mortgages, collectively called alternative mortgage 
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instruments (AMIs) were then created to cope with the above mentioned 
problems. 
The variable rate mortgage (VRH) was the first flexible-rate mortgage 
to be authorized by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in 1979. Under this 
contract, the mortgage interest rate can be adjusted periodically in 
response to changing market interest rates. This mortgage type eliminated 
the reluctance of mortgage funds lenders to commit their funds for a long 
period of time if they thought market rates were to rise in the future. 
The FHLBB guidelines on VRMs included many of the safeguards 
suggested by consumer groups. The mortgage rates were not to increase by 
more than .5 percent per year, with a maximum increase of 2.5 percent. The 
guideline also required the availability of FRMs and that a comparison 
between the terms of the two mortgage types be available to borrowers. 
Renegotiable rate mortgages (RRH) were the second generation of 
adjustable loans authorized by FHLBB. Popular in Canada and also known as 
Canadian Rollover loans, RRMs are series of short term loans of three to 
five years, secured by a fixed rate mortgage that amortizes the loan 
principal fully over the life of the loan (typically 25-30 years). There 
is, however, a call provision requiring the payoff or renegotiation of the 
loan terms within the 3-5 year period. At that time rates would adjust to 
reflect the current market interest rates. 
The main difference between VRMs and ARMs lie in the size and 
frequency of rate adjustments. FHLBB regulations allow the interest rate 
on a RRM loan to be adjusted no more than 1.5 percent every three to five 
years, and by no more than 5 percent over the life of the loan. This 
mortgage type then has looser rate caps, but allows less frequent 
adjustments. On the whole, both VRM and RRM, however, are consumer-
oriented adjustable rate loans. Lenders, not surprisingly, felt that the 
regulations on both mortgage types did not allow them sufficient 
flexibility in offering mortgage loans. 
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A major reform in the real estate market, in April 1981, was the 
approval of Adjustable Mortgage Loans (AML) for federally chartered savings 
and loan associations by the FHLBB, and the comptroller of the currency's 
authorization of Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM) for commercial banks 
shortly thereafter. The rules governing AMLs and ARMs are quite similar 
and much more relaxed compared to pervious flexible rate mortgages, most 
consumer safeguards applicable to the original VRMs are removed. 
The initial monthly payment of the ARM is calculated in the same way 
as the monthly payment of a FRM. The rate on ARMs, however, is adjusted 
periodically, hence, the monthly payments could increase or decrease as the 
general level of interest rates fluctuate. In some cases, the term of the 
loan as well as the balance increases. 
The interest rate on an ARM is normally determined by adding 2-3 
percent to an index rate chosen by, but not controlled by the lender, and 
verifiable by the borrower to determine ARM rates. The most widely used 
index rates include yield on Treasury securities, cost of funds to S&Ls, 
rates on certificates of deposits, and national average contract interest 
rates for major lenders on the purchase of previously occupied homes closed 
in the first five working days of each month. 
Teaser rates, as the initial contract rates are commonly called, are 
generally lower than the index rate plus the margin. These rates are used 
to attract more borrowers by enabling them to qualify for loans. ARM rates 
will subsequently increase to a level equal to the index rate plus the 
margin after the first year. 
Adjustment of these mortgage rates is limited to once every six 
months, and the adjustment cannot be more than 1 percent per six month 
period. There are no limits on the adjustment over the life of the loan. 
Written notices of any interest rate adjustments must be provided to the 
borrower. 
In an environment of sharp increases in the index rate, most 
borrowers face "payment shocks" which possibly would result in foreclosure. 
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Most lenders agree to impose interest rate or payment caps. The interest 
rate caps limit interest rate changes for each adjustment period. Lifetime 
interest rate caps are absolute rates over which the mortgage rate cannot 
climb. The lender may specify an interest rate floor as well. The rate 
below which the mortgage rate cannot drop over the life of the loan. 
When the new monthly payment subject to interest rate caps is smaller 
than the payment implied by the new contract rate, the new monthly payment 
may not be sufficient to cover interest on the loan. In these cases, the 
unpaid portion of the interest would be added to the loan balance, thus 
increasing the balance despite the payment. This process is called 
negative amortization. Since loans that are subject to negative 
amortization are not accepted for purchase in the secondary market by the 
Federal National Mortgage Association, most lenders set strict limits on 
this practice. For example, there may be requirements to adjust payments 
every five years to amortize the outstanding balance over the life of the 
loan. 
Other features of ARMs are convertability and prepayment penalties. 
Convertability allows the conversion of the ARM to a FRM at predetermined 
dates. Prepayment penalties are zero if the loan is paid off at the time 
the interest rate is adjusted.% 
Compared to FRMs, ARMs have a lower initial rate, and are more 
affordable due to the lower initial monthly payment. Moreover, for people 
who relocate frequently, ARMs are more advisable since they allow the full 
benefit of the teaser rates. Also, ARMs allow borrowers to take advantage 
of lower rates by making lower monthly payments, or by applying some of the 
payment to the principal and lower the unpaid balance. Generally they are 
not subject to prepayment penalties if the loan is prepaid at the end of 
 ^For further analysis of factors that should be considered in 
selecting a particular ARM, see A. 6. Yohannes, "The Professional Desktop 
Guide to Real Estate Finance," Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 
1990: Chapter 7. 
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the adjustment period. Finally, in many cases, points may be lower on ARMs 
compared to FRMs. 
The major disadvantage of ARMs is the uncertainty of the future 
mortgage rate and the monthly payment. In the absence of interest rate 
caps, the increase in monthly payment could be quite substantial. 
Moreover, if negative amortization is allowed, an increase in rates may 
increase both the monthly payment and the loan balance, causing financial 
difficulties for the borrower. 
Although today's real estate market is virtually dominated by the 
above mentioned ARMs and FRMs, there remain several other alternative 
mortgage types designed to suit particular homebuyers. The rest of this 
section is an explanation of such mortgages. 
Graduated payment mortgages (GFH) were introduced by the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development in the mid-1970s. They are aimed at 
allowing families whose income were expected to grow, to qualify for 
mortgage loans. 
GPMs have a fixed contract rate. However, the monthly payments start 
at a lower level than a comparable fixed rate mortgage, and rise during the 
graduation period, according to a graduation rate, to a level higher than 
that of a comparable fixed rate mortgage, and stay there. 
In a variation of the scheme, the lender may establish an overall 
mortgage rate, and a corresponding initial interest rate to calculate 
monthly payments. The initial rate is then increased every year during the 
graduation period by a given percentage, thus increasing the monthly 
payments during that period. 
The main problem with GPMs is that due to insufficiency of early 
payments to cover interest cost, the loan balance may increase, causing 
negative amortization. Some lending institutions have designed GPM with 
sufficiently high initial rates to cover the full interest expense, and 
thus eliminating this problem. 
16 
Graduated payment adjustable rate mortgages (6PARM) combine the 
features of the graduated payment mortgages with those of renegotiable 
mortgages. 
As in a typical GPM, the initial monthly payments are smaller than 
the payments of a comparable level-payment mortgage and rise during the 
graduation period. At the end of the first adjustment period, however, the 
monthly payment could rise by more than the graduation rate, signifying 
higher market interest rates. By the end of the graduation period, any 
adjustment in the mortgage rate reflect changes in market rates. 
Furthermore, every five years, payments may increase to the level 
that allows full amortization of the remaining loan balance over the 
remainder life of the loan. This adjustment is known as the "catch up" 
payment and is established at the time of approval along with the 
graduation rate, graduation period, any caps, and method of annual rate 
adjustments. 
The main advantage of this type of loan to the borrower is the 
relative low initial monthly payment, thus qualifying the homebuyer for a 
larger loan. Moreover, if the note rate declines, the monthly payments 
could go down. And finally, from the lender's point of view, the interest 
rate risk has been largely shifted to the borrower. 
The major disadvantage of GPARMs is the fact that the borrower is 
subject to the risk of interest rate fluctuations. Increase in future 
interest rates could cause increases in monthly payments, which already are 
subject to increase during the graduation period. Negative amortization is 
also a possibility. 
Growing equity mortgages (GEM) allow loans with a higher loan-to-
value ratio be made with fixed interest rates and terms of 25-30 years. 
Although the mortgage rate is fixed, monthly payments increase by a 
predetermined percentage per year for a specified period of time. This 
allows for a more rapid pay-off of the loan, since the increases in monthly 
payments are applied fully to the principal. 
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Since the monthly payments are determined based on the actual 
mortgage rate, the payments are enough to cover interest cost, and no 
negative amortization occurs. So as long as the income of borrower 
increases to provide for higher payments, GEMs reduce the life of the loan 
considerably, thus saving the borrower substantial amounts of interest 
expenses. 
Advantages of GEMs include the certainty about payment amount, since 
the interest rate, the graduation rate, and the graduation period are all 
determined at the time of origination. Also, the borrower qualifies for 
the loan using the first year's monthly payments despite higher payments in 
the subsequent years. Moreover, unlike a GPM, this type of loan does not 
generate negative amortization. Finally, from the lender's point of view, 
the acceleration of equity build up for the home owner which possibly 
reduces the probability of default, and the shorter period of time for 
which their capital is tied up is very attractive. 
The major disadvantage of the GEM is that if the borrower's income 
does not grow as fast as the increase in the monthly payments, default will 
be a realistic possibility. 
Reverse Annuity Mortgages (RAH) are loans which are more or less the 
reverse of fixed rate, level payment mortgages. Specifically, the borrower 
receives the loan in equal installments over a given period of time, and 
then makes a lump sum payment, including principal and interest, at the end 
of loan period. 
This type of mortgage loan is designed to allow people who own their 
homes free, or have a very low outstanding balance on their mortgage to use 
the equity in their homes without selling or getting loans that require 
monthly payments. 
The sum of the new loan, and any existing loans would be a set 
percentage of the appraised value of the home, typically 70 percent or 
less. The mortgage ends if the home is sold, the borrower dies, and in 
some other situations such as the nonpayment of taxes. In case of 
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homeowner death, the lender would collect from the estate of the borrower, 
although arrangements may be made to name the lending institute as the 
beneficiary in the borrowers life insurance contract. 
The advantages of RAMs for homeowners with high equity is to receive 
a limited period annuity that is tax free, while living in their home, and 
taking advantage of its appreciation. Finally, as opposed to refinancing, 
and obtaining second mortgages, the homeowner need not make any payments 
until the term of the RAM ends. 
The major disadvantage of this mortgage type is the accumulation of 
debt. If the owner outlives the mortgage, and there is not sufficient 
equity to guarantee another reverse annuity loan, the house must be sold as 
a means of repayment. For the lender, if accrual method of accounting is 
used, the interest that accrues may be taxable although it is not received 
until the maturity of RAM, since under this accounting method income is 
recognized when it is earned rather than when it is received. 
PricQ level adjusted mortgages (PLAM), introduced in 1982, are 
designed to protect lenders against inflation by adjusting the mortgage 
balance for the changes in the purchasing power of money. If prices 
increase, the balances are revised upward, resulting in higher monthly 
payment. 
In a typical PLAM, the lender requires a real rate of return equal to 
the nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation. The monthly 
payments over the first year will be calculated using the real rate of 
return, and are typically low. If prices remain constant, the loan will 
amortize fully with the real interest rate as the prevailing mortgage rate. 
In cases of rising inflation, however, the loan balance will be revised 
upward by a factor of 1 + the change in price level, thus preserving the 
real value of the loan balance. The new monthly payment is calculated 
using the adjusted balance, the real interest rate, and the remaining term 
of the loan. 
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The PLAM benefits the borrower with its relatively low payment in the 
first year, and the possibility of continuing such low payments if prices 
remain stable. Its advantage for the lender is the protection against 
inflation by maintaining a stable real rate of return on the loan. In 
times of hyperinflation, PLAM could increase the probability of default 
substantially. Due to higher monthly payments, the borrower may have a 
difficult time making the mortgage payment unless his/her income rises 
proportionally. Moreover, although the real rate of return on the loan is 
stable, the riskiness of the lenders portfolio is greatly increased due to 
the possibility of borrower default. 
Shared appreciation mortgages (SAM) are mortgage loans made at low 
interest rates—2 to 3 percent below the current comparable mortgage rates-
-and in return the lender receives 20 to 30 percent of the appreciation in 
the value of the home as "contingent interest" when the loan matures, when 
the property is sold, or at some other specified time. In this manner, 
when the general level of interest rates is high, inflation in the value of 
the property is in part substituted for higher mortgage rates. 
In a typical SAM, the borrower has to put a substantial down payment, 
up to 40 percent of the price of the home, and may be subject to 
substantial prepayment penalties. The life of the loan is typically 10 
years, although it amortizes over a much longer 20 to 30 year period. 
Existence of SAMs, allows many otherwise rejected borrowers, to qualify for 
mortgage loans since it allows much lower monthly payments. The large down 
payment is appealing to lenders by lowering the default risk, and 
uncertainties of interest rate movements are lowered due to shorter terms 
of the loan. 
The disadvantages of SAMs include the borrower's inability to pay the 
"contingent interest" without the sale of the home. If the desire to sell 
before the terms of the SAM exist, prepayment penalties could be very 
prohibitive. Moreover, additions to the property, and home improvements 
pose a problem for computing the portion of the increase in home value is 
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due to inflation and sharable by the lender. Finally, the lender may face 
trouble if the expected appreciation in home prices does not materialize. 
Wraparound mortgages (WH) are those that include, or are wrapped 
around an existing first mortgage. The buyer purchases a property subject 
to an existing first mortgage and gives the seller a wraparound mortgage 
with a face amount larger than the balance on the existing loan. The 
difference between the face amount and the balance is financed by the 
seller, who continues to make payments on the first mortgage but retains 
the difference between the monthly payment on the wrap and the monthly 
payment on the first mortgage. 
This mortgage is used when the interest rate on the existing mortgage 
is lower than current mortgage rates. The seller thus takes advantage of 
the difference in rates by taking back a wraparound mortgage from a buyer 
at an interest rate that is higher than that of the first mortgage but 
lower than that the current mortgage rates. The face amount of the 
wraparound mortgage consists of the balance of the existing loan and the 
amount financed by the seller. Since the interest rate on the wraparound 
mortgage is higher than the rate on the existing mortgage, the seller earns 
extra interest on the existing mortgage. 
The term of the wraparound mortgage is usually the same as that of 
the remaining term of the existing mortgage. The buyer or the wraparound 
borrower sends monthly payment to seller and gets title to the property. 
The seller however is still responsible for making the payment to the 
original lender. 
The advantages of this mortgage type for the seller includes 
facilitating the sale of the property and earning some interest on the 
first mortgage. The buyer benefits by paying an interest rate that is 
generally below the current market rates. 
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CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF MORTGAGE FINANCING LITERATURE 
Chapter 3 is an examination of the mortgage financing literature. 
Such literature includes those exploring the characteristics of the 
borrowers of different mortgage types and those examining the mortgage 
pricing principals. 
The Mortgage Choice 
The literature on mortgage choice includes theoretical studies by 
Baesel and Biger (1980), Statman (1982), Jan K. Brueckner (1986), Donald 
J. Smith (1987) and empirical studies by Dhillon, Shilling and Sirmans 
(1987), and Brueckner and Follain (1988). 
In 1980, Baesel and Biger developed the first theory about the 
determinants of borrowers' choice between fixed-rate and index-linked 
mortgages. As mentioned before, in a fixed-rate mortgage, both the 
interest rate ^ nd the monthly payment are fixed. However, an index-linked 
mortgage is a special kind of adjustable-rate mortgage, in which the 
interest rate is adjusted with the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Baesel and Biger (BB) start their analysis with the effect of 
inflation on mortgage choice. It is argued that the profit gain or loss 
for borrowers and lenders due to inflation depend on three factors; 
mortgage contract rate, inflation rate, and expectations about future 
economy. 
Both borrowers and lenders face uncertainty in real terms, and since 
during periods of rising inflation rate, interest rates are likely to 
increase, borrowers who have locked in lower interest rates will be better 
off. In a recession the opposite is true—interest rate generally fall, and 
borrowers of FRMs will be worse off. Unlike the fixed-rate mortgage, the 
index-linked and the variable rate mortgages allow for the mortgage rate to 
be adjusted in response to a higher rate of inflation. The index-linked 
mortgages are written with both principal and interest payments indexed. 
It requires the borrower to repay sufficient nominal dollars to insure the 
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lender a specified real return on his investment. The variable rate 
mortgages can be adjusted at specified times to offset inflationary 
effects. Thus, both index-linked and variable-rate mortgages eliminate the 
uncertainty and the risk of inflation for the lenders. However, since 
lenders are usually large financial institutions with ownership traded in 
capital markets, they can diversify their portfolios to pass the risks on 
to the market. Hence both fixed-rate and index-linked loans will exist. 
Baesel and Biger make this clear: 
Since the risk characteristics of a firm are determined by the risk 
characteristics of their assets, capital market theory suggests that 
the risks of the alternative mortgage contracts will pass through to 
the market. If the risks of alternative mortgage contracts are 
different, then the yields necessary to allow market ec[uilibrium will 
also differ. In equilibrium, there will not be dominant assets on a 
risk-adjusted basis. The lender should be indifferent between the 
alternative loans as long as the contract rate is appropriate to the 
level of risk.3 
Baesel and Biger, then, focus on the borrowers' preference for index-
linked or fixed-rate mortgages, which is assumed to depend on the 
characteristics of their income stream. The analysis is conducted within a 
single period and under the following assumptions: 
1. Mortgage lenders are specialized companies with common stock 
traded in an efficient capital market. 
2. Lenders offer a fixed rate mortgage at rate "Gl," and a index-
linked mortgage at "G2 = Gl - Z," where "Z" is the constant 
representing the rate differential. 
3. The borrowers are risk averse in the mean-variance sense and 
concerned only with their terminal real wealth "W." 
4. Borrower utility is expected to increase with the expected real 
wealth (W) and decrease with the variance of real wealth. 
5. The uncertain labor income for the period is denoted by "Y." 
Baesel & Biger, "The allocation of risk: some implications of fixed 
versus index-linked mortgages," Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis. June 1980: 458. 
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6. The purchasing power of money is expected to remain constant, 
E(P'') = 1, where, P represents one plus the rate of change in 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Thus, the real wealth of the 
borrower at the end of the period is computed as follows: 
W = Y*P-' - [h Gl* P' + (M-h) G2] 3.1 
Where, "M" is the total amount of the loan; "h" is the amount of the 
mortgage loan given a fixed rate, and 0 < h < M. The impact of h on 
expected terminal real wealth is a constant: 
dE(W)/dh = -Z 3.2 
Considering the inflation risk, fixed-rate mortgages are offered at a 
higher interest rate as compared with the initial interest rate in an 
index-linked mortgage, i.e. Z>0. Thus, h has a fixed negative effect on 
the expected terminal real wealth. However, the impact of h on the 
variance of terminal real wealth depends on borrower's labor income and P'. 
The effects of the expected terminal real wealth of the borrower, E(W), and 
its variance, Var(W), on the choice between alternative mortgages are then 
examined under several cases. 
Case I Nominal labor income is index-linked and certain 
Under this condition, the real labor income, denoted by I, is 
certain. Therefore, the terminal real wealth is 
W = I - [ h ( G2 + Z )•' + ( M -h ) G2 ] 3.3 
The variance of the terminal real wealth is; 
Var(W) = h^  (G2+ Z)^  Var(P') 3.4 
The impact of h on the variance of real terminal wealth is found by 
differentiating the variance with regard to h: 
dVar(W)/dh = 2h (G2+Z)^  Var(P') >0 3.5 
Equation 3.5 shows a positive effect of h on the variance of real terminal 
wealth [Var{W)]. Thus, under this condition, expected real wealth 
decreases with h, but the variance of real wealth increases with h. Since 
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borrowers are assumed to prefer expected wealth and to dislike variance of 
wealth, index-linked mortgages will be chosen. 
Case II Real labor income is statistically independent of P"' 
The real end-of-period wealth is 
W = ÏP' - [h(G2+Z)P-' + (M-h)G2] 3.6 
with variance: 
Var(W) = Var(YP') + h^ (G2+Z)Var(P-') 3.7 
and dVar{W)/dh = 2h^  (G2+Z): Var(P') > 0 3.8 
The result is the same as in Case I, indicating that h negatively relates 
to expected terminal wealth but relates positively to the variance of the 
real wealth. Both effects lead to a borrower's choice of index-linked 
mortgage. 
Case III Real labor income is stochastic but not independent of P'' 
In this case, 
Var(W) = Var{YP') + h^  (G2+Z)Var{p-') - 2h(G2+Z)Cov(yp',p-') 3.9 
and, dVar(W)/dh = 2h(G2+Z)^ Var(P') - 2(G2+Z)Cov(YP',P') 3.10 
The sign of the covariance term is the key for mortgage decision. If a 
borrower expects his real labor income to rise with inflation, the 
covariance term will be negative. As a result, the variance of the 
terminal real wealth will increase with h, indicating a borrower's 
preference for index-linked mortgage. On the contrary, if the real labor 
income is expected to fall as a result of inflation, the covariance will be 
positive. The variance of terminal real wealth, in this case, might rise 
or fall with h depending on the relative signs of the components of the 
derivative. In the case that Var(W) decreases with h, the borrower's 
mortgage choice depends on the trade-off between expected real wealth 
(E(W)) and the inflation risk (Var(W)). This suggests that both fixed-rate 
and index-linked mortgages will exist. 
Case IV Labor income is fixed in nominal terms 
Under this condition, the terminal real wealth is 
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W = YP-' - [h(G2+Z)P-' + (M-h)G2] 3.11 
with Variance: 
Thus, 
Var(W) = [YP' - h(G2+Z)]: Var(P') 
dVar{W)/dh = -2(G2+Z) (YP"' - h(G2+Z) ]Var(P-') < 0 
3.12 
3.13 
h has a negative impact on Var(W), showing that the variance of real wealth 
will decline as the amount of fixed-rate mortgages increases. Since Z>0, 
the expected real wealth (E(W)) will also decline. As a result, the 
borrower's choice of mortgage will again depend on the trade-off between 
these two factors. 
In general, Baesel and Biger suggest that a borrower's choice between 
a fixed-rate and index-linked mortgage depends on the relationship between 
future income and the inflation variable represented by the rate 
differential of the two mortgages (Z). Assuming a borrower prefers 
expected wealth and dislike variance of wealth, if the borrower's future 
income is either fixed or stochastically independent of inflation, he will 
choose an index-linked mortgage. As shown, Baesel and Biger's model is 
particularly concerned with the borrower's cash flow. 
In 1982, Meir Statman expanded Baesel and Biger's study on consumers' 
mortgage choice by taking account of the effect of the home value as well 
as their cash flow. In Statman's view, a borrower's terminal wealth should 
consist not only of his cash flow but also of his equity in the house, 
because mortgages are not necessarily paid out of labor income. When 
interest rate rises, mortgage payments must increase to avoid negative 
amortization. Instead of taking additional mortgage payments out of his 
labor income, borrower may also borrow against his equity to meet the 
increased payments, i.e., securing a second mortgage. Thus, given the 
assumption of no participation in capital markets, "the terminal wealth of 
the borrower is composed of the difference between real labor income and 
real mortgage payments, plus the net (of mortgage) terminal real value of 
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the house."4 The Hypothesis is the same as specified by BB: borrowers 
are risk-averse in the mean-variance sense and concerned only with their 
terminal real wealth, which now includes value of the house (net of the 
mortgage obligation), XP"'.^  
W = YP-' - (hGlP-' + {M-h)G2) + XP-' 3.14 
where, 
W is the terminal real wealth; 
y is the (uncertain) labor income during the period; 
P is one plus the rate of change in the consumer price index, CPI,( 
for simplicity, assuming E(P"') = 1 ); 
M is the total amount of mortgage; 
h is the amount of mortgage loan taken with a fixed rate 0<h<M); 
X is the net terminal nominal value of the house; 
G1 is the mortgage rate of FRM ,fixed-rate mortgages; 
G2 is the mortgage rate of index-linked mortgages (assuming G1-G2 = 
Z, where Z is a constant). 
Statman then analyzes the borrower's utility function to explore the 
determinants of the borrower's choice on mortgages. According to Statman, 
the borrower's utility function is assumed to be in the form of 
U(W) = E(W) - l/2L*Var(W) 3.15 
where L is a measure of risk aversion assumed to be positive. 
Using equation 3.1, this utility function can be transformed as follows: 
U(W) = E(YP') - h(G2+Z)E(P-') - (M-h)G2 + E(XP') -
l/2L(Var(YP-') + h2(62+Z)^  Var(P') - 2h(G2+Z) + 
C0V(YP',P-') + 2Cov(YP',XP-') - 2h(G2+Z)Cov(XP ',P '). 3.16 
* Statman, Meir. "Fixed Rate or Index-Linked Mortgages from the 
Borrower's Point of View: A Note," Journal of Finance and Quantitative 
Analysis. September 1982; 452. 
 ^Recall BB's model; V = WP' - (hGlP' + (M-h)G2). 
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To maximize borrower's utility, the first order conditions are taken for 
the optimal amount to be financed by the fixed rate mortgage: 
dU(W)/dh = -Z - hL(G2+Z): Var(p-') + L(G2+Z)*( Cov(YP-',p-') 
+ Cov(XP-', P')). 3.17 
Setting the derivative equal to zero, the amount of fixed rate mortgages 
is: 
h = -Z/L(62+Z)^ Var(P') + l/(G2+Z)Var(P-') * {Cov(ïP',P') + 
C o v ( X P - ' , P - ' )  3 . 1 8  
Since 0<h<M, if the optimal level of h is below or above M, it will take 
the values of zero or M, respectively. The significant difference of this 
model and BB's model is the inclusion of the term Cov(XP"', P"'). The 
borrowers' preference behaviors were analyzed for the same four cases 
mentioned earlier. 
Cases I and II Nominal income is index-linked and certain or is 
stochastically independent of P' 
The implication of these conditions is that the covariance between 
yp"' and P*' equals zero: Cov{YP"'. P"') =0. If the terra Cov(XP"', P') as in 
BB's model, 
h = Z / L(G2+Z): Var(P') < 0. 
Assuming Z>0, and 0<h<M, the optimal value of h is zero, which means to 
maximize utility, the borrowers choose only index-linked mortgages. 
However, if Cov(XP'', P"') is included in the model and is larger than 
Z/L{G2+Z), then the value of h will be greater than zero, meaning that some 
or all of the mortgages will be at fixed rate. Thus, for cases I and II, 
if borrower expects the real value of the house to decline with inflation, 
his preference for fixed-rate mortgage rises. 
® Second-order conditions for maximum are satisfied, because 
d^  U(V) / dh= = -L(G2+Z)2 Var(P') < 0. 
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Case III Real labor income is stochastic but not independent of P'' 
Under this condition, Cov(YP"', P"') does not equal to zero. A 
negative (positive) sign indicates that a borrower expects his/her real 
labor income to rise (fall) with inflation. When the term Cov(XP'', P"') is 
neglected, a negative sign of Cov(YP"',P"') leads to an optimal h value of 
zero, and borrower's preference of index-linked mortgages. On the other 
hand, if Cov(YP"',P'') is positive and greater than Z/L(G2+Z), h will exceed 
zero, indicating the presence of demand for fixed-rate mortgages. If the 
term Cov(XP"',P.,) is not zero and sufficiently large, a fixed-rate will be 
chosen even if Cov(YP'',P'') is negative. 
Case IV Labor income is fixed in nominal terms 
In this case, Cov(YP"',P'') becomes C Var(P') where C is the nominal 
labor income. Disregarding Cov(YP"',P"') term, if C Var(P"') is larger than 
Z/L(G2+Z), the h value will be greater than zero, implying that at least 
some fixed-rate mortgages will be taken. However, when the term Cov(XP'',P" 
') is included, the results can be different. As stated before, a negative 
Cov(XP',P'') means that a borrower expects the real value of his/her house 
to rise with inflation. If this term is negative and sufficiently large in 
absolute value, the optimal value of h will stay at zero, suggesting that 
only index-linked mortgages will be used. Thus, if the real value of the 
house is expected to rise with the inflation, the borrowers tend to prefer 
index-linked mortgage even if their nominal labor income is fixed. In 
Statman's view, this effect is of special importance, because mortgage 
bankers usually ignore it and judge a borrower's ability to pay the 
mortgage by his labor income. 
In conclusion, Statman emphasizes that borrowers' choice for fixed-
rate and index-linked mortgages depend on the signs of the covariance 
between the rate of changes in labor income and the rate of inflation 
(Cov(YP',P')) and the signs of the covariance between changes in the net 
value of house and the rate of inflation( Cov(XP"',P"') ). 
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Donald Smith's 1987 study extended borrowers' mortgage choice theory 
to include adjustable-rate mortgages. Building on Baseal & Biger and 
Statman's studies. Smith further examines the impact of covariance between 
the real interest rate and, in turn, real income and real asset values on 
consumers' mortgage decisions. This analysis focuses on the directional 
impact the various factors have on the borrowers' choice moving toward an 
all fixed rate or an all adjustable rate contract. The study is based on 
the following assumptions: 
1. A mean-variance expected utility maximizing borrower in a 
single-period framework. 
2. The borrower's objective is to maximize the expected utility of 
end-of period real wealth. 
The equations for calculating real wealth (W) are 
1. For a fixed-rate mortgage: = ÏP"' - FMP"' + XP"'; 3.19 
2. For an adjustable-rate mortgage: W* = ïP"' - AMP"' + XP"' 3.20 
where Y = the borrower's nominal income at the end of the period; 
F = 1 + fixed interest rate; 
A = 1 + interest rate to be adjusted at the end of the period; 
M = loan amount; 
P = price level index at the end of the period; 
X = the proceeds of the sale of the asset financed by the loan. 
The borrower's utility function is assumed to be a simple function of the 
expected mean and variance of real wealth. 
EU(W) = E(W) - LVar(W) 3.21 
where L is the measure of constant absolute risk aversion. The borrower's 
optimal decision depends on which loan contract provides the higher 
expected utility of real wealth. Thus, if EU(W*) - EU{W'')>0, an 
adjustable-rate mortgage will be chosen; if EU(W*) - EU(W'')<0, a fixed-rate 
mortgage will be preferred. If the result is zero, the borrower is 
indifferent to these two mortgages. Adjustable-rate mortgages are tied to 
some reference market interest rate or index of rates. The nominal 
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adjustable rate can be decomposed into the inflation rate and the real 
rate. The focus of Smith's study is to examine the extent to which 
variability in the real rate can affect the borrower's choice between the 
two alternative mortgages. If inflation does not change the reference rate 
in anone-to-one fashion, the real interest rate will vary. Substituting 
3.19 and 3.20 into 3.21 and using the expression for the variance of sums 
of random variables: 
EU(WA) - EU(W'') = E(FP') - E(AP-') + LMFVar(P-') 
-LMVar{AP-') + 2LCov(YP ', AP ') - 2LFCov(YP ', P"') 
+ 2LCov(XP-', AP-') -2LFCov{XP-', P') 3.22 
The first two terms in 3.22 may be written as follows: 
E(FP') - E(AP') = [F - E(A)]E(P-') - Cov(A, P') 3.23 
The rate spread between fixed-rate and adjustable-rate [F-E(A)] is 
positive, and the Cov{A,P') terra in 3.23 will be negative as long as market 
rates and inflation move in the same direction. The result is E(FP'') -
E(AP') > 0. 
The next two terms in 3.22 may be combined as 
LMtVar(FP-') - Var(AP-')] 3.24 
Since the market reference rate is positively correlated with inflation, 
changes in the real rate will be smaller than changes in the inflation 
rate. Thus the variance of the real cost of a fixed rate loan will exceed 
the variance of the real adjustable rate, indicating a positive result for 
equation 3.24. The remaining terms in 3.22 are 
2L[Cov(YP-', AP') - FCov(YP-', P"') + 2L[cov(XP', AP"') -
FCov(XP', P-')] 3.25 
The implications of Cov(YP"', P') and Cov(XP"', P"') were stated in Baesel and 
Biger's and Statman's theories respectively. The impact of variability in 
the real interest rate, which can be tested from term Cov(yP"', AP"') and 
Cov{XP'', AP"') is examined here. A positive covariance between the real 
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income and the real interest rate [Cov(YP"', AP'')>0] shifts borrower's 
preference toward the adjustable-rate mortgage. Similarly, a positive 
covariance between the real asset value and the real interest rate 
[Cov(XP"', AP"')>0] increases the probabilities of ARM loans. 
Smith's conclusion is that borrowers' choice for ARM loans depends on 
a number of factors including: a wide and positive rate spread, increases 
in real income and real asset value due to inflation and real interest 
rates, and a relatively low degree of risk aversion. 
Jan K. Brueckner in 1986 further developed the theory of borrowers' 
choice on adjustable-rate mortgages. In his view, a borrower is faced with 
a trade-off between mortgage cost and interest rate risk in choosing 
between an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) and a fixed-rate mortgage (FRM). 
Since the initial interest rate of an ARM is generally low, it may be 
assumed lower as compared to a FRM. But, the ARM borrower must bear the 
risk of future rate variability. The borrower thus evaluates the market 
trade-off between cost and risk and chooses the mortgage with the most 
favorable combination of these features. 
The coexistence of different types of mortgages in today's market 
indicates that borrowers react differently to the cost-risk trade-off. 
This suggests that individual characteristics play an important role in 
mortgage decision. Brueckner's theoretical study aims to find out how the 
optimal mortgage choice depends on borrowers' characteristics and the 
market condition. 
Brueckner's study includes three parts. First, a price equation 
relating the ARM margin (M) and the rate cap (K) is derived. The equation 
shows that these two parameters are inversely related; a lower margin 
relates to a higher rate cap. This is an indication that lenders are 
willing to lower the ARM margin to secure less interest rate risk. 
The borrower's indifference curve between the margin and the rate cap 
parameters, showing the demand-side trade-off between interest rate risk 
(K) and mortgage cost (M) is then developed. The borrower's mortgage 
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choice will be the optimal margin-cap combination, which is a point of 
tangency between an indifference curve and the price curve. 
Given the choice framework constructed above, a comparative static 
analysis is made about how a change in borrower characteristics influences 
the change in optimal mortgage. The analysis shows that: 
1. Borrowers who place a high value on future consumption prefer a 
tight interest rate cap and are likely to favor FRMs. 
2. Borrowers with rapidly rising income streams prefer a loose 
rate cap and are likely to choose ARMs. 
3. Wealthy borrowers with a higher income level path usually have 
large housing consumption and thus favor tightening rate cap. 
They are likely to be FRM borrowers. 
4. The change in the market environment also has some effect on 
borrower's mortgage decision. If both lenders and borrowers 
expect that the future interest will fall as the case of a 
recession, the optimal rate cap falls, and the borrowers will 
choose FRMs. 
Brueckner and Follain's empirical study of 1988 estimates an 
econometric model of choice between adjustable-rate and fixed-rate 
mortgages. The purpose of the study is to "identify household 
characteristics and variables that are important determinants of the 
probability that a borrower will choose an ARM over fixed-rate mortgage."' 
The data for the study includes a working sample of 475 mortgages in 
1985, 316 of them FRMs and 159 ARMs. This sample is drawn from the 
Residential Mortgage Finance Database compiled by the National Association 
of Realtors. The mean contract interest rates for FRMs is 12.21 percent 
and for ARMs 10.44. The majority of the ARMs are one-year adjustable, the 
rest are six-month, three-year, and five-year adjustable. The average 
' Brueckner & Follain, "The Rise and Fall of ARMs; An Econometric 
Analysis of Mortgage Choice." The Review of Economics and Statistics. 
1988: 93, 
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adjustment period in the sample is 1.29 years. Almost all ARMs have both 
adjustment-period and life-of-loan rate caps, with the average values being 
2.34 percent and 4.98 percent, respectively. 
A borrower's choice between a FRH and an ARM depends on a number of 
factors. The first three factors are a borrower risk aversion, personal 
discount rate for future consumption, and the strength of his/her demand 
for housing. The theoretical background of these three assumptions is 
based on the following beliefs: An individual with low risk aversion and a 
high discount rate can live with the uncertainty of what ARM future 
payments will be and is likely to be an ARM borrower, while an individual 
with a high demand for housing will have a large mortgage loan and is 
highly sensitive to the risk of fluctuating interest rates and thus likely 
to be a FRM borrower. Moreover, when borrowers have dependent children, 
their risk aversion is expected to rise, while their discount rate on 
future consumption is expected to fall in response to concerns with future 
spending, such as college educational expenses. The dummy variable FAMILY 
is then used to represent the three borrower's characteristics: high risk 
aversion, low discount rate and high demand for housing. All three are 
expected to have a negative impact on the choice of an ARM. 
Another key factor is the borrowers' income path characteristics 
consist of the current level as well as the rate of increase in their 
income stream. This is based on Brueckner's conclusions of the previous 
theoretical study that the rate of increase of borrower's income stream has 
a positive impact on ARM choice, whereas the level of increase of income 
has a negative effect. In this model borrower's income (INC) is used to 
measure the level of the income, and the age of the borrower (AGE) is used 
as a proxy for the rate of increase of the income assuming that young 
borrowers have a higher rate of increase of income as compared to older 
borrowers. 
Mobility also plays a critical role on ARM choice. Since borrowers 
with higher mobility usually prepay their mortgage, their interest-rate 
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risks will be much lower than other ARM borrowers, hence mobile individuals 
prefer ARM loans. The variable used in the model,identified as NBWMETRO, 
indicates that the borrower is new to the metropolitan area, and "the 
expectation is that individuals who have moved at least once between 
metropolitan areas are more likely to move again than those who have 
not."^  
In addition, the market interest-rate differential between FRMs and 
ARMS has an important effect on Borrower's mortgage choice. A higher 
differential raises the probability of ARM choice. The variable RATEDIFF 
is used to measure the rate differential. 
Furthermore, the general level of rates tends to have a great impact 
on ARM choice. This hypothesis is based on the fact that in an 
inflationary environment, high nominal rates make the resulting initial 
payments more expensive under FRM. Since ARMs, which require lower initial 
payments, offer a way to ease the liquidity problem, the demand for ARMs 
can be expected to increase with the rise of inflation. The variable 
AFIXRT representing the FHLBB average rate is used as a measure of the 
general affordability of mortgages. 
Another affordability effect on mortgage choice is measured by the 
variable REPTBUYR, which indicates whether the borrower is a repeat 
homebuyer. Since repeat buyers are able to make a large down payment out 
of housing equity, they are unlikely to be constrained by higher payment-
to-income qualification standards under FRMs. On the other hand, many 
first-time buyers may not be able to meet the qualification and thus be 
pushed toward ARMs, REPTBUYR is expected to have an inverse relationship 
with ARM choice. 
Brueckner & Follain, "The Rise and Fall of ARMs: An Econometric 
Analysis of Mortgage Choice." The Review of Economics and Statistics. 
1988: 95. 
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The interest-rate expectations of borrowers also affect mortgage 
choice greatly. Different individual expectation on interest-rate leads to 
different mortgage choice. The problem is that the differences in 
individual expectation are unobservable. Thus expectation effects would be 
related to the error term in the mortgage choice equation. 
Finally, the regional dummy variables NE, NC and SO' are included in 
the model to explain the possibility that consumers in certain parts of the 
country especially prefer ABMs. The eonometric model used is of the form 
Vi = Xi'B - Ei 3.25 
where, 
Xi: A vector consisting of the explanatory variables discussed above 
for observation i. 
B; A coefficient vector. 
Ei: A standard normal error term. 
An ARM is chosen if Vi > 0, Whereas a FRM is chosen if Vi < 0. 
One problem in estimating equation 3.26 is that the sample does not 
reflect the rate on the mortgage not chosen. Therefore, the FRM-ARM rate 
differential actually faced by the borrower is unknown. In order to solve 
this problem, RATEDIFF (rate differential) is estimated using available 
data to correct selectivity bias. The empirical results of their 
estimation of RATEDIFF, however, showed little variation in the FRM-ARM 
rate differential. This is an indication of consistent pricing policies 
within markets. Since the FRM-ARM rate differential is essentially non-
random, the problem of selectivity bias can be ignored. 
The estimated coefficients for both an equation using the 
selectivity-corrected RATEDIFF and an equation without the selectivity-
corrected RATEDDIF suggest the following facts: 
' The transactions are roughly divided among the northeast, north 
central, southern, and western parts of the country. The first three 
regions are represented by the dummy variables NE, NC, and SO. 
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1. The coefficient of RATEDIFF is significantly different from 
zero and positive in sign, indicating that the ARM choice 
probability rises with the increase of FRM-ARM rate 
differential as expected. 
2. The coefficient of AFIXRT also shows a positive relationship 
between ARM choice and the general level of rates. This means 
that for a given rate differential, the higher the general 
level of rates, the higher the probability of choosing an ARM. 
In other words, as the general level of rates rises, mortgages 
in general become less affordable for homebuyers. Therefore, 
the relatively cheaper ARMS become more attractive. 
3. Among borrower characteristic variables, only INC and NEWMETRO 
are statistically significant. The positive coefficient of 
NEWMETRO supports the expectation that intermetropolitan movers 
with high mobility have a higher ARM choice probability. 
4. In contrast to the expectation, the result shows a positive 
effect of the level of income stream (INC) on ARM choice, 
although the strength of the income effect is modest. 
5. All the rest of the variables regarding borrower's 
characteristics are statistically insignificant, suggesting 
that those variables (AGE, FAMILY, REPTBÏR) have little impact 
on homebuyer's mortgage selection. 
6. All three of the regional dummy variables have negative 
coefficients, indicating lower probabilities of ARM choices for 
borrowers in nonwestern areas. 
The above empirical results suggest that the most important 
determinants on mortgage choice are the FRM-ARM differential and the level 
of the FRM rate. An increase in either of these variables leads to an 
increase in ARM choice probability. In addition, mobile borrowers with 
high-income prefer adjustable-rate mortgages, and western borrowers have 
higher ARM choice probabilities than others. 
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Finally, the 1987 empirical study by Upinder S. Dhillon, James D. 
Shilling and C.F. Sirmans examines the impact of pricing and borrower 
characteristics on the choice between fixed-rate and adjustable-rate 
mortgages. The data for Dhillon's study were collected from the Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana office of a national mortgage banker on loans closed in 
January 1984. During this period, the lender maintained a consistent 
policy of originating and selling single-family loans in the secondary 
mortgage market at par. The total sample contains 78 observations with 46 
fixed-rate and 32 uncapped adjustable-rate loans. All fixed-rate loans are 
nonassumable with 30-year maturities. The interest rates on the adjustable 
rate mortgages are tied to intermediate Treasury securities. The frequency 
of interest rate adjustment is between six months and one year. 
The study assumes the interest-rate risk premium can be measured by 
the spread between long- term and short-term securities, and a standard 
probit probability specification. The model to be estimated is 
Pi = Pr(Ii>=I") 3.27 
where 
P; = dependent variable for borrower i that takes the value one if the 
borrower chooses an adjustable rate mortgage and zero otherwise; l, = 
"mortgage choice" index, e.g., the index I, measures the propensity of 
borrower i to choose an adjustable-rate mortgage. 
Variations in I; are explained by the following linear equation: 
li = f(fX, M, YLDfPTS, MAT, AGE, SCH, FTB, FO, MC, SE, MOB, 
PR, mf, LA, STL) 3.28 
where 
FX = fixed interest rate; 
M = margin on the adjustable rate mortgage; 
YLD = the difference between the 10-year Treasury rate less the 1-
year Treasury rate; 
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PTS = the ratio of points paid on adjustable to fixed rate mortgages; 
MAT = the ratio of points paid on adjustable to fixed 
rate mortgages; 
AGE = age of the borrower; 
SCH = number of years of school; 
FTB = a dummy variable of one if the borrower is a first-time 
homebuyer, zero otherwise; 
CO = a dummy variable of one if there is a co-borrower, zero 
otherwise; 
MC = a dummy variable of one if the borrower is married, zero 
otherwise; 
SE = a dummy variable of one if the borrower is self-employed, zero 
otherwise; 
MOB = number of years at present address; 
PR = the ratio of mortgage payments to income; 
NW = net worth of the borrower; 
LA = liquid assets; 
STL = short-term liabilities. 
The coefficients reported in the Dhillon's study are estimated 
probability index changes with respect to changes in the independent 
variables. Since the probability of choosing an adjustable rate mortgage 
is a definite increasing function of the estimated probability index, the 
coefficients do indicate the directions in which the independent variables 
affect the actual probability of taking out an adjustable rate mortgage. 
The results show that: 
1. All the price variables are significant, indicating that those 
variables play a dominant role in the choice decision. For 
instance, the independent variables margin (M) and points (PTS) 
have a negative effect on the choice of adjustable-rate 
mortgages. 
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2. Some classes of borrowers, like households with co-borrowers, 
married couples, and those with short expected housing tenures, 
have a tendency to prefer adjustable-rate mortgages. However, 
other borrower characteristics, such as age, education, first-
time homebuyer and self-employment are insignificant. Taken 
together, individual borrower characteristics have a weak 
influence on mortgage choice. 
3. Holding everything else constant, the effect of variation in 
mortgage payment ratios on ARM choice is insignificant. This 
implies that borrowers "look beyond" initial payments. 
4. The positive sign of variable NW (net worth of the borrower) 
indicates the borrowers with greater wealth tend to prefer ARM 
loans. 
The conclusion is that pricing variables have a significant effect on 
mortgage choice decision. Households with co-borrowers, married couples, 
and short expected housing tenures have the greatest probability of taking 
out adjustable-rate mortgage loans. 
Principles of Mortgage Pricing 
There are two basic methodologies for mortgage pricing. The option 
pricing theory realizes that all mortgage contracts include some option 
elements. FRMs as well as ARMS grant the borrower the option of prepaying 
the loan at any time prior to maturity. Another obvious feature of a FRM, 
and one of the reasons for the popularity of ARMs among lenders, is that 
the borrower can retain the loan if interest rates rise but may refinance 
at a lower rate, a call option, if rates decline. ARMs offer options of 
their own; for example, if the market interest rate increases beyond the 
rate caps on the ARM, the borrower only faces a maximum rate hike as 
dictated by the interest rate caps. The lender, in essence, has granted 
the borrower the "option of not paying the difference between the market 
rate and the cap on the adjustment date for the length of the adjustment 
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period" if the former lies above the cap ceiling.'® Option pricing theory 
is then useful in determining mortgage prices based on the claims given up 
by the lender or the borrower. 
Simulation, or Honte Carlo techniques, employs the known or assumed 
characteristics of changes in interest rates to perform "what if" 
experiments on ARMs with different terms. Different interest rate 
generating processes may be assumed. For example, the mean reverting 
assumption implies that long terms interest rates change at random but tend 
to revert to the mean average. The Wiener process, on the other hand, is 
one in which random interest rate changes, defined in terms of a trend and 
volatility, are generated and simply added to the previous rate over a 
several-year period. Regardless of the rate-generating process, different 
ARMS may be compared by observing their payment and loan balance behavior. 
If, for example, the scenario calls for a substantial upward trend with 
large volatility in interest rates, the ARM with small rate caps may not 
perform well for the lenders while those with more liberal rate change caps 
perform better. Of course, a more liberal rate cap may result in a smaller 
margin or lower initial rate, and the resulting ARM, in turn, will not 
perform well if rates do not rise or rise slowly with little volatility. 
Michael Asay," emphasized the possibility of paying less or more 
than the market rate of interest because of the cap or floor. With some 
simplifying assumptions, he was able to find the price of ARM caps in terms 
of a discount from a simple ARM—an adjustable rate mortgage without caps 
that adjusts completely and quickly to the current index rate. This ARM 
grants no options and has a value equal to the discounted future value of 
its payments. The discount from the ARM with no caps is the "price" of the 
10 Terrence M. Clauretie, "Pricing Adjustable rate Mortgages: A 
Review of Recent Findings," The Real Estate Finance Journal. Spring 1986: 
73. 
" Micheal Asay, "Pricing and Analysis of Common Adjustable Rate 
Mortgages," Mortgage Banking. December 1984: 61-72. 
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cap on a regular ARM- Asay found that a 1 percent annual cap required a 
2.86 percent discount from par. A 2 percent cap reduced the discount by .94 
percent to 1.92. For an ARM with a 1 percent annual and a 5 percent 
lifetime cap, changes in the assumed volatility of rates resulted in 
further discounts. An increase of 1 percent in volatility, from 2 to 3 
percent, resulted in a jump in the discount to 6.15 percent and a 1 percent 
decline in volatility lowered the discount to .37 percent. The volatility 
of interest rates, then, is a primary factor in pricing ARMs. 
As an alternative to a discount from a simple ARM, the caps of a 
regular ARM may be priced in terms of the margin over index, more 
restricted caps demanding a larger margin. With an average life of 
thirteen years and an initial 12 percent interest rate, a 1 percent point 
discount in the ARM price translated to an additional 20-basis-point 
margin. 
Kau, Keenan, Muller, and Epperson*^  focused on the margin required 
by lenders to make the value of an ARM to them equal to its value to 
borrowers. The latter is equal to the loan amount plus the value of the 
prepayment option. They assumed the interest rate was a mean reverting 
process of the following form: 
dr = s.(t - r)dt + (r.dvar)"^  
where t is the long-term interest rate, r is the short-term rate, and s is 
the speed of adjustment. 
After establishing the boundary conditions for the value of the ARM 
components, they followed a simulation experiment to find the optimal 
trade-off of the margin and the annual and lifetime rate caps. For ARMs 
originating at the assumed long-term rate of 12 percent, imposing a 2 
Kau et al., "Rational Pricing of Adjustable Rate Mortgages," 
Journal of American Real Estate S Urban Economic Association. Summer 1985: 
117-128. 
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percent annual cap required a margin increase of 42 basis point from 116 to 
158. Moreover, the placement of a 5 percent life-of-loan cap on a 
previously uncapped loan demanded a 15-basis-point increase from 143 to 158 
basis points. This indicates the lower value of the 5 percent lifetime cap 
compared with an annual rate cap of 1-2 percent. 
Clauretie and Sklar'^  reported the result of a simulation on 10 ARMs 
available in the marketplace at the time the study was done. The ARMs 
varied according to the frequency of rate change, types of caps, first-year 
rates, discounts, and margins. They were tested under four different 
interest rate scenarios based on annual trends and volatility. The authors 
assumed that for each month during a 12-month period, ARM payments were 
invested in a fund earning the conventional rate of interest. This fund 
was added to the loan balance at the end of the period to form the loan's 
terminal value which is turn was used to rank the ARMs. In addition, a FRM 
with three discount points was included and compared with the ARMs. 
The results showed that for moderate upward trend and variability, 
the fixed rate mortgage was quite competitive, it was ranked first under 
two scenarios and fourth in another. Plus, the FRM could also perform well 
for declining rates; the authors, however, only considered low, moderate 
and large upward trend, and omitted the simulation of a negative trend. 
ARMS with no rate change caps, or if the caps were present, with large 
discounts to compensate for the caps, performed consistently well. The 
results confirmed that the lender may profit from trading off the caps for 
less frecpient change intervals. Loans with a combination of annual and 
lifetime interest rate caps and attractive first-year rates performed 
poorly regardless of the interest rate scenario. The poor performing ARMs 
also tended to have low margins and low initial rates in combination. 
T. Clauretie and M. Sklar, "Designing ARMs for Interest Rate 
Uncertainty," Mortgage Banking. May 1985; 23-32. 
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Clauretie^ '* noted that most ARM terms that can be altered to 
increase investment returns, rate caps and frequency of rate change for 
example, also increased the variability of investment performance. 
Discount points and margins, however, may be increased to produce larger 
returns without increasing the variance. He showed that ARMs with above 
average discounts and margins are mean-variance efficient when simulated 
over various interest rate scenarios. Lenders who design the ARM should 
then consider pricing caps in terms of larger discounts and margins. 
Crane and Lea^  reported on the results of two simulation 
procedures. In the first case, the interest rate generating process for 
any period began with the forward rate implied by the yield curve and then 
randomly generated changes were used to adjust that rate. The second 
procedure generated interest rates based on the prior year's rate. The 
authors were able to indicate the discount necessary to equate capped with 
uncapped ARMs from the difference in the present value of the income stream 
generated by each type. The resulting discounts implied by the two methods 
of generating interest rates were significantly different for a 1 percent 
payment capped ARM. The discounts for both the 1 and 2 percent caps under 
the second method were virtually identical to those suggested by Asay using 
the option pricing methodology. 
Buser, Henderson, and Sanders'® employed the standard option pricing 
method to establish an interest rate generating procedure for their 
simulation in an attempt to estimate the discount required for different 
sizes of the lifetime cap. Under a normal yield curve, only 24-28 basis 
T. Clauretie, "ARM'S Investment: Variance and Returns," Mortgage 
Banking. Summer 1986: 45-56. 
Crane and Lea, "Pricing Rate-Capped ARMs," Secondarv Mortgage 
Markets. Summer 1984; 18-24. 
Buser, Henderson, and Sanders, "Pricing Rate Caps on Default-Free 
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages," (Working Paper No. 1525), National Bureau of 
Economic research. Dec. 1984. 
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points were required as the discount for a high variability scenario. When 
the yield curve was assumed steeply rising, high volatility required a 
discount of 555-70 points and moderate volatility demanded 30-40 basis 
point discount. 
CHAPTER 4: FUTURES MARKETS 
In the early 1800s, it was common for farmers to bring their crop to 
centralized markets for sale, where often times they faced temporary lack 
of demand. Within a few months, however, the demand for such products 
would rise considerably above the available supply, thus creating a large 
increase in prices. Such adverse price movements were disruptive to the 
market, and realizing the seasonal nature of the disturbance, traders began 
making contracts for forward or future deliveries. The Chicago Board of 
Trade was founded in 1848, and by the late 1800s, the rules of futures 
trading were formalized by creating standardized futures contracts, and 
establishing rules of conduct, clearing, and settlement. 
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange was started in 1874, followed by the 
Kansas City Board of trade (1856), the Mid-America Commodities Exchange 
(1868), and the New York Commodities Exchange, Inc. in 1933. 
Futures contracts are legal obligations to make or accept delivery of 
a specific commodity at a predetermined time and place. The terms and 
conditions of the futures contracts are nonnegotiable by the trading 
parties, except for the contract price which is determined through open 
bidding on the floor of exchanges. This allows transactions to be 
conducted quickly, and increases liquidity of futures contracts trading. 
The two most general measures of liquidity and depth of futures 
markets are trading volume and open interest. Trading volume is the number 
of contract-unit transactions during a given period of time. Open interest 
is the number of open contracts at any given point in time. 
Futures trading volume is reported as one side only—buys and sells 
are not added together—although the number of contracts bought always 
equals the number of contracts sold- A large volume of trading is a good 
indication of a liquid market. 
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Open interest is the number of contracts which have not been offset 
by an opposite trade, nor settled by delivery at the end of the business 
day. Open interest is also recorded on a one-side basis. 
Interest Rate Futures^  ^
The need for the organized trading of futures contracts on fixed 
income securities was evident after the sharp rise and fall of interest 
rates in 1969-1970, and 1973-1974. Frequent fluctuations in rates since 
1979, have made the advantage of trading interest rate futures quite clear 
and caused a tremendous growth in the volume of trade for such instruments. 
In October 1975, the Chicago Board of Trade began marketing the 
Government National Mortgage Association—Collateralized Depository Receipt 
(GNMA-CDR) futures contracts, followed by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
introduction of 90-day U.S. Treasury Bills futures market. Currently, the 
CBT lists various interest-rate futures contracts including those on O.S. 
Treasury bonds, 5 and 10 year Treasury notes, as well as Municipal Bond 
futures, stock index futures, and most recently (June 11, 1990) 2-year U.S. 
Treasury note futures. 
Treasury bonds are obligations of the United States government to 
make semi-annual coupon payments, along with the lump sum payment of the 
principal at a predetermined maturity date to the holder of such 
securities. All the specifications of Treasury securities, except the 
price, are known at the time of the sale. The price is determined at 
competitive biding to purchase the securities. 
The U.S. government auctions Treasury bills. Treasury notes, and 
Treasury bonds with a specific maturity through the 12 Federal Reserve 
Banks and the U.S. Treasury Department Bureau of Public Debt. Small 
investors, wishing to invest less than $1 million, submit noncompetitive 
The institutional aspects of the interest rate futures contracts 
may be found in "The Treasury Futures for Institutional Investors" and 
"CBOT Financial Instrument Guide" published by the Chicago Board of Trade. 
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bids, agreeing to pay the price established by competitive bidders who must 
specify quantity, and minimum yield to maturity at which they are willing 
to buy. 
The Treasury fills all noncompetitive bids first, and awards the 
remaining issues to competitive bidders starting with the lowest yield 
(highest price). The average of the yields awarded is calculated, and the 
coupon of the newly issued security is set to the nearest 1/8 of a percent 
below the average yield. For Treasury bills, however, the full face value 
must be paid at the auction, with the difference between the face value and 
the average price set at the auction refunded to the purchaser in about two 
days. The interest income for T-bill will be realized when the full face 
value is received at maturity. 
Treasury bills auctions are held weekly, while Treasury bonds and 
notes are sold about once a month. The maturities range from 91 days to a 
year for bills, and two to thirty years for notes and bonds. The size of 
an issue is as much as $10 billion dollars, accounting for the exceptional 
liquidity of these markets. 
Approximately $100 billion worth of government securities are traded 
daily. In addition to the large size of the offerings, the frequency of 
auctions, relative absence of credit risk, and the intense competition 
among government securities dealers, leading to narrow bid-ask spreads, are 
the causes of such high liquidity. 
The secondary market for Treasury securities is a dealer market. 
Security dealers purchase a large sum and a wide array of securities for 
their own account, and with their own capital. They report to the Federal 
Reserve System, and trade either directly with the public, or indirectly 
through a network of brokers. 
The standardized features of the CBT Treasury futures require the 
delivery of the underlying Treasury instrument with a face value of 
$100,000 during the months of March, June, September, and December. These 
months can extend to more than two years in the future. At any given time. 
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several Treasury securities may qualify as deliverable for a CBT Treasury 
futures contract. 
The Treasury bond futures contract stipulates delivery of $100,000 
face value, 8 percent coupon, U.S. Treasury bonds with at least 15 years to 
maturity, or if callable, with at least 15 years to call date. However, it 
should be realized that yields in financial markets are "generally" quoted 
on a hypothetical, 8 percent, 20 year Treasury bond. This information is 
used only for reference purposes, and although 8 percent is used as the 
basis of the CBOT T-Bond futures contract, other bonds with different 
coupon rates may be delivered in to the correlating futures as long as they 
meet contract specifications with regard to minimum time to maturity. It 
is the choice of the short, the seller, to determine which issue to 
deliver, and logic dictates that the short would choose to deliver the cash 
instrument which is most economical.^  
The seller of the futures contract must identify the least costly 
cash instrument to deliver in cases of contract settlements. For example, 
a $100,000 T-bond, with a 12 percent coupon maturing May 15, 2005, has 
greater market value than a $100,000 T-bond with a 10 3/4 percent, maturing 
August 15, 2005. The 12 percent T-bond offers $12,000 in annual interest 
compared to $10,750 received by holding the 10 3/4 percent T-bond. The 
most "advantageously" priced instrument for delivery is known as the 
cheapest-to-dellver (CTD). With a variety of bonds trading at any time, 
with different coupon rates and maturities, the seller has a difficult task 
in identifying the cheapest-to-deliver instrument. The ability to 
accurately compare the cash and futures prices is imperative in making the 
selection. 
For the purposes of comparing the cash and the futures prices, and in 
order to allow the delivery of any outstanding U.S. T-bonds for settlement 
Chicago Board of Trade, "Treasury Futures For Institutional 
Investors," Chicago; CBOT, 1990; page 12. 
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of futures contracts, a "conversion factor" system has been developed by 
the CBOT. A conversion factor represents the price, as percentage of par, 
at which a particular bond or note will yield 8 percent. If the above 
mentioned 12 percent T-bond of May 15, 2005, were to be delivered in March 
1988, a conversion factor of 1.3682 would signify that this bond is 
approximately 137 percent more valuable than the 8 percent futures contract 
standard. Similarly, the 10 3/4 percent bond of August, 2005, deliverable 
in March 1988, is 125 percent more valuable than the contract standard. 
If a futures contract position remained open following the last day 
of trading for this contract, the dollar value of any specific T-bonds to 
be delivered against the open position would be obtained according to the 
following formula, and is termed the "invoice price." 
Invoice Price = Contract Size * Futures Contract Settlement Price * 
Conversion Factor + Accrued Interest. 
Assuming a settlement price of $80,000 or 80 percent of par for March 
1988 T-bond futures contract, the invoice price of the 12 percent, May 
2005, T-bond would equal $109,465, ($100,000 X .8 X 1.3682) + accrued 
interest . Cash equivalent price of a futures contract, or adjusted futures 
price, is determined by multiplying the futures price by the appropriate 
conversion factor, i.e., invoice price without regard to accrued interest. 
Conversely, when the cash price of any deliverable bond or note is divided 
by its appropriate conversion factor, the resulting price is called a 
futures equivalent price or adjusted cash price. 
The conversion factor for an 8 percent bond is approximately one. 
The eligible instruments for delivery, with a coupon lower than 8 percent, 
have a conversion factor of less than one, signifying the discount. 
Similarly, T-bonds with a coupon of more than 8 percent, show a premium 
over par by a conversion factor which is greater than one. Since invoice 
prices incorporate conversion factors, they will also reflect any premiums 
or discounts. 
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Chicago Boards of Trade Treasury futures contract prices are quoted 
in points, as a percentage of par value. The minimum price increment is 
called a "tick", and is equal to one thirty-second of one percent or $31.25 
(1/32 X .01 X $100,000). A T-bond future contract priced at 91-10 
indicates a dollar value of 91 10/32 percent of par or $91,312.50 (.91315 X 
$100,000). A 5-year T-note futures contract quoted at 85-06 has a dollar 
price of $85,187.50. 
Through the conversion factor system, a general relationship between 
the cash price and its equivalent futures price is established. This is 
critical in determining the cheapest-to-deliver instrument in cases of 
settlement. Specifically, the price of the futures contract approximates 
the price of the cheapest-to-deliver cash instruments if its coupon were 8 
percent while holding its maturity and yield constant. In other words, 
throughout its life, a futures contract tends to track the adjusted cash 
price of the cheapest-to-deliver instrument. In reality however, there is 
a price differential between the two. The difference between the cash 
price and the futures price of the same instrument is known as the basis. 
It is an important concept because basis changes tend to be more stable 
than changes in either cash or futures prices. 
The basis can be either positive, signifying an excess of cash over 
futures price, or negative in cases where cash price is lower than the 
futures price. Theoretically, the basis should equal "the cost of carry." 
Assuming that financial market participants finance a cash position by 
borrowing at the short term rates, and lock in a selling price by writing 
futures contracts, the difference between interest received from coupon 
payments and the short term financing rate is the net financing charges to 
hold the cash position. 
If the investor earns more interest income on the cash bond then he 
paid to finance it, he experiences a net interest income or "positive 
carry." The difference between adjusted cash price and the futures price— 
the basis—is thus also positive. Positive carry is characteristic of an 
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upward slopping yield curve, where long term rates are higher than short 
term rates. In a positive interest rate environment, thus, cash prices 
exceed futures price. When the observed yield curve is inverted, there is 
negative carry due to excess of long-term over short-term rates. The 
investor would be spending more on a net basis to finance the purchase of 
the cash instrument, hence, the futures price would be higher than cash 
price. 
The Theory of Hedging with Financial Futures 
With the understanding of the basics of futures markets and 
specifications of Treasury securities futures contracts, the next step is 
to analyze hedging opportunities in the mortgage markets offered by 
interest rate futures. 
Futures markets provide several advantageous possibilities for 
hedgers. Among them are continuous trading on an exchange floor, firm 
prices displayed instantaneously, immediate offsetting positions available 
without any need to renegotiate terms of the commitment, a narrow price 
spread between bid and ask prices for most futures contracts (typically 
1/32 of 1 percent), and the existence of a clearing house to insure 
satisfactory settlement of contracts. 
Working^ ' suggests that futures markets have traditionally been 
viewed as speculative markets. The hedging function of the futures markets 
was regarded as a useful by-product. To many people, however, the hedging 
function of the futures market is what is desirable and appealing. Any 
individual facing a price risk—the risk that the value of a cash position 
will change from its current level—may consider the hedging benefits of 
the futures markets. 
Hedging classification schemes are either based on the hedger's 
purpose or based on the hedger's choice of hedging instrument. A direct 
Halbrook Working, "New Concepts Concerning Futures Markets and 
Prices," American Economics Review. Fall 1965: 434-436. 
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hedge is a hedge in futures of the same commodity as the hedger has a 
current or anticipated cash position. A cross hedge is a hedge in the 
futures of a different, but related commodity. The criteria for judging 
the "sameness" of the asset may be the grade, the quantity, or the time of 
delivery. 
There are several types of hedges in the futures markets, of which 
three are more important in application to financial markets. A selective, 
or discretionary hedge, is part hedge and part speculation. Its primary 
purpose is to prevent large losses in the value of commodity stocks, or 
cash financial instruments, by attempting to forecast the direction of 
price. An expected decline in price is motivation for placing a full 
hedge, while expectations of higher prices would encourage investors to 
lift all or portions of their short hedge to benefit from a rise in the 
value of their asset. In other words, the motivation of hedging is not 
risk avoidance in the strict sense, but avoidance of loss. 
The second type of hedge used in financial markets is the risk-
avoidance hedging, often called an "insurance hedge." This type of hedge 
is undertaken to avoid any changes in the market value of the cash 
position. To protect themselves from adverse price or interest rate 
fluctuations, commercial interests typically sell a quantity of futures 
sufficient to hedge their full inventory, thus this hedge is often 
"complete." 
An anticipatory, or forward pricing, hedge is undertaken to "lock in" 
and protect a cash position that is expected to be taken in the future. 
For example a bank planning to borrow funds in six months might sell a 
financial futures contracts to lock in its future borrowing rate. To the 
extent that interest rates and futures prices move inversely, an increase 
in the cost of borrowing caused by higher rates would be offset by the gain 
from purchasing the futures contracts at a lower price than it was 
originally sold. 
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Successful hedging strategies to reduce exposure to interest rate 
risk using financial futures requires the hedgers to first determine the 
exact dollar amount of the position to be hedged. Then an appropriate 
futures contract has to be selected to minimize basis risk; the number of 
contracts needed to provide a full hedge must also be determined. Then the 
buy or sell in the futures markets would be executed, with a reversal of 
the position at the end of the hedging horizon. 
The most important step in successful futures hedging is to devise a 
way to manage the differences in cash and futures price movements, commonly 
called basis risk. This occurs due to different price sensitivities 
exhibited by the futures and cheapest-to-deliver instruments with regard to 
yield changes. Minimizing the basis risk is achieved through the use of 
the appropriate hedge ratio, also called the cash-futures equivalency 
ratio. The hedge ratio represents the number of futures contracts 
providing a desired change in the value of the futures position when the 
value of the cash position changes. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show graphically 
the cases of a perfect and a partial hedge using futures contracts. 
In case of a perfect hedge, the seller of the futures contracts fully 
offsets any changes in the cash position when price movements affect his 
securities portfolio. Similarly an investor who has a short position in 
the security market may fully protect his position by buying the 
appropriate number of futures contracts. A partial hedge on the other hand 
would protect the long or short cash position only partially. Thus, 
choosing the best futures contract and the correct number of such contracts 
becomes essential in futures hedging. 
In choosing the appropriate futures contracts as the hedging 
instrument, the hedger must determine the price correlation between the 
futures and cash instruments, as well as the hedging time horizon, the 
contract option months, and the liquidity of the futures contract. 
If the hedger expects that a change in the market value of the cash 
instrument to be offset by an opposite change in the price of the futures 
54 
Value of Cash Position 
Long Cash Position 
Short the Equivalent Number 
of Futures Contracts 
No Eb^ sure in Long Cash Position 
Value of Futures Position 
Figure 4-1. A complete hedge using futures contracts 
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Value of Cash Position 
Long Cash Position 
/ Partial Exposure in 
/ Long Cash Position 
Short a Fewer Number of 
Futures Contracts 
Value of Futures Position 
Figure 4-2. A partial hedge using futures contracts 
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market instrument, the magnitude of the change in values relative to one-
another must be examined. Regression analysis may be used to determine the 
correlation of the futures price movements to the yield, or price changes 
in the cash market. The "best" or the most closely related futures 
contracts will then be identified. The regression coefficient may also be 
used as the appropriate hedge ratio. This subject is further examined in 
Chapter 7 and is used to determine the hedge ratio when attempting to use 
T-bond futures contracts to hedge changes in mortgage values. 
In addition to regression coefficients mentioned above, other formal 
methods exist to determine the appropriate hedge ratios. They include 
conversion factor weighing, basis point value weighing, and duration 
comparisons. 
Conversion factors, as measures of relative price sensitivity of the 
cash instrument to the futures contract, may be used as equivalency ratios. 
For example, the conversion factor used in an earlier example (1.3682 for a 
12 percent bond maturing in May 2005) signifies that price sensitivity of 
cash instrument is approximately 136 percent of the futures price 
sensitivity. So the conversion factor shows how many futures contracts are 
needed to hedge $100,000 face value of the cash position. Inherent in this 
analysis is that the cash instrument being hedged is the cheapest-to-
deliver into the futures contract. If not, the futures contract is tracing 
one bond, while the conversion factor is adjusting for the volatility of 
another. The result is basis point risk. 
A basis point value, BPV, is the change in price of a debt instrument 
resulting from one basis point change in the yield of that instrument, 
holding maturity constant. Thus, the hedge ratio is calculated as the 
ratio of basis point value of cash security to basis point value of the 
futures contract. This ratio, thus, provides us with the change in cash 
instrument price relative to the change in futures contract price. 
A point of concern in calculating basis point value of the futures 
contract is the familiar assumption that the futures contract price tracks 
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the price of the cheapest-to-deliver cash security. As a result, the BPV 
of the futures contract is simply the BPV of the cheapest-to-deliver 
instrument divided by its conversion factor. 
Duration is the weighted average of the present value of all the cash 
flows, with years of cash flow used as the appropriate weights. 
Alternatively, duration may be defined as weighted average time until cash 
flow payment, using the present value of cash flows as the relevant 
weights. Regardless of which definition is used, duration is a means of 
comparing interest rate risk between securities with different coupons and 
different maturities. As the maturity of a bond increases, duration also 
increases. Similarly a decrease in the yield of the security, lower coupon 
payments,and less frequent cash flows increase duration. 
Duration represents the price sensitivity of a security to changes in 
yield, with higher duration representing a riskier bond. If there is an 
expected change in the discount factor (yield), the understanding of the 
concept of duration, and the effective use of it, may help the investor in 
choosing the correct security to purchase. For example, the duration of a 
14 percent bond with maturity of seven years is 4.99 with the assumption of 
discount factor of 8 percent. Similarly, a 7 year, 7 percent coupon bond, 
yielding 8 percent has a duration of 5.61 years. If there is an expected 
rate increase, the 7 percent bond should be avoided due to its relatively 
higher interest rate sensitivity. 
Since duration measures the percentage change in price of a security 
in response to a given percentage change in yield, knowing the duration and 
the change in yield, the change in price of that security may be 
calculated. 
After identifying a series of futures contracts, the hedging time 
horizon needs to be examined. A portfolio of securities with 1 year to 
maturity may best be hedged using T-bill futures, whereas portfolios of 
longer duration should be hedged with T-note or T-bond futures. 
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Liquidity and contract month are closely related, and must be 
considered next. Generally, the more distant months in the futures 
contract are much less liquid than the nearby months. The use of nearby 
months, thus, provides more liquidity, and also allows for rolling the 
position forward thus provide for hedging of long term risk. 
She Hedger as A Utility Haximizer 
The analysis of how large a portion of the cash market a hedger would 
choose to hedge may be studied in the utility maximization framework.^ " 
Suppose, as a consequence of decisions made at time t, an investor 
anticipates acquiring q^ y quantity of cash instrument in time T. The cost 
of the instrument at time t is denoted c(q„ ^ ), and x^  ^represents the 
quantity of output hedged in time t by selling T-bond futures. The 
investors overall profit at time T, denoted by II, is given by 
n, = PT • (q^T - x^t) + (*T + V) • *t.T - c(q^T) 4.i 
where is the investor's revenue from an unhedged unit of the instrument, 
and + F,j represent investor's revenue from a hedge unit of the assets. 
$T denotes maturity basis, which by definition is Py - Fx.t» Thus, the 
first term on the right hand side is the revenue from the unhedged portion 
of output, the second term is the revenue from the hedged portion of the 
output, and the third term is cost. 
Then, 
E,(nT) = E,tPT] • (q,,T - X^T) + (E(®T) + F^T) ' X..T 4.2 
- c(q^ T) 
Var,(nx) = Var^ P?) ' (q,,T " + Var,{*,) • x^ j 
+ 2 • (q,,T - x,.T) • • COV(Pt, «J) 4.3 
John F. Marshal, "Futures and Options Contracts, Theory and 
Practice," Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing Co., 1989. 
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where EXHy) is the expected terminal profit and var,(II,) is the variance of 
profit. 
Assuming that the basis has a mean of zero for all terminal values of 
spot price, E,(4,) = 0 for all Pj, implies that cov^ Py, «j) = 0, and 
®t[^ T,T] ~ ' Then, 
E,(nT) = E,(FT.T) • (g^T - Xt.T) + F|.T • Xt,T " (=(%.?) 4.4 
Var,(nT) - Var,[PT] * (q,.T - + Var,(®,) • x?,t 4.5 
rearranging terms in equation 4.4 yields 
E,(nT) = E,(Ft,t) • q,,T - (E,(Ft,t) " F,.t) ' x,.t " c(q..T) 4 .6  
Assuming that there is a cost to hedging, E(Fx_t) ~ F^ T>Of and the 
basis risk is less than the price risk, we can graph the relationship 
between E^ Hj and and the one between Var(II,) and X^ Tf Figure 4-3 and 
the one between Var (11^  ) and Figure 4-4. In graphing these 
relationships, we assume that Var^ P?), Var,($,), E^ FTj), q^ x» and c(q^ T) 
are held constant. 
The above two graphs can be combined to show the relationship between 
the producers expected profit, EXHy), and the variance of profit as shown 
in Figure 4-5. 
Figure 4-6 shows that the optimum profit-risk trade-off may be found 
by overlaying the risk-return indifference map and Figure 4-5. We may then 
refer to Figure 4-3 or 4-4 to find the size of optimal hedge, denoted by 
X,T amount of time T-delivery futures at time t. 
Next, if F,t were to decline so that the cost of hedging {E,(Fx,t)-F,,t) 
were to rise, expected profit would fall while the variance of profit would 
not change. As a result, the profit/risk curve of Figure 4-6 pivots 
downward, thus increasing the amount of risk. Comparison of points M and 
M', in Figure 4-7 show that the amount of the instrument that the producer 
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(Profit) 
t,T 
Amount of Output Hedged 
Figure 4-3. Expected profit as a function of quantity hedged 
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Var (profit) 
1 1 
! 1 
1 ! 
t^,T 9t,T 
Amount Output Hedged 
Figure 4-4. Variance of profit as a function of quantity hedged 
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Fully Hedged 
Variance (profit) 
Figure 4-5. Profit/risk trade-off as a function of quantity hedged 
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Ej. (Profit) 
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•n 
Profit/Risk Line 
Variance (profit) 
Figure 4-6 The optimal profit/risk trade-off for a risk-averse utility 
maximizer 
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New Profit/Risk Line 
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Figure 4-7. The profit/risk line when cost of hedging increases 
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has chosen to hedge declines which makes sense in lieu of higher hedging 
cost. 
If the cost of hedging is zero, the profit/risk curve would be a 
horizontal line. Figure 4-8. In such a case, all risk-averse producers 
would hedge their entire output. 
Johnson^ ' showed that basis risk and price risk are related 
according to the following equation 
Var ($T) = (1 - PP.F) ' VarJPT) 4.7 
where Ppp is the correlation coefficient between Py, and and Pp_p is the 
coefficient of determination, and shows the effectiveness of hedge. For 
example, a Pp.F = 1 implies a perfect correlation between spot and futures 
prices, and basis risk is zero, hence the hedge is perfectly effective. 
If the effectiveness of the hedge increases, the variance of the 
profit would decline in response to the decline in the variance of the 
basis (equation 4.6). The profit/risk thus pivots upward, as shown in 
Figure 4-9, with the resulting optimal hedge at point M". Since the new 
optimal hedge has a higher expected profit, the amount of hedge has 
declined. In other words, as the hedge becomes more effective, the 
investor requires less of it for the desired level of risk reduction. 
L.L. Johnson, "The Theory of Hedging and Spreading in Commodity 
Futures", Review of Economic Studies 27, No 3: 139-151. 
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Variance (Profit) 
Figure 4-8. The optimal quantity hedged when hedging is costless 
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Figure 4-9. The optimal quantity hedged when hedging effectiveness 
increases 
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CHAPTER 5: THE OPTIONS MARKETS 
Chapter 5 is composed of two sections. First, various options market 
instruments, including Treasury bond and Treasury note options, options on 
financial futures, and options on interest rate indexes, will be 
introduced. Then, the Black's options pricing theory on financial futures 
will be discussed. 
Options Markets Instruments 
A T-bond option^  contract covers $100,000 principal amount of a 
specific issue of the two or three most recently issued bonds with 
approximately 30 years to maturity. These options are generally introduced 
for trading two business days following the auction of the particular T-
bond, and have four consecutive monthly expiration dates following the 
auction month for the underlying securities. Trading of options on a 
particular issue will be replaced by options on more recent and hence more 
liquid Treasury bonds of the same type. 
T-bond options strike prices bracket the current market price of the 
underlying security at intervals of 1/2 point, ensuring the existence of a 
near-the-money option at all times. Moreover, strike prices generally will 
cover an interval at least two points above, and two points below an 
issue's current market price. However, with low volatility of interest 
rates, a one-point strike price interval could be set, and with increased 
volatility, the interval could be expanded to four points above and below 
the security's market price. 
Premiums for options on T-bonds are quoted in terms of points and 
32nds of a point, with minimum fluctuations of 1/32 of a point. Each point 
is equal to one percent of the underlying amount (.01 x $100,000 = $1,000). 
Thus, the minimum fluctuation equals $31.25 (1/32 x $1,000). For example. 
For a more detailed discussion of the institutional aspects of T-
bond and T-note option contracts see "Understanding Treasury Bond and Note 
Options" published by the Chicago Board Option Exchange. 
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a quote of 3.04 equals $3,125.00 (3 4/32 x $1,000). If exercised, 
settlement of these options occurs on the second business day following 
exercise. This allows market participants to cover positions in the cash 
market as the option on T-bonds is based on a specific issue concept. The 
only deliverable security is the one carrying a particular rate of 
interest, maturing at a specific time. 
I-note options contracts are very similar to options on the bonds in 
characteristics and uses. The underlying securities are specific issues of 
the most recent 5 year Treasury notes of $100,000. Strike prices are set 
at one-point intervals as percentage of par and bracket the current market 
of the individual issue. Expiration is generally in the two nearby months 
on thé March quarterly cycle (March, June, September, December), and final 
settlement is the Saturday following the third Friday of the expiration 
month. Premiums are stated in points and 32nds of par, with minimum of 
1/32. 
Options on financial futures contracts^  ^are written on a debt 
security futures contract as the underlying asset, rather than the debt 
security itself. Trading of options on Treasury bond futures began in 
October 1982, on the floor of the CBOT, and was followed by the 
introduction of options on T-note futures in May 1985, and options on 
Municipal Bond Index futures in June 1987. 
The trading unit for the CBOT options on U.S. Treasury bond/note 
futures is a $100,000 face value CBOT U.S. Treasury bond/note futures 
contract of a specified delivery month. The long investor in T-security 
futures option may exercise the option on any business day prior to 
expiration by notifying the clearing corporation who in turn assigns the 
notice to an option writer through its clearing members. A futures 
position is thus established for the options buyer (long futures position 
See "CBOT Financial Instruments Guide" for more of a detailed 
discussion. 
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for call buyers and short futures for put holders), and an opposite futures 
position for the seller at the futures option strike price. After 
exercise, the investors may liquidate the futures position immediately or 
at a later time, and they also may hold the contract until expiration and 
make or accept delivery. 
T-bond futures options strike prices bracket the current T-bond 
futures contract price at integral multiples of 2 points, while strike 
prices are set at intervals of 1 point per T-note futures contracts. The 
trading months for futures options are the same as those for CBOT T-bond/T-
note futures contracts, March, June, September, and December. Premiums are 
stated in points and sixty-fourths of a point, with minimum price 
fluctuations of one sixty-fourth of a point or $15,625 per contract 
($100,000 X 1/64%). A price quote of 3.04 for an option on T-bond futures 
contract, thus, equals $3,062.50. 
Critics of futures options point out that investors in such 
instruments are twice removed from the cash market, making hedging 
strategies more complex compared to options on cash instruments. However, 
when it is advantageous to exercise options on Treasury futures, investors 
move from one leveraged position to another. While exercising the option 
on bonds requires payment of the full market price of the security in cash, 
the exercise of a security futures option requires only margin money to 
establish the futures position. Furthermore, protection continues through 
the futures position even after the option on futures is exercised. 
Other advantages of options on futures over options on cash bonds 
include the availability of an array of deliverable bonds against a futures 
contact versus the specific bond issues deliverable against a T-bond 
option. Moreover, the underlying asset for futures options is extremely 
liquid, and premiums for such options reflect the competitive, continuous 
pricing of T-bond futures. Finally, futures contracts, and options on 
futures are traded on the same floor whereas cash securities and options 
written on them are not. 
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Options on interest rates, introduced by the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange on June 23, 1989, are "cash settled, yield driven" instruments 
which provide another alternative for traders in financial instruments in 
terms of hedging and speculative activities. These options are based on an 
underlying composite value which is calculated using interest rate yields 
rather than security or security futures prices. Moreover, delivery of 
bonds, or bond futures is not necessary in cases of exercise, as options on 
interest rates are settled in cash. The contract size is the same $100 
multiplier as options on equities and stock indexes, and are only to be 
exercised at maturity, unlike other financial options. 
The short-term rate option is based on the yield of the most recently 
auctioned 13-week Treasury bill, while the options on long-term interest 
rates are based on the average yield to maturity of the two most recently 
issued 7, 10, and 30-year Treasury securities. The value of the composites 
are 10 times the underlying Treasury rates, T-bill rates for the short-term 
interest rate options, and the average of the six longer-term notes and 
bonds for options on long-term interest rates. An average yield-to-
maturity of 10.55 percent would place the long term composite at 105.5, and 
an annualized yield of 7.5 percent on newly issued 13-week Treasury bills 
translates to a composite value of 75.00. When the Treasury rate changes 
one point the composite changes by a multiple of 10, or 10 points. 
The strike prices of interest rate options are set at 2 1/2 point 
intervals to bracket the current value of the composite. Each interval 
represents 1/4 of one interest rate percentage point, or 25 basis point. 
Strike prices represent the underlying interest rates, a strike price of 
97 1/2 represents 9.75 percent interest rate. 
Exercise of an interest rate option gives the holder the cash 
difference between $100 times the strike price and that day's closing 
composite value multiplied by $100. For example, if interest rates average 
to 9.75 percent at expiration, the holder of a call option on interest 
rates with strike price of 92 1/2 would exercise the option and receive 
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$500, the difference between the current composite and the strike price (97 
1/2 - 92 1/2 = 5) times $100. If the composite closes below the strike 
price of a call, or above the strike price of the put, the option would 
expire unexercised and the holder would lose any premium paid. 
Premium for interest rate options are quoted in points and fractions 
with a minimum fraction of 1/16 if the premium is below 3 points, and a 
minimum of 1/8 for all other premiums. Each point equalls $100; a premium 
of 6 3/8 is thus equal to $637.50. Because interest rate options are 
yield-driven, a change in the yield of the underlying Treasury security 
changes their value. Specifically, a rise in the 13-week Treasury bill 
rates or in the average of the 6 long term rates would increase the value 
of the short term and the long term interest rate options respectively, 
while lowering the premiums of the corresponding put options. 
Options Pricing Theory^'* 
The theory of pricing options on futures contracts is derived by 
Black (1976), based on the Black-Scholes stock option study of 1973. Under 
certain assumptions, the value of futures options will depend on the price 
of the futures contract and variables that can be taken to be known 
constants such as options exercise price, time to maturity, risk free rate 
of interest, and variance of the fractional change in the futures prices. 
The major assumptions of the Black model are: 
1. The markets for futures and options are frictionless, i.e., 
there are no restrictions on short sales, no transactions 
costs, and no taxes; 
2. the risk-free rate of interest is known and constant over the 
life of the option; 
The extent of literature on option pricing is vast. See the 
"Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities" by Fisher Black and Myron 
Scholes. Also, "Option Pricing: A Review," by Clifford Smith, Jr. are good 
references. 
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3. the fractional change in the futures price over any interval is 
distributed log-normally with a known variance which remains 
constant over the life of the option; 
4. the option can only be exercised at maturity (European type). 
It is then possible to create a hedged position whose value will 
depend only on time and the values of known constants by taking a long 
position in the option, and a short position in the futures contracts. 
Denoting C(F,T) as the value of the European call option expressed as a 
function of futures price, F, and time, t, in order for the hedge to be 
riskless, the hedger must adjust the position continuously by holding a 
number of contracts equal to 1 / (3C/3F)^  for every futures contract sold 
short. Moreover, since futures contracts are settled daily with gains 
added to the trader's account and losses deducted from his/her account, the 
value of the futures contract is reset to zero each day. The value of the 
equity of the hedged position is then just the value of the option. 
The change in the value of the hedged position over the time interval 
At is: 
9 C 
Ac - • AF 5.1 
3~F~ 
where Ac = C(F + AF, t + At) - C(F,T) 5.2 
Assuming that the short position is continuously adjusted, Ac may be 
expanded by the use of stochastic calculus: 
fid 9 
Ac = - AF + 2 ^ ^ • F^ At + - At 5.3 
dF 2 dF'dt dt 
 ^The Black model assumes continuous adjustment of the hedge at zero 
cost. In order for the hedge to be riskless, the change in the value of the 
position must be zero; thus the hedge ratio is H = 3C/3F, since an 
instantaneous unit change in the futures price causes change in the price 
of the call option of this magnitude. There is no theoretical 
justification for assuming that H is constant at alternative values of F, 
so, as the price changes, the hedge ratio must be adjusted to keep H equal 
to 9C/3f. 
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substituting 5.3 into 5.2, the change in the value of the hedged position 
is: 
dc dC - 3^ c 2 2 
AC - -F = • AF + ® • a F At + - At -
~3f~ ~SF~ 2 ôFat ~3t~ 
dc 2 3C 
1 d C 2 2 
AF = • a F At + • At 5.4 
dt 2 dFdt dt 
Since for a riskless hedge, the value of the equity must equal the value of 
equity time rAt, 
1 d^ C 2 2 
_ ° ^ • a F At + • At = CrAt 5.5 
2 aFgt at 
Solving 5.5 for dC/dt yields the following differential equation 
= Cr - 1  ^° pZ 5.6 
at 2 aFat 
with C(F,T) = Ft- E if Fx > E 5.7 
= 0 if Fx < E 
as the boundary conditions, i.e., if the futures price, F^ , is greater than 
the exercise price, E, the option holder may attain monetary gain by 
exercising the option and buying the futures contract below its current 
price, the holder would leave the option unexercised. 
Equations 5.6 and 5.7 may be solved for C, which is the Black formula 
for the value of a European call option on a futures contract; 
C(F,T) = e-'CF • N(d,) - E • N(d2)] 5.8 
F 1 2 
where d = [ln( ) + _ •  a  T J / a V l ;  5.9 
E 2 
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F 1 2 
and d = (ln( ) - _ - o T]/dvT = d - oT 5.10 
2 1 
K 2 
where T = Time to expiration 
E = Exercise price 
F = Futures price 
r = risk-free rate of return 
er = variance of futures price 
N(di) = cumulative normal density function for d; 
The implications of the model may be examined by evaluating the 
effects of changes in the value of the models parameter on the options 
price. 
-rT 
= e - N(d ) > 0 5.11 
1 dF 
= -e • N(d_) <0 5.12 
~5Ë~ 
-rT 
= -T e [F - N(d ) - E • M{d )] < 0 5.13 
1 2 dr 
-rT 
= e . T • F • N'(d ) > 0 5.14 
3var 
9C 
= 2. Te'^ F^ -a • N'(d ) + eT^ E^rNfd ) = 0 5.15 
3T 2  ^  ^ < 
The derivations of the effects of changes in each of the model's 
parameters on the value of the call option are based on the work in Option 
Pricing by Robert A. Jarrow and Andrew Rudd, Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc., 1983; 119-120. 
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X where N'(d-) = . e 
The valuation of a European put option follows directly from the 
Black formula for a call option on futures, and the application of the put-
call parity. Assuming the construction of a portfolio made of long 
position in put options, short position in call options, and a long 
position in the futures contract, there will be a terminal cash flow that 
does not depend on the relationship between the futures price and the 
exercise price of the option as shown in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1. Cash flow from the arbitrage portfolio 
Closing 
Position Opening Ft>E Ft<E 
Write a call C, E-Fx 0 
Buy a put -P, 0 E-Ft 
Buy a futures contract 0 Fy-F, FT-F, 
Total C,-P, E-F, E-F, 
The initial value of the arbitrage portfolio must be zero, if there 
are no riskless profits to be made, so, the present discounted value of the 
cash flows must be zero 
0 = C, - P, + e''^ {E-F,) 5.16 
which may be rearranged as the put call parity 
P = c - e"^  • (F-E) 5.17 
The put-call parity equation may be used to solve for the price of the put 
option on the same futures contract, and with the same exercise price and 
expiration date as the call option by using the Black call option model. 
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The effect of a change in any of the parameters of the model on the 
put option price can be derived from the impact on the call option price 
and the put-call parity equation as follows: 
dp 
<0 5.18 
dF 
dp 
dE 
dp 
dr 
dP 
> 0 5.19 
< 0 5.20 
> 0 5.21 
3var 
> 
dp 
= 0 5.22 
31 < 
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CHAPTER 6: IBE APPLICATION OF FINANCIAL FUTURESAND OPTIONS 
AS HEDGING INSTRUMENTS IN MORTGAGE MARKETS 
Chapter 6 begins with position diagrams as introductory tools in 
understanding the use of financial futures and options in mortgage markets. 
The return distribution to the unhedged mortgage and those mortgages 
"covered" with various futures and options is then derived mathematically. 
Finally, the results of an empirical study on the use of such instruments 
in mortgage markets are reported. 
Position Diagrams 
Position diagrams are used to represent basic strategies on buying or 
writing of put and call options. 
1. Buy call. Figures 6-la and 6-lb.^  Having acquired the right but 
not the obligation to buy at strike price, E, if the market price of 
the underlying security appreciates over the strike price, the holder 
would gain by exercising the option. If the market price of the 
underlying security remains at or below the strike price, the option 
will be allowed to expire, and the buyer will have lost the premium. 
2. Buy put. Figure 6-2. Since the buyer of the put has the right, but 
not the obligation to sell at specific strike price, E, if interest 
rates rise and cause market prices to fall below E, he/she would 
exercise the option and gain in the process. A fall in interest 
rates causing market prices to rise above E, gives no incentives for 
the exercise of the option and the paid premium is lost. 
3. Write call. Figure 6-3. Any increases in interest rates cause the 
call option to remain unexercised, hence the writer will earn the 
 ^There is an inverse relationship between interest rates and 
security prices. For example, assuming that a bond with 30 years remaining 
to maturity was issued at par (100) with a coupon of 8% to reflect market 
rates at the time of issue, if market rates rise to 10%, it would be traded 
below par of 87.07 to have a yield comparable to market rates. 
79 
Net Capital Gain 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ \ E = F(t) 
\ 
\ < > 
\ Yeild- of- futures 
\ 
\ 
\ 1 1 J 
c(t)-/ 
Buy Call 
Net Capital Gain 
Buy Call 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
E.= F(t) . 
â. /L 
/ 
/ Value of the futures 
contract 
/C(t) 
Figure 6-1. Net capital gain from the the buy-call strategy: a. As a 
function of yield to maturity of the underlying security; 
b. As a function of the underlying security's value 
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Figure 6-2. Net capital gain from the buy-put strategy 
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Figure 6-3 Net capital gain from the sell-call strategy 
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premium received. A decline in rates and the resulting higher 
security prices,however, gives the holder of the option an incentive 
to exercise his/her right to buy the security at E. The writer of 
the option, in this case, incurs a loss equal to the difference 
between the market price and exercise price. The loss, however, is 
modified by the call option premium which is already received. 
4. Write put. Figure 6-4. Higher rates will result in the exercise of 
the put option and the writer must accept delivery of the underlying 
securities at higher than market value and loses in the process. The 
put premium, as in the case of writing calls, modifies the losses. A 
decline in market interest rates and the increase in securities' 
prices, leaves the put option unexercised and the writer will gain 
the premium. 
With this background, some of the choices available to financial 
institutions may be examined. The institution may hedge against the loss 
of the portfolio value stemming from increases in interest rates by 
offering ARMS, Figure 6-5. As is shown in Figure 6-5, for a simple ARM 
with no interest rate caps or floors, this strategy fully insures the 
financial institution against lower portfolio value but also totally 
eliminates any gains in value that may result from lower interest rates. 
The public demand for FRMs is still present, and for competitive 
purposes if nothing else, the institution may desire to make such mortgage 
loans. Figure 6-6. If interest rates rise, mortgage value drops, and a 
decline in rates translate in to higher portfolio value. Thus, offering 
FRMs clearly involves a risk which must be analyzed more carefully. 
The risk structure of a FRM portfolio may be altered with the use of 
financial futures and/or options on financial futures. This chapter will 
examine some of the choices available to financial institutions in hedging 
interest rate risk exposure of their mortgage portfolio. Position diagrams 
are employed to show the effect of each hedging strategy on the mortgage 
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Figure 6-4. Net capital gain from the sell-put strategy 
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Figure 5-5. Net capital gain from an uncapped ARM position 
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Figure 6-6 Net capital gain from the FRM position 
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position as rates change, and the return on the unhedged position as well 
as the return on alternative hedged positions are derived mathematically. 
Return Distribution to Alternative Positions 
The return distribution to the unhedged mortgage position as well as 
the mortgage portfolio hedged with various hedging strategies is derived in 
this section. These include hedging the mortgage portfolio with a short 
position in financial futures, a short position in call options on 
financial futures/^  a long position in financial futures put options, and 
a combination of the latter two strategies. 
The unhedged mortgage position 
If the cash instrument's prices at time t, and tj, are M, and M; 
respectively, where t; > t, , the value of gains or losses from the 
unhedged mortgage position is 
U = Xm(MJ - M,) 6.1 
where XM = size of the cash position in multiples of $100,000 
The expected value and variance of the unhedged position may then be 
defined as 
E(U) = Xm E(M2-M,), 6.2 
and Var(U) = X^ M Var(H) 6.3 
where Var (M) is the subjective variance of the cash instrument and E is 
the expectations operator. 
This strategy may be viewed as a speculative position since the 
financial institution would use it under specific expectations of the 
potential interest rates movements. It may be more accurate to refer to 
this strategy as an "insurance policy" rather than a hedging strategy. For 
continuity and simplicity, however, this position will be refereed to as a 
hedging strategy in the remainder of this study. 
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Hedging with financial futures 
Based on the traditional hedging theory,emphasizing the pure 
risk-avoidance characteristics of futures markets, the hedger would take a 
position in the futures market equal to, but opposite of, his/her position 
in the cash market. This argument is based on the assumption that cash and 
futures instruments' prices generally move together; thus, the gain or loss 
on the hedged position would be less than for an unhedged position. Figure 
6-7.29 
Denoting the futures instrument's price at times t, and t2, F, and F; 
respectively, the profit/loss position of the cash market instrument hedged 
with a short position in the futures contract on a one-to-one basis is 
R= XM [(MJ - M,) + (F, - Fz)] 6.4 
If the prices of the cash and futures instruments move together, the 
variance of the hedged position would be smaller than that of the unhedged 
position. This risk reduction potential is often discussed in terms of 
basis, F, - M,, as discussed in Chapter 4. Allowing to represent the 
basis at time t, equation 6.4 may be written as: 
R= -XM [(Fz -Mz) - (F, - M,)] = -XM AB 6.5 
2® It will be shown later in this chapter that even if the assumption 
of cash and futures instruments' prices moving together is not satisfied. 
Figure 6-7 would hold true by using an optimal hedge rather than a one-to-
one hedge. 
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Traditional hedging was based on the argument that changes in the 
basis were quite small relative to the price of the instruments because of 
the possibility of making or taking delivery of the commodity. 
The pure risk-minimizing assumption of the traditional hedging theory 
was criticized beginning in 1953 by H. Working who argued that hedging was 
undertaken primarily to maximize profits. The holders of a long cash 
position would only sell futures contracts if they expected a narrower 
basis. 
Changes in basis may be especially important when a cross-hedge— 
where the futures contract instrument is different than the cash 
instrument—is being undertaken. In such cases as hedging mortgage loans 
with T-bond futures contracts, the possibility of a change in the basis 
over the hedging period is of special importance. 
Johnson^ " and Stein^  ^developed a unified theory of hedging by 
applying basic portfolio theory to incorporate the traditional risk-
minimizing criteria and the maximization aspects of expected profit theory. 
A number of alternative measures of risk focusing on the disutility of 
uncertainty may be used, including the probability of loss, the expected 
value of loss, and the variance of the expected return. Ederington (1979), 
assumed hedging of only one cash instrument, and subsequently derived the 
optimal proportion of the cash instrument to be hedged in the futures 
markets when changes in the basis are not necessarily equal to zero. 
If R represents the change in the market value of the portfolio which 
contains and Xp holdings of the cash and futures market instruments 
L.L Johnson, "The Theory of Hedging and Spreading in Commodity 
Futures", Review of Economic Studies 27, No 3, 1960: 139-151. 
Jerome L. Stein, "The simultaneous determination of Spot and 
Futures Prices", American Economic Review 51, No. 5, December 1961; 1912-
1925. 
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respectively, the expected return'^  and variance of the hedged positions 
are; 
E(R) =XM E(M2 - M,) + XpE (Fz - F.) - C(XF) 6.6 
Var(R) = X^ M var{M) + X^  var(P) + 2XM Xp cov(M,F) 6.7 
where C(Xp) represents brokerage and other costs of undertaking futures 
contracts, and var(M), var(F), and cov(M,F) represent the subjective 
variance and covariance of the possible price changes between periods one 
and two. Although margin costs are not known with certainty, they have 
traditionally been stable over time. It is thus assumed than the variance 
of C(Xp) is zero. 
Let n represent the number of futures contracts traded for each unit 
of the cash instrument held, i.e., n = -Xp/Xm. Substituting n into 
equations 6-6 and 6-7 gives 
E(R) =XM E (M2-M,) - n XM E (FZ-F,) -C(XM,n) 
=XM [E(M2-M,) - n E (FÎ-F,)] -C(XM,n) 6,8 
and 
Var (R) = X^ M var(M) + n^ X^ Mvar(F) - 2nX^ M cov(M,F) 
= X^ M [Var(M) + nVar(F) - 2 n cov(M,F)] 6.9 
Letting the expected change in basis be E(AB) = E[(F2-M2)-(F1-M1)], the 
expected return on the hedged position is 
E(R) = XM[(1-n).E(AM) -nE(AB)] - C(XM,n) 6.10 
where E(M;-M, ) is the expected change in the price of one unit of the cash 
instrument. 
The terms expected return and expected capital gains are used 
interchangeably in the rest of the study. 
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Equation 6.10 shows that if the expected change in the basis is zero, 
as in the traditional theory, the expected gain/loss of the hedged 
position, E(R), is reduced as n approaches one. It may also be seen that 
the changes in the basis can add to, or reduce, the return that would have 
been expected on the unhedged position where E(U) = Xn({M2-M,). 
Since the size of the holding of the cash instrument is assumed to be 
constant, the effect of a change in n on the variance of the return is 
3var(R)/3n = X^ Mt2nvar(F) - 2 cov (M,F)] 6.11 
and the risk minimizing hedge ratio is 
n' = cov(M,F)/var(F) 6.12 
The numerical value of cov(M,F)/var(F) may be estimated from 
historical data with an ordinary least square regression of 
observations on (Fj-F,) observations. The regression coefficient for (Fj-F,) 
is the estimate of cov(M,F)/var(F). If the risk minimizing hedge ratio, 
n' = AM/AF, is substituted in equation 6.8, the expected return on the 
optimally hedged portfolio may be found as shown in equation 6.13; 
E(R) = E(XM(AM-n'AF) ] = E[XM(AM-AM/AF.AF] =0" 6.13 
For simplicity, in the rest of this study, the term C(XM,n) is 
omitted from the return distribution of mortgages hedged with both futures 
and futures options contracts. Since the cost of entering a futures 
position and that of entering option markets are quite comparable, the 
comparative effect on the return distribution of mortgages hedged with 
futures or options is negligible. 
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Figure 6-7, then, also shows the return on the hedged portfolio using 
an optimum number of futures contracts, where the curve for the return on 
the cash holding is weighted by 1/n" in order to make the analysis 
consistent. The return is thus for 1/n* units of the cash instrument and 
one unit of the futures instrument. 
In Figure 6-7, the slopes of the return lines are of equal absolute 
size, since for each one unit change in the price of the futures contract, 
the value of 1/n" units of the cash instrument will be n" x 1/n" =1. The 
return on the sale of a futures contract is positive when F^  < F', because 
the seller of the contract can buy it at a lower price than its initial 
selling price. 
The total return for the hedged position is then zero at each 
alternative price of the futures contract. It has been implicitly assumed 
that n* > 0 in this discussion, so that the cash position is hedged with a 
short position in the futures instrument. Moreover, it has been assumed 
that the basis is stable over time, i.e., although the prices of the cash 
and futures instruments may not move together, the relationship between the 
two, once determined, remains constant. 
Hedging with options on financial futures 
Prepayment is a substantial problem for financial institutions 
attempting to hedge in the futures market: as interest rates fall, the 
value of the mortgage portfolio will rise, but the consumers will begin to 
prepay their mortgages and take out new ones at the lower rates. 
Therefore, the value of the mortgage portfolio may not appreciate for the 
institution, while the futures position is declining in value. The net 
result may be a loss in the futures market, without a corresponding gain in 
the portfolio of mortgages. So, institutions are able to protect 
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themselves from rising interest rates but not from losses during periods of 
portfolios of mortgages/* 
Mortgage positions may also be hedged with various option market 
strategies. One advantage of using futures options as hedging instrument 
is that the option offers protection only on one side of the market 
compared to a futures market position that is affected by both sides of the 
market.^ * If the financial institution chooses the "appropriate" option 
hedging strategy, it can protect itself only against the one-sided movement 
of rising interest rates. 
Moreover, if the institution chooses to engage in purchasing an 
option as the hedging method, it may benefit from the fact that margin 
requirement on options on futures are not subject to daily settlements. 
The institution may, then, not be adversely affected in cases of large 
movements of the futures contract price. In other words, the institution 
need not mark the account to market at the end of every day, thus 
eliminating the need to have large sums of cash at hand to avoid the risk 
of frequent margin calls. If the institution, on the other hand, decides 
to write an option as the hedging strategy, it remains subjected to daily 
settlements. 
Hedging mortgages with a short position in call options on financial 
futures, Figure 6-8,^ ® is a strategy for bearish bankers and is effective 
in a relatively flat market. It limits the upside potentials of the price 
movements in order to lower the loss in the event of falling values. 
 ^Marshal and Colwell, "Hedging Mortgage Portfolios with Options on 
Futures", Real Estate Development. Fall 1985; 7. 
Recall that an option is defined as the right, but not the 
obligation to buy or sell an asset at a predetermined price. 
The figure is drawn for either a one-to-one hedge, if the basis is 
zero, or for an optimal hedge of 1/n* units of the cash instrument with one 
call option, if the basis is not assumed to be zero. In the latter case, 
the slopes of the curve for the return on the cash instrument may be viewed 
as having been weighted by 1/n'. 
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Although there are other possible strategies to limit the loss, writing 
calls is considered in this study because the premium received is an 
effective "insurance policy" when the price of the underlying security 
declines by a relatively small amount. As is shown in Figure 6-8, the 
banker who is involved in this strategy will lose only if the value of the 
underlying security falls below k'. Any decline in value smaller than this 
amount, are fully offset by the call premium received. 
One disadvantage of this strategy, as for any other option writing 
strategy, is the daily settlement requirement.^ ' If the call is 
"uncovered", the writer must deposit the premium plus 20 percent of the 
underlying security's value and may thus be subjected to margin calls. If 
the call is out-of-the-money, the margin is reduced by the amount by which 
the option is out-of-the-money. 
For "covered" calls, if the option's exercise price is at least equal 
to the underlying security price, the banker need not deposit any 
additional margin beyond that required on the underlying security. If, 
however, the exercise price is less than the security price, the maximum 
amount the investor may borrow on the futures contract is based on the 
call's exercise price rather than the futures contract price. 
It is assumed here that the banker has a portfolio of financial 
assets that include T-bond and T-bond futures contracts, also the primary 
options considered are the at-the-money calls. So, it is assumed that the 
daily settlement of call writing strategy is not of great consequence to 
the financial institution. 
Assuming that the exercise price of the call option is equal to the 
initial selling price of the futures contract, F„ and the call option 
Additional information on margin requirements on option writing 
strategies may be obtained from Robert W. Kolb, Options; An Introduction. 
Miami, Florida: Kolb Publishing Company, 1990. 
Don. M. Chance, "An Introduction to Options & Futures," second 
edition. Fort Worth; The Dryden Press, 1991; 55-56. 
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premium at the time of initiating the hedge, t, is denoted C,, the 
profit/loss position of selling the option is determined as follows. 
The option would expire unexercised if futures price were to decline 
over the hedge period, or if the futures price at the end of the hedging 
period. Fx, were below the exercise price of the option, E. The investor 
would then earn the call option premium. If futures prices were to 
increase so much as to surpass the options strike price, the exercise of 
the option would create a loss equal to the difference between and E. 
The expected return to the mortgage hedged with selling call options is 
Rc — ( ) + C( Fx ^  E 
= (M2-M,)-(Ft-E) + C, FT > E 6.14 
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the prices of the cash and 
futures contracts do not necessarily move together. To correct for the 
existence of a nonzero basis, the previously derived hedge ratios may be 
also used in options hedging. So, instead of hedging one mortgage contract 
by writing one call option, it is assumed that 1/n* units of the cash 
instrument is hedged with selling call options. Intuitively, it is easier 
to do this rather than assuming that partial option contracts are written 
to cover one unit of the cash instrument. Equation 6.14 would then change 
as follows: 
R'c =l/n (Mj-M,) + C, Fx < E 
=l/n" (Mj-M,) + (Fx-E) + C, = C,'' Fx > E 6.15 
It is assumed that at the time the hedge is initiated, E is equal 
to F,. So, (Fx-E) is the same as (Fx-F,) which will be canceled out by 
1/n" (Mj-M,), assuming that n' is the optimal hedge ratio previously derived. 
The expected return on the mortgage portfolio hedged with writing call 
options, when Fx>E, is then C,. 
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Purchase of put options on T-bond futures as hedging tool. Figure 
6-9, sets a limit on the loss in mortgage value resulting from higher 
interest rates without limiting the potential for gains if interest rate 
were to fall. Specifically, the put option purchased with an exercise 
price equal to the futures contract price at time of initiating the hedge, 
t, at a premium of P„ would only be exercised if the futures price were 
lower at the time the hedge was lifted. This would create a gain of F^ -E. 
The option would expire unexercised otherwise. The expected return to the 
hedged position is then 
RP=(M2-M,) + (E-FT) - P, 
= - P, 
FT<E 
FT>E 6.16 
Hedging the mortgage with put options according to the optimal hedge ratio, 
i.e., hedging 1/n" units of the mortgage with one put option contract, 
would yield 
R"p = 1/n" (MJ-M,) + (E-FT) - P, = P,"*" FT<E 
= 1/n* (M2-M1) - P, Ft>E 6.17 
Finally, combining a short position in financial futures call options 
with a long position in the put options on the same contract provides a 
total return similar to the hedge with selling futures contracts. 
"•o (E-F-R) = (F,-FT), assuming the purchase of an at-the-money put at 
the start of the hedge period. If n" is the optimal hedge ratio, then (FT-
F,) and 1/n" cancel each other. The expected return on the mortgage 
position hedged with the buy put strategy when Fi.<E is simply P,. 
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Figure 6-10. The long put hedges against a rise in rates and the short 
call trades away some of the seller's upside potential in a rally in return 
for premium income that will offset some or all of the cost of the put. 
The expected return for the hedged position is then 
Rcp= (Mz-M,) + (E-FT) -P. + C, 
(M2-M,) - (FT-E) -P. + C, 
F-j-^ E 
FT>E 6.18 
Hedging 1/n" units of the mortgage using this strategy changes the expected 
return as follows. 
R"cp=l/n (Mz-M,) + (E-FT) -P. + c, FT^ E 
l/n"{M2-M,) - (FT-E) -P, + C, FT^ E 
=-P,+C, Ft<>E 
Assuming the equality of put and call premia for all at-the-money options. 
Rçp—0 6.20 
The Results of the Empirical Study 
The result of empirical studies of the four hedging strategies using 
historical data is presented in this section. 
Data specification 
The length of each hedge period is six months and a new hedge was 
initiated on the 15th day of every month beginning January 1983 and ending 
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in December 1991. Therefore, a total of 102 hedged positions are 
considered. The year 1983 was chosen as the starting date since options on 
futures contracts were first introduced three months prior to that time and 
by the beginning of that year there was considerable volume of trade in the 
market. 
Mortgage rates used in the study were those on fixed rate 
conventional, fully amortized first mortgages on single family homes closed 
in the third week of every month for all lender types. This mortgage rate 
series was obtained from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board of Des Moines for 
the period 1983-1988 and then from the Office of Thrift Supervision for the 
remainder of the period under study. 
The mortgage rate series was converted into a price series with the 
use of "The prepayment mortgage value table for the 30-year mortgage 
prepaid in twelve years" extracted from Thorndike Encyclopedia of Banking 
and Financial Tables. Revised Edition. Prepayment in twelve years was 
assumed because it roughly corresponds to the expected life of recently 
originated conventional mortgages. 
The Treasury bond futures contract chosen was the one with maturity 
lasting at least to the last day of the hedge period. The futures price 
used was the settlement price for the 15th day of the month and in those 
cases where the 15th day was not a trading day, the price for the closest 
alternative day was used. The premium for put and call options on T-bond 
futures contracts with strike prices closest to the futures price and 
maturities of equal or greater than those of the underlying futures 
contract were also obtained for a trading day as close to the middle of the 
month as possible. Similar data were gathered for the next in-the-money 
and out-of-the-money puts and calls. 
The futures price series and put and call option premia were 
collected from the Statistical Annual published by the Chicago Board of 
Trade for the period October 1982 to December 1986, and from the Wall 
Street Journal for the years 1987 through 1991. 
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It was then assumed that the financial institution was hedging a 
portfolio of thirty-year mortgages with an interest rate of eight percent 
and expected prepayment in twelve years. This mortgage type was used since 
it is essentially on the same footing as the T-bond futures contracts which 
are based on an eight-percent-coupon Treasury bond. 
Estimation of optimal hedge ratios 
It was shown in Chapter 4 that the optimal number of futures 
contracts used to hedge mortgage portfolio values may be estimated as the 
regression coefficient of the change in mortgage value on the change in 
price of futures contracts. The result of risk minimizing hedge ratio 
estimation are presented in this section. 
It was assumed that each position was maintained for six months. The 
data used in the estimations, then, were monthly observations for the six-
month changes in the mortgage and Treasury bond futures contract prices. 
It was further assumed that the first hedge was established on January 15, 
1983, and the last hedge lifted on December 15, 1991. 
The slope coefficient for the regression of the changes in mortgage 
prices on changes in the futures contract prices using the six-month 
periods was .7821.'*' This means that in order to minimize the risk of the 
position, each $100,000 of mortgage holdings would be hedged by selling 
.7821 Treasury bond futures contracts. The coefficient of determination 
for this regression was .2922 signifying that a large portion of the 
movement in mortgage values is not accounted for by the changes in futures 
prices. The value of Durbin-Watson statistic, .4943, suggested a large 
degree of autocorrelation among the residuals. When the estimates were 
corrected for autocorrelation, the optimal hedge ratio dropped to .6132 
with r^  of .4076. 
The coefficient was significant at the .0001 level. 
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In both of the above cases, a noticeable portion of mortgage value 
changes was found not to associate with changes in futures contract price. 
It was shown by Hillard and Haney"*^  that during the latter parts of the 
1970s, changes in mortgage interest rates lagged behind changes in the 
yield on long-term government bonds by approximately one month. Since the 
yield on government bonds move parallel to the movement in futures prices, 
the relationship between changes in mortgage prices and changes in future 
prices were re-estimated incorporating a one month lag. In other words, it 
was assumed that mortgages were hedged a period earlier by selling futures 
contracts—the mortgage portfolio of 2/15/83 was hedged in 1/14/83** as an 
example. 
The results of the re-estimation showed the optimal hedge ratio as 
.8991 with r^  equal to .3542 for the uncorrected, and .7993 with 
coefficient of determination at .4256 for the corrected series. The result 
of the regression analysis is summarized in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1. Regression estimation for changes in mortgage and futures 
prices 
CONTEMPORANEOUS 
HEDGE 
AM, = a + b.AF, 
UNCORRECTED CORRECTED 
FOR FOR 
AUTOCORRELATION AUTOCORRELATION 
0.0831 
0.7821 
102 
100 
7.5412 
R-SQUARED 
.2922 
D-W .4943 
a 
b 
n 
d. f 
t 
0.3571 
0.6132 
102 
100 
14.5851 
0.4076 
1.6210 
LAGGED 
HEDGE 
AM, = a + b.AF,., 
UNCORRECTED CORRECTED 
FOR FOR 
AUTOCORRELATION AUTOCORRELATION 
-0.5567 
0.8991 
101 
99 
3.2563 
0.3542 
0.9821 
0.1265 
0.7993 
101 
99 
10.295 
0.4256 
1.9230 
J. Hillard and H. Haney, "The evolutionary Relationship between 
Bond Markets and Mortgage Markets; A Cross-Spectral Analysis." Housing 
Finance Review 1, No. 3, July 1982; 279-294. 
January 15, 1983 was not a trading day. 
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Return distribution to alternative strategies 
The period under the current study is one in which interest rate 
levels generally declined, and the mortgage and futures values consequently 
increased. There was considerable variation within the changes in mortgage 
values. Of the 102 hedge periods, 62 were periods in which mortgage values 
increased and the remaining 40 periods showed a decline in values. The 
maximum increase in value, 9.05,^  occurred between November 1985 and May 
1986 and the minimum gain was .060 points, for the period August 1987 to 
February 1988. The maximum loss in value of 6.300 points happened in 1987, 
April to October, and the minimum loss was .050 points, between March and 
September 1983. 
One of the main advantages of using options on futures is that the 
holder has the right, but not the obligation to take a position in the 
futures market. So, the return to mortgages hedged with a long position in 
futures put options, as an example, rather than futures contracts should be 
relatively more favorable when mortgage values and futures pricSs generally 
rise. Of course, the mortgage value must increase by at least an amount 
large enough to offset the premium paid for the put option before the 
benefits of this hedging strategy materialize. Referring back to Figure 
6-9, mortgage value must increase above k'' before any gains are realized. 
The return on mortgages hedged through writing call options, for 
relatively moderate price changes, could be more favorable than hedging 
with futures, if mortgage values decline. For example, if mortgage values 
fall down to k' in Figure 6-8, the loss in mortgage value is more than 
offset by the call premium received, thus generating more favorable results 
than hedging with futures as depicted in Figure 6-7. If the mortgage value 
falls below k', on the other hand, the call premium does not offset the 
All mean returns and standard deviation of returns are expressed 
as thousands of dollars. 9.050 points, then, equals $9,050. 
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full amount of the loss in mortgage portfolio. Writing calls in this case 
will not be preferable to hedging with futures. 
In order to evaluate the risk-return of alternative strategies under 
rising interest rates, a simulation method was used to reverse the mortgage 
and futures price series. Consequently, the mortgage and futures prices at 
the time the hedge was initiated became the end of period prices, and 
prices at the time of hedge terminations were used as the initial price 
series. The strike prices of the options were then adjusted to represent 
the new initial futures prices and the premia for the options were obtained 
from the sources mentioned previously. In cases when options with the new 
strike prices were not traded, the option premia was estimated according to 
the Black futures options pricing formula using the one month historical 
variance and the six-month Treasury-bill rate. 
When the two series are combined, the resulting sample would 
represent a series in which there is no trend in the price of either 
mortgages or the futures contracts, but there remains substantial variation 
in these prices within the period. 
Return distribution for the combined series The result of the 
hedging exercise for the combined series is reported in Table 6-2 for the 
contemporaneous and in Table 6-3 for the lagged series. The first entry in 
each column shows the mean capital gains, or mean return, from an unhedged 
position in a portfolio of $100,000 mortgages, as well as the mean return 
from the same portfolio if hedged with various hedging strategies. Brokers 
fees are not considered in this study, so the returns may be slightly 
overestimated. The second number in each column refers to the standard 
deviation of returns for the hedged and unhedged mortgage positions. 
The return for the unhedged mortgage and mortgages hedged with 
futures are zero for both the contemporaneous and the lagged relationships. 
This is expected as reversing the mortgage and the futures price series 
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Table 6-2. Return distribution for the hedged and unhedged mortgage 
positions, combined series, contemporaneous relationship 
ONE-TO-ONE 
HEDGE RATIO 
OPTIMAL 
HEDGE RATIO 
UNCORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRELATION 
CORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRALATION 
MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED 
MORTGAGES 0 4.823 0 4.823 0 4.823 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
FUTURES 
0 4.212 0 3.504 0 3.071 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
CALL OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
0.162 3.445 
0.322 3.229 
0.414 3.209 
2.257 3.196 
1.506 3.336 
0.698 3.387 
2.345 3.808 
1.234 4.068 
0.414 4.176 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
PUT OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-0.670 3.211 
-0.942 3.222 
-0.956 3.341 
-1.261 3.416 
-2.066 3.172 
-3.064 3.465 
-1.011 4.229 
-1.795 3.841 
-2.780 3.897 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
LONG PUT 
+ 
SHORT CALL 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-0.847 3.763 
-0.614 3.730 
-0.538 3.784 
1.315 5.592 
0.007 3.959 
-2.366 5.106 
1.366 6.222 
0.103 5.049 
-2.375 6.167 
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Table 6-3. Return distribution for the hedged and unhedged mortgage 
positions, combined series, lagged relationship 
ONE-TO-ONE 
HEDGE RATIO 
MEAN 
CAPITAL 
GAIN 
OPTIMAL 
HEDGE RATIO 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
OF 
RETURN 
UNCORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRELATION 
MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
CORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRALATION 
MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED 
MORTGAGES 0 4.823 0 4.823 0 4.823 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
FUTURES 
0 3.651 0 3.307 0 3.005 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
CALL OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
0.207 3.125 
0.359 3.072 
0.448 3.068 
2.533 2.906 
1.407 2.861 
0.922 2.964 
2.405 3.128 
1.247 3.197 
0.501 3.251 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
PUT OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=P 
E>F 
-0.989 3.118 
-0.623 3.033 
-0.925 3.042 
-1.191 3.016 
-1.922 2.862 
-2.981 3.032 
-1.024 3.289 
-1.769 3.112 
-2.824 3.267 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
LONG PUT 
+ 
SHORT CALL 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-0.781 3.379 
-0.589 3.359 
-0.477 3.412 
1.260 4.691 
0.080 3.555 
-2.344 4.755 
1.346 5.217 
0.081 3.997 
-2.323 5.167 
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would simply reverse the sign of returns without changing the magnitude. 
The standard deviations of return for the hedged position are lower for 
both 
series and for all hedge ratios although the lagged series show a larger 
reduction on the variability of returns. The one-to-one hedge of the 
lagged mortgage series with financial futures reduced the standard 
deviation of return by 24 percent, from 4.823 to 3.651 points.'*' Using 
the uncorrected optimal ratio of .8991 lowered the standard deviation to 
3.307 points and the use of optimal hedge ratio corrected for auto 
correlation, .7993, accounted for standard deviation of 3.005 points. 
These numbers translate into a reduction of 31 and 38 percent respectively. 
For the contemporaneous series, the variability of returns were 
reduced by 13, 27, and 36 percent respectively for the one-to-one, 
uncorrected, and corrected hedge ratios. 
Hedging mortgage portfolios with selling at-the-money call options on 
financial futures generated interesting results. The return on all cases 
was positive with a minimum of .322 points for the one-to-one hedge of the 
contemporaneous mortgage series and a maximum of 1.506 points for the same 
series hedged with the uncorrected hedge ratio. Standard deviation of 
returns were lowered considerably in all cases. The smallest reduction in 
variability was a standard deviation of 4.068 points, 15 percent lower than 
that of the unhedged mortgage. The best result was a reduction of 41 
percent in standard deviation of return to 2.861 points, for the 
uncorrected optimal hedge ratio of the lagged series. In general the 
lagged series showed a better reduction of the standard deviation for all 
cases of hedging with the short position in the call option than the 
A standard deviation of $3,651 on capital gains from a $100,000 
position of 8 percent mortgages. 
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contemporaneous series. This was true for the options with exercise price 
different than the initial futures price as well. 
The employment of in-the-money call options, E<F,, increased the 
return at the expense of higher standard deviation in all but two cases. 
The variability of return for the lagged series hedged with the corrected 
hedge ratio, and that of the contemporaneous series hedged with the 
uncorrected ratio were lower when the in-the-money option was used. The 
use of the out-of-the-money option lowered the return and increased the 
standard deviation in all cases of optimal hedging , but increased the 
return slightly and lowered variability by a small amount for the one-to-
one hedge.''® 
In conclusion, hedging with a short position in call options on 
T-bond futures contracts lowered the standard deviation of return compared 
to the unhedged mortgage and increased the return under all circumstances 
considered in this study. These results are consistent with the fact that 
this position may be more correctly viewed as an "insurance policy" rather 
than a hedge since the banker would undertake it only if he/she has formed 
some expectations on the future directions of interest rates. 
The buy-put strategy was also quite successful in lowering the 
variability of return when compared with the unhedged mortgage position. 
For at-the-money puts, the standard deviations of return were lowered in 
all cases with the smallest reduction of 20 percent for the contemporaneous 
series hedged with the corrected ratio, and the best result of 41 percent 
lower standard deviation in the case of uncorrected optimal hedge of the 
lagged series. However in all cases, the return to the hedged positions 
were negative, with the one-to-one hedge showing a smaller decline in 
return for both series as compared to the optimal hedge. 
The possibility of margin calls are not considered in this study. 
It is implicitly assumed that the financial institution owns a portfolio of 
financial assets, including Treasury bonds and Treasury bond futures 
contracts. The margin requirement is thus similar to those on futures 
contracts. 
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The use of the in-the-money put option, E>FT, as the hedging 
instrument produced curious results. The standard deviation of returns 
were generally higher compared to the at-the-money put hedge, but returns 
were surprisingly lower also. On the other hand, the out-of-the-money put 
created a better return, i.e., a smaller loss, at the expense of higher 
variability in five out of six cases for both series and hedge ratios. 
These results may be attributed to a possible overpricing of put options 
and will be discussed later in this chapter when comparing the result of 
the study for the original and the reverse series. 
The synthetic futures hedge, selling calls and buying puts with the 
same strike price and assuming equal put and call premia, is expected to 
create a return similar to that of the mortgage position hedged with 
futures contracts. Indeed for all cases of optimal hedges for the lagged 
and contemporaneous series with the at-the-money options this seems true. 
The returns to this position are .080 and .081 points for the uncorrected 
and corrected optimal hedges of the lagged series respectively. For the 
contemporaneous series these values are .103 and .007 points for the 
corrected and uncorrected hedges. On average, then, there is approximately 
$7 of positive return to this position. 
The standard deviation of returns are lower than that of the unhedged 
mortgage in all but one case. When the contemporaneous series is hedged 
with the corrected optimal ratio, the return is above zero by a relatively 
large amount, .103 points, and the variability of return has increased by 
approximately 5 percent compared to the unhedged position. The other cases 
show a standard deviation which is 17 to 25 percent lower than the unhedged 
position. 
When compared to the short futures hedging, however, the synthetic 
futures does not perform as well in reducing variability if optimal hedge 
ratios are used. In the most disappointing case, the futures hedge creates 
a standard deviation which is approximately 64 percent lower than the one 
offered by the sell call-buy put strategy and in the most promising 
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condition the futures hedge is more successful in lowering variability by 
only 7 percent. The one-to-one hedge with the put-call strategy fared 
better than futures hedging in lowering variability of return although it 
created a considerable loss. 
The move to a higher exercise price created a substantial loss for 
all optimal hedges using this strategy and increased the standard deviation 
by a large amount as well. The use of options with smaller exercise prices 
created a considerable profit although it came at the expense of quite 
larger variabilities. This may be due to relative overpricing of put 
and/or relative underpricing of calls and will be mentioned later in 
comparisons of the original and reverse price series. 
Return distribution for the original and the reverse series This 
section will focus on a more detailed analysis of each hedging strategy. 
The returns to the original and the reverse series are looked upon 
separately in an attempt to distinguish and explain the return 
distributions as they respond to the direction of the price movements. 
Tables 6-4 and 6-5 report the results of the experiment for the original 
series under both relationships while Tables 6-6 and 6-7 present the 
results for the reverse series. 
The specific hedging scenarios are then as follows: On the 15th day 
of the month the financial institution aims in managing mortgage-portfolio 
price risk resulting from potential interest rate changes. On the same 
day, the institution may decide to enter an opposite position in the 
futures markets. Thus, a number of futures contracts will be sold on that 
day for each $100,000 of mortgage portfolio. The exact number of the these 
contracts may be one if the hedger follows a one-to-one hedging strategy, 
or other than one if the hedger employs an optimal ratio derived from the 
regression method explained earlier. This position will be maintained for 
six months at which time the institution will take an offsetting position 
in the futures market, thus realizing a gain or a loss depending on the 
direction and magnitude of changes in futures prices. This change. 
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Table 6-4. Return distribution for the hedged and unhedged mortgage 
positions, original series, contemporaneous relationship 
ONE-TO-ONE 
HEDGE RATIO 
OPTIMAL 
HEDGE RATIO 
UNCORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRELATION 
CORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRALATION 
MEAN 
CAPITAL 
GAIN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
OF 
RETURN 
MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED 
MORTGAGES 1.182 4.823 1.182 4.823 1.182 4.823 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
FUTURES 
-0.294 4.212 0.025 3.504 0.275 3.071 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
CALL 
OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=P 
E>F 
1.273 3.128 
1.096 3.338 
0.875 3.714 
3.583 1.825 
2.593 2.796 
1.768 2.662 
3.497 2.244 
2.539 2.248 
1.725 3.316 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
PUT 
OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=F 
E>P 
-0.704 3.321 
-1.050 3.113 
-2.104 3.088 
-0.007 3.590 
-0.919 3.478 
-1.969 3.428 
0.495 4.565 
-0.449 4.408 
-1.510 4.292 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
LONG PUT 
+ 
SHORT CALL 
E<F 
E=P 
E>F 
0.595 4.275 
0.049 4.238 
-1.229 4.261 
3.493 4.096 
1.402 3.967 
-0.201 4.068 
3.993 4.208 
1.928 4.059 
0.225 4.180 
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Table 6-5. Return distribution for the hedged and unhedged mortgage 
positions, original series, lagged relationship 
ONE-TO-ONE 
HEDGE RATIO 
OPTIMAL 
HEDGE RATIO 
UNCORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRELATION 
CORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRALATION 
MEAN 
GAIN 
STANDARD MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION CAPITAL DEVIATION 
OF 
RETURN 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN OP 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED 
MORTGAGES 1.162 4.823 1.162 4.823 1.162 4.823 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
FUTURES 
-0.246 3.651 -0.104 3.307 0.036 3.005 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
CALL OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
1.316 2.906 
1.146 3.039 
0.929 3.252 
3.397 1.590 
2.385 1.788 
1.558 2.305 
3.335 1.745 
2.289 2.140 
1.511 2.554 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
PUT OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-0.855 2.768 
-1.064 2.734 
-1.992 2.865 
-0.043 2.985 
-0.892 2.889 
-1.980 2.894 
0.181 3.350 
-0.675 3.235 
-1.772 3.217 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
LONG PUT 
+ 
SHORT CALL 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
0.046 3.697 
-0.079 3.661 
-0.177 3.643 
3.191 3.323 
1.452 3.534 
-0.422 3.497 
3.516 4.002 
1.614 3.972 
-0.261 3.934 
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Table 6-6. Return distribution for the hedged and unhedged mortgage 
positions, reverse series, contemporaneous relationship 
ONE-TO-ONE 
HEDGE RATIO 
OPTIMAL 
HEDGE RATIO 
UNCORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRELATION 
CORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRALATION 
MEAN 
CAPITAL 
GAIN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
OF 
RETURN 
MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED 
MORTGAGES -1.182 4.823 -1.182 4.823 -1.182 4.823 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
FUTURES 
0.297 4.212 -0.025 3.504 -0.275 3.071 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
CALL OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
1.551 3.197 
1.452 3.259 
1.448 3.289 
1.568 4.567 
0.418 4.423 
-0.372 4.112 
1.152 4.372 
-0.071 4.340 
-0.897 4.035 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
PUT OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-1.809 3.333 
-1.834 3.331 
-2.103 3.360 
-2.515 3.242 
-3.212 2.865 
-4.158 3.148 
-2.516 3.893 
-3.140 3.273 
-4.049 3.501 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
LONG PUT 
+ 
SHORT CALL 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-0.261 3.251 
-0.382 3.221 
-0.660 3.306 
-0.947 6.224 
-1.389 3.950 
-4.530 6.144 
-1.364 7.236 
-1.722 5.039 
-4.964 7.153 
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Table 6-7. Return distribution for the hedged and unhedged mortgage 
positions, reverse series, lagged relationship 
ONE-TO-ONE 
HEDGE RATIO 
OPTIMAL 
HEDGE RATIO 
UNCORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRELATION 
CORRECTED 
FOR 
AUTOCORRALATION 
MEAN 
GAIN 
STANDARD MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION CAPITAL DEVIATION 
OF 
RETURN 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN OF 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED 
MORTGAGES -1.162 4.823 -1.162 4.823 -1.162 4.823 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
FUTURES 
0.246 3.651 0.104 3.307 -0.036 3.005 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
CALL OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
1.515 2.998 
1.428 3.104 
1.420 3.229 
1.668 4.221 
0.429 3.934 
0.285 3.623 
1.474 4.510 
0.205 4.253 
-0.509 3.947 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
PUT OPTIONS 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-1.742 3.370 
-1.182 3.332 
-2.032 3.315 
-2.338 3.047 
-2.951 2.835 
-3.981 3.170 
-2.229 3.288 
-2.862 2.989 
-3.875 3.317 
MORTGAGES 
+ 
LONG PUT 
+ 
SHORT CALL 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-0.227 3.060 
0.246 3.056 
-0.612 3.181 
—0.671 6.058 
-1.292 3.576 
-4.266 6.013 
-0.824 6.432 
-1.453 4.022 
-4.384 6.400 
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ideally, should wholly or partly offset the gain or loss in mortgage 
values. 
For the original series, falling rates and rising values, futures 
hedging lowers potential gains for the benefit of lower variation of 
returns. Net capital gains are much closer to zero when mortgages are 
hedged with futures contracts. They range from a low of -.296 points (a 
loss of $294 on a $100,000 position) for the one-to-one hedge of the lagged 
series to a high of .275 points for the corrected optimal hedge of the 
contemporaneous series. Standard deviations of return is lower by 13 to 38 
percent as well. 
optimal hedging with futures performs better than the one-to-one 
hedge, returns are closer to zero and standard deviations are lower. This 
may be expected, as the discussion of the basis in Chapter 4 suggested that 
the use of an optimal number of futures contracts when the basis is not 
zero would increase the effectiveness of the hedge. Furthermore optimal 
hedging of the lagged relationship is more successful in lowering the 
variation of return compared to the contemporaneous series. Finally, When 
optimal hedge ratios are corrected for autocorrelation, both the return and 
the standard deviation improves considerably for the lagged as well as the 
contemporaneous series. 
The magnitude of the change in mean expected capital gains as 
compared to the magnitude of the corresponding change in the standard 
deviation of returns is next discussed to better understand the 
effectiveness of this hedge. 
The one-to-one contemporaneous hedge of the mortgage portfolio 
lowered the mean expected return by 124 percent for only a 13 percent 
reduction in standard deviation. The optimal hedges, however, performed 
better: 98 percent lower return and 27 percent lower standard deviation 
for the uncorrected hedge ratio of the contemporaneous series, and a 77 
percent reduction in expected capital gains coupled with a 37 percent 
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smaller standard deviation for the corrected-for-autocorralation hedge 
ratio of the same series. 
The optimal hedge of the lagged relationship, although lowering the 
variability of returns by a larger amount than the contemporaneous hedge, 
paid for it by a larger reduction in mean returns: A reduction of 31 
percent in standard deviation at the expense of 109 percent lower return 
for the uncorrected, and 38 percent lower variability costing 97 percent 
lower mean capital gains for the corrected optimal hedge ratio. The one-
to-one hedge of this series, lowered the variability by 24 percent and the 
return by 121 percent. 
The reverse series provides collaborating results. The magnitude of 
returns for futures market hedging are always the same as the original 
series and have the opposite sign. Standard deviations are exactly the 
same. In general, then, standard deviation of returns are lowered if the 
futures hedge of the reverse series is undertaken, and the mean expected 
returns are more favprable and closer to zero as compared to the large loss 
of the mortgage value 
So it is concluded that given the circumstances under this study, 
futures hedging is successful in lowering the variability of returns. 
Optimal hedge ratios are superior to the one-to-one ratio, correction for 
autocorrelation improves the results, and the lagged relationship performs 
better than the contemporaneous when mortgage values are falling. 
As an alternative strategy, an at-the-money call option may be sold 
with the strike price nearest the futures price on that day. If interest 
rates increase in the next six months resulting in lower mortgage and 
futures prices, the option remains unexercised and the institution may 
apply the call premium already received to soften the blow of lower 
mortgage portfolio value. In periods of falling prices, then, the hedger 
with the sell-call option strategy must do better on average that the 
unhedged banker. If interest rates decline and values rise, the loss 
incurred from the exercise of the call by the holder would only lower the 
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gain from the increase in portfolio value. The banker in this case is 
guaranteed a positive return, although limited in magnitude depending on 
the call option premium. 
The empirical results of the study support this theory. The return 
distribution for both the contemporaneous and lagged studies for the 
original series—falling rates and rising prices—show a positive return 
for short call hedging under all conditions involved. The one-to-one hedge 
of the contemporaneous series provides the lowest positive return, 1.096 
points, for the at-the-money option compared to an average of 1.182 points 
for the unhedged mortgage- When the optimal mortgage amount is hedged with 
the call option, the gains increase substantially 2.539 and 2.593 points 
for the optimal hedge ratio uncorrected and corrected for autocorrelation 
respectively. Similar increases in return are evident when the lagged 
relationship is considered, although the contemporaneous series provide 
slightly higher returns. 
Since the original series is characterized by rising mortgage values, 
and yet the position of mortgages plus sales of call options has a higher 
mean return than the unhedged position during this period , the results 
need to be further analyzed. An examination of option prices will aid in 
continuing the study. 
As Figure 6-8 showed, during periods of rising mortgage and futures 
prices, the holder of the call option incurred a loss in the option 
position modified by the premium received. This loss, coupled with the 
gain in mortgage value, resulted in a guaranteed position of earning a 
positive return equal to the call option premium. Had interest rates 
declined by a substantial amount resulting in mortgage values increasing by 
an amount larger than the call premium, the holder of the call would end up 
with a mean return that was inferior to the unhedged position. Relatively 
small increases in mortgage value, on the other hand, would enhance the 
returns if the position is covered by selling call options. 
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The average at-the-money call option premia for this period was 2.798 
points or $2,798. Moreover, in agreement with the Black option pricing 
theory, the premia for in-the-money and out-of-the-money options were 3.894 
and 1.922 respectively.The average gain in the mortgage position, 
however, is only 1.182 points or $1,182. So, in accordance with the above 
discussion, and as is evident from Tables 6-4 and 6-5, the return for the 
covered-with-call position is close to the average call premium. Thus the 
sell-call strategy provides for an average capital gains which is better 
than the unhedged mortgage position. 
Variability of returns are lowered considerably when compared to the 
unhedged mortgage as well as mortgages hedged with futures contracts. When 
standard deviation is considered, the lagged series performs much better 
than the contemporaneous. For example, standard deviation is lowered by 63 
percent for the uncorrected ratio of the lagged relationship compared to 
the unhedged mortgage, and by 46 percent compared to the future hedge. For 
the contemporaneous series these values are at 53 and 36 percent 
respectively. 
So, for the case of rising prices, the short call strategy performs 
better than the unhedged and the hedged with futures series both in terms 
of the magnitude and the variability of returns.^' 
The reverse series represent a simulated case for the general rise in 
interest rates over the entire period under study. Again, in all cases the 
hedger is doing better with call options than without. A loss of -1.182 
points for the contemporaneous relationship is changed to much lower losses 
or even gains, -0.071 for the corrected optimal ratio hedge with the short 
position in at-the-money call and 0.418 for the uncorrected optimal hedge 
Recall that 3C/9E < 0 as was previously shown. 
Comparison of Figures 6-6 and 6-7 similarly suggests that during 
periods of rising values the sell-call strategy should provide better 
capital gains than the sell-futures strategy. 
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ratio. There is even a potential gain of 1.452 points for the one-to one 
hedge. For the lagged series, optimal hedges always provide positive net 
returns except when the corrected ratio is used for the out-of-the-money 
call. 
Referring to Figure 6-8, the above results are as predicted. During 
periods of falling values, if the mortgage is covered by selling call 
options, the loss in mortgage value is to be lower by an amount equal to 
the call premium. This is because when futures prices are falling, the 
holder of the call does not exercise the option. The writer, then, simply 
gains the premium which in turn will soften the loss of mortgage value. 
For example, the premia for the at-the money-option, 2.193 points or $2,193 
is roughly equal to the difference between the returns on the hedged and 
the unhedged mortgage positions."" In other words, the loss in the hedged 
mortgage position is less than the loss in the unhedged portfolio by an 
amount which is close to the call option premia. 
Standard deviation results are not as promising under a falling price 
scenario when short call hedging is used. Although in all cases this 
strategy lowers variability compared to the unhedged mortgage, the futures 
hedging may be a better choice. Generally the short call position for the 
reverse series generates returns that are much closer to the futures return 
while the standard deviation is higher than that of futures for all cases 
of optimal hedging. The one-to-one hedge has a better than futures 
standard deviation. 
Although these results apply to this particular series, the graphical 
representation is supported nevertheless. Hedging mortgages with selling 
For optimal hedges, the corrected optimal hedge of the 
contemporaneous reverse series as an example, the loss of unhedged 
mortgage, -$1,182, is reduced by selling call options to a loss of- $71; a 
reduction in loss equal to $1,111 which is smaller than the option premia. 
However, since the optimal hedge ratio of .6132 was used in this case to 
hedge $163,079 of mortgages with selling one call option, the loss in 
mortgage value is, on average, higher at -1.182/.6132 or -1.927. The 
reduction in loss is then much closer to the call premium. 
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call options reduces the potential loss from falling prices while ensuring 
a positive return, although of limited magnitude, when mortgage values rise 
sharply. Moreover, the variability of returns are lowered with this type 
of hedge. 
Hedging mortgage risk by buying put options should limit the losses 
to the put premium if prices and values decline. Rising portfolio value 
due to lower interest rates will, however, be also modified. The banker 
who hedges with the buy put strategy thus substitutes lower gains in return 
for limiting losses. 
Over the period under the current study, the investor who chose this 
method of hedging did not do well in term of returns. For the original 
series, lagged or contemporaneous hedges with either one-to-one or optimal 
hedge ratios, the gain in mortgage portfolio value was substantially 
lowered. The one-to-one hedge with at-the-money put created a loss of 
-1.050 points compared to a potential gain of 1.182 points for the 
contemporaneous unhedged mortgage, a decline in mean capital gains of 
$2,232 or 188 percent. The optimal hedge ratios resulted in losses of -
.919 and -.449 points for the uncorrected and corrected for autocorrelation 
respectively. In percentage terms the above losses were smaller, 177 and 
138 percent respectively, as compared to the one-to-one hedge. 
The purchase of in-the-money puts magnified the negative effects 
which may be explained by guessing that the higher premium paid for this 
option more that offset the benefit of exercising it. In other words, 
since in this period interest rates declined and prices increased, the 
exercise of the option would be rarely warranted. Thus, a person who paid 
an average premium of 2.627 points ($2,627) for the at-the-money put or 
3.636 points ($3,636) for the in-the-money option eliminated potential 
gains in mortgage value at a high cost. Conversely, the out-of-the-money 
put with average premium of $1,829 provided for smaller declines in 
portfolio value as compared to the unhedged position. 
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The strategy, however, was quite successful in lowering the 
variability of returns. The one-to-one hedges lowered the standard 
deviation of return from an unhedged value of 4.823 points to 2.734 and 
3.113 points for the lagged and contemporaneous relationships respectively. 
These numbers mean a reduction of 43 and 35 percent for each case. The 
comparable futures hedging accounts for a smaller reduction in variability. 
In other words, the one-to-one hedge with futures has a standard deviation 
of return which is 26 percent higher than the contemporaneous buy-put hedge 
and 25 percent higher than the lagged relationship's variability. This is 
true for the put with exercise price other than E=Ft as well. 
Optimal hedges with the put option were also very helpful in lowering 
the standard deviation of returns. The lagged relationship performed 
better than the contemporaneous. In the best case, uncorrected hedge of 
the lagged relationship, variability of the unhedged return was lowered to 
2.889 points, a reduction of 40 percent. The corrected optimal hedge of 
the contemporaneous series was the least successful and lowered the 
standard deviation by 9 percent to 4.408 points. On average, variability 
was lower by 25 percent when mortgage portfolio was hedged with the buy-put 
strategy. 
When compared to the futures hedging, the results are a bit puzzling. 
It is expected that under the original series of rising prices the strategy 
should perform better than the futures position. For the one-to-one and 
the uncorrected optimal hedges this seems to be true. Although in both 
cases, and for the lagged as well as the contemporaneous relationships, 
returns are lower than the futures case, standard deviation of returns are 
smaller as well. For both relationships, however, the corrected optimal 
hedge accounts for a higher variability that the future hedge. 
Falling prices represented by the reverse series resulted in a loss 
of -1.182 points in the value of the unhedged contemporaneous position. 
The price did not, however, fall by enough to compensate for the premium 
paid for the put option. Had prices fallen by a large amount, according to 
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Figure 6-9, the loss would not have exceeded the paid premium. In this 
case, the average loss for the optimal hedge ratios of both relationships 
is indeed on par with the average premium paid for the put option. The 
average premium paid to buy the put option is 3.440 points ($3,440) and the 
average loss is 3.040 points ($3,040). So, in fact optimal hedges did 
limit the loss at a level very close to average put premium, while the one-
to-one hedges showed a smaller loss. This is expected as a one-to-one 
hedge covers a $100,000 mortgage with one option contract while the optimal 
hedge represents the hedge of a larger value with the same contract, 
(n* < |l|). The optimal hedge should then account for a larger loss.®° 
The move to in-the-money puts with an average premium of 4.522 points 
magnified the losses as well as increasing the variability of returns. 
Lower priced out-of-the-money puts, with average premium of 2.478 points, 
created smaller losses but higher standard deviations. This, in general, 
is not to be expected since in a period of falling prices the put is 
exercised. It must then be theorized that either due to a lower than 
expected rise in interest rates or as a result of overpricing of puts for 
the period under study, this hedging method was not successful for the 
reverse series. In other words, mortgage prices did not fall by enough to 
create large enough gains from the exercise of the costly put to compensate 
the buyer of the option for the paid premium. 
The sell call-buy put strategy using at-the-money options for the 
original mortgage series generally provide returns and standard deviations 
similar to the unhedged position. The optimal hedge of the lagged and 
contemporaneous series increased returns by a low of .220 (18 percent) and 
For the corrected hedge ratio of the contemporaneous series, for 
example, the hedge ratio of .6132 means that (1/.6132)* $100,000 of 
mortgage portfolio is being hedged with the purchase of one put option 
contract. Consequently, the average loss of $1,182 per $100,000 of 
mortgages would on average equal to 1/.6136 times as high for this optimal 
hedge. The loss, in other words is 1.631 * $1,182, or $1,928 for the 
optimal hedge. So, the average loss for the one-to-one hedge is smaller 
than the average loss for the optimal hedges. 
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a high of .750 points ( 63 percent), accompanied with changes in 
variability of 12 percent to 27 percent lower. In this period of rising 
prices, the exercise of the call created loses that were more than offset 
by the gains in mortgage value modified by the call premia received and the 
put premia paid. Thus a positive return was generated and variability was 
reduced in all cases. 
The reverse series generated large losses for optimal hedges compared 
to the unhedged position, although the variability of returns were lowered 
as well in all cases of hedging with the at-the-money options. The losses 
were increased between 11 and 45 percent and standard deviations were 
lowered by 16 to 26 percent. The one-to-one hedge lowered the mean capital 
loss as well as lowering the variability. 
When compared to the futures hedge, the synthetic futures position 
created more erratic results. Return were much higher that the futures 
position for the original series and lower considerably for the reverse 
series. Standard deviations were similar in all cases. 
So, although for the combined series the results were quite similar, 
the original and reverse series compare differently to the futures hedge. 
The use of options with an exercise price different than the initial 
futures price created higher fluctuations in returns and increased the 
standard deviation greatly. When E is smaller than F-p, the profits for the 
original series soar and the losses for the reverse series diminish. This 
may be due to the fact that the premium received for the new in-the-money 
call far exceeds the premium paid for the out of the money put, on average 
3.893 versus 1.829 points. Rising prices triggered the exercise of the 
call but did not create big enough losses to offset the large net premium 
received as well as the gain in mortgage value. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE COMPARISON OF FIXED AND ADJUSTABLE RATE 
MORTGAGES BASED ON OPTIONS HEDGING STRATEGIES 
The choices that a financial institution has available in hedging the 
interest rate risk associated with its portfolio of fixed rate mortgages 
include offering adjustable rate mortgages and "covering" the fixed rate 
mortgage with various options on T-bond futures. If the institution 
chooses to offer ARMs solely, changes in the short term interest rates 
translate into similar changes in mortgage rates, thus leaving the 
portfolio value relatively intact. If, on the other hand, the choice was 
to cover the risk of the FRM with options on financial futures, the 
additional cost of hedging needs to be addressed more carefully. 
The empirical study of the previous Chapter 6 clearly showed the 
benefits that exist in hedging mortgage portfolios with options on futures. 
This chapter continues the study by simulating possible changes in mortgage 
rates and analyzing the effects on the unhedged FRM portfolio as well as 
portfolios hedged with various options strategies. Had mortgage rates 
changed, as allowed by the limitations of an ARM, the value of the ARM 
portfolio would remain relatively constant while the FRM value would 
fluctuate. If the mortgage bankers were able to "insure" against adverse 
and undesirable changes in the value of their FRM, they should be willing 
to hold them as well. This "insurance policy" may be in the form of 
hedging strategies with options on financial futures contracts. 
Marshal and Colwell compared the fixed and variable mortgage rates 
based on the cost of hedging the interest rate risk of FRMs with options on 
futures:^ 
What if the SSL decides to issue both fixed rate mortgages and 
variable rate mortgages? What should be the interest rate spread 
between the two mortgages? The fixed rate mortgage could be 
"converted" to a variable rate mortgage simply by purchasing a put 
option on a futures contract and rolling it over until the fixed rate 
David W. Marshal and Peter P. Colwell, "Hedging Mortgage 
Portfolios with Options on Futures," Real Estate Development. Fall 1986; 8-
9. 
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mortgage is paid off. If the only difference between a fixed rate 
mortgage and a variable rate mortgage is the fact that a fixed rate 
mortgage has an additional expense of purchasing options, then the 
spread in the interest rate between the two types of mortgages should 
be no more than the cost of the option. If every nine months the S&L 
has to spend an additional $600, for example, in order to convert an 
$80,000 fixed rate mortgage, an extra cost of $600 for the required 
option could be covered by charging a rate which is 1 percent higher 
than the variable rate, {($600*1.333)/$80,000} = .01.®^ This 1 
percent, then, should be the spread between the fixed and the 
variable rates. 
Since the default risk is generally greater for ARMs due to the fact 
that lower income buyers may qualify easier as a result of lower initial 
rates, mortgage bankers may prefer FRHs under comparable cost and risk 
structure. They should be indifferent to hedging the risk with ARMs or by 
hedging with futures options as long as the cost of options hedging is not 
prohibitive and is taken in to account when fixed mortgage rates are 
determined. If the same purpose is served by either of the two hedging 
methods, ARMs or options, then the cost of the option as the "insurance 
instrument" should be the difference between the ARM rate and the FRM rate. 
This amount represents the "conversion cost" of "neutralizing" the FRM risk 
structure similar to that of an ARM. 
The current study continues by performing a simulation study similar 
to the one performed by Marshal and Colwell to determine the benefits of 
hedging with futures options under various interest rates scenarios, 
followed by a historical comparison of the fixed-adjustable rate 
differential to the cost of hedging with interest rate put options. "If 
the spread in the marketplace is larger than the spread as determined by 
hedging with options, then the S&L can benefit from the situation by 
offering "overpriced" fixed rates and converting them to variables at a 
cheaper cost than is implied by the interest rate spread. The spread ought 
to narrow as S&Ls compete against each other in this way. 
The $600 is spent every nine months which translates into a 
yearly cost of $800. In order to raise $800 on an $80,000 loan, the rate 
must be increased by 1 percent. 
Marshal and Colwell, 1986: 8. 
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Each simulation exercise involves generating a random series of 
interest rates by allowing the rates to change randomly within 
predetermined annual and lifetime caps. The new interest rate series is 
then used to analyze the effects of random changes in interest rates on the 
unhedged mortgage value as well as the value of the FRHs hedged with the 
three options strategies discussed in Chapter 6: writing calls, buying 
puts, and the combination of the two. This exercise will be different from 
the one performed in the preceding chapter as the changes in interest rate 
are completely randomized, with no trends in the direction of the 
changes.^ 
It is assumed that the value of the mortgage and the T-bond futures 
are correlated as determined in Chapter 6 for the lagged series corrected 
for auto correlation. In other words, an optimal hedge ratio of .7993 is 
used in hedging the mortgage portfolio with futures options. This choice 
was made because R-squared was the largest for that particular series. 
Marshal and Colwell had assumed a one-to-one hedge ratio. 
As an example, on 1/15/83, the price of a $100,000 mortgage with an 8 
percent coupon, 30 years to maturity and prepayment in 12 years is known to 
have been 70.884 percent of par from the empirical study of Chapter 6. If 
the interest rates were to increase by 1 percent during the six-month hedge 
period, 1/83-7/83, the value of the mortgage would drop to 65.595 percent 
of par, a decline of $4,289.00. However, since one option contract is 
being used to hedge an optimal mortgage amount of (1/.7993)*$100,000 = 
$125,109, the actual loss in mortgage value is magnified to $5,365.^^ 
The "combined" mortgage and futures price series in Chapter 6 
provided similar circumstances of random interest rate changes, although it 
was still only one of the many possible interest rate scenarios. The 
current exercise, however, is performed for 42 different simulated interest 
rate and price series. 
Recall from Chapter 5 that to account for the basis in hedging 
with futures options, 1/n* units of the cash instrument were assumed to be 
hedged with one option contract on T-bond futures. 
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On the same day, three options market strategies might have been 
considered: a call option with strike price nearest the current price of 
the T-bond futures contract could have been sold for 2.547 points or 
$2,547; an at-the-money put option could have been purchased at a cost of 
$2,391; and finally a combination of the above actions at a net cost of -
$156 could have been taken. As a result of the 1 percent change in 
interest rates, the futures price would decline, thus prompting the 
exercise of the put and would cause the call to remain unexercised. The 
new price for the futures contract may be calculated as follows. 
Since the price of the futures contract on 1/15/83 was 75.656 percent 
of par, it provided for a yield of 11.457 percent (the coupon rate of 8 
percent and maturity of 15 years are known). The price at the new rate of 
11.475+1 or 12.475 percent may then be calculated at 70.279 percent of par. 
The exercise of the put option would generate $3,330.00 of profits for the 
mortgage banker, 76.00 -70.279 -2.391 = 3.330 points, which offsets some of 
the loss in mortgage value. The financial institution loses only $2,065 
compared to potential loss of $5,365.00 for the unhedged mortgage. The 
call strategy would lower the loss in mortgage value by the amount of 
premium received, thus the banker would incur a net loss of $2,818.00 
($5,365 - $2,547). Finally, the strategy of buy put-sell call, in turn, 
would provide for a profit of $482.00 instead of the large loss of the 
unhedged mortgage portfolio. 
For the case of a decline in interest rates, 1 percent lower for 
example, the value of one mortgage contract climbs by 4.701 points to 
75.585 percent of par, creating a gain of (1/.7993)*$4,701 = $5,881 in the 
mortgage position. The value of the futures contract at the same time 
increases to 81.677 percent of par. In this case, the put will remain 
unexercised, lowering the capital gains of the unhedged mortgage by the 
paid premium of 2.391 points to $3,490. The loss incurred from the 
exercise of the call by its holder, on the other hand, results in a net 
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gain of $2,407. The combined put-call strategy lowers the return to a 
modest gain of $16. 
For both of the above cases of change in interest rates, the standard 
deviation of returns may also be calculated and compared to the return 
distribution of the unhedged mortgage portfolio. 
The current study considers 42 scenarios of random changes in 
interest rates over the period January 1983 to December 1991. For each of 
the 101 six-month hedge periods, an initial series of mortgage prices, 
futures prices, and put and call option premia is assumed as will be 
discussed in the next section. Interest rates are then allowed to vary 
randomly during each of the hedge periods, resulting in net capital gains 
or losses in the unhedged mortgage value or mortgages hedged with options 
strategies. The mean capital gains and standard deviation of returns on an 
annual basis and for the entire period under study are then calculated and 
analyzed. 
Next, the put option hedging strategy will be discussed further as 
the potential hedging choice that may best suit the financial institution's 
objectives. The cost of buying put options on financial futures will, in 
turn, be used to compare the fixed and adjustable mortgage rates and to 
test a hypothesis regarding the spread between the two rates. 
The Results of the Simulated Study 
The simulation study involves generating 42 random series of interest 
rates and comparing the value of the original mortgage portfolios to the 
average of values from each of the new interest rate series. The change in 
the value of the unhedged mortgage when interest rates change at random may 
then be evaluated. Similarly, the change in value of the mortgage 
portfolio hedged with one of the option strategies under the same scenarios 
of random changes in interest rates may be examined and compared to the 
change in the value of the unhedged mortgage. The results of the 
simulation study are reported in the next section. 
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Data specification 
It is assumed that the financial institution continuously owns a 
portfolio of 8 percent, 30 year mortgages with 12 years to prepayment. At 
the start of each hedge period of six months duration, the mortgage value 
and the price of the T-bond futures contracts are the same as the ones used 
in the empirical study of Chapter 6. Moreover, at the beginning of each 
period, the S&L may choose to engage in one of the three options 
strategies, also with the specifications identical to those explained in 
Chapter 6. It is further assumed that after the hedge initiation, long 
term interest rates may fluctuate by a random amount within given bounds. 
The current study assumes an interest rate cap of 1 percent per six-month 
period. The FRM rate is thus allowed to increase by a maximum of 1 percent 
during the hedge period or it may decline by as much.^® 
Strictly for comparison purposes, and only pertinent to the 
particular period under this study, a simple regression analysis was 
performed to compare changes in short term rates and the long term mortgage 
rates.®' For the period January 1983 to December 1991, monthly data on 
the three and six-month Treasury bill rates were collected from the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. These rates were looked upon as the index rate to which 
a margin is added to determine the ARM rate. Two situations are 
considered: for the contemporaneous series, the relationship between the 
changes in mortgage rates and the rate change on Treasury bills in the same 
month are compared. The lagged relationship considers the relation of the 
The interest rate cap on mortgage rates was chosen at 1 percent 
per six-month hedge period after an examination of the movements in rates 
over the period under consideration. The comparison of the changes in the 
short term and the long term interest rates that follow are for "rough" 
comparisons and have no bearing on the study. 
The literature on the term structure of interest rate is vast. The 
current study does not attempt to capture the relationship between the long 
term and the short term rates with the simple regression performed. The 
slope coefficient of the regression line is only used as a "rough" relation 
factor between the two rates. 
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change in mortgage rate to the change in T-bill rate of one month earlier. 
The result of regressing FRM rates with specifications identical to those 
of Chapter 6 on the three or six-month T-bill rates for both relationships 
are reported in Table 7-1. The mortgage rate is denoted as 'm', and 'tb' 
represents the Treasury bill rate. The regression coefficient for the T-
bill rate, b, is the measure used in translating the short term rate 
changes to the corresponding change in the long term rates. Thus, the 2 
percent annual cap assumed for the FRH rate is a response to a cap range of 
2.63 to 2.73 percent annually for the ARM, depending on which slope 
coefficient is considered. 
Table 7-1. Regression estimates for changes in mortgage rate and the 
Treasury bill rate 
CONTEMPORANEOUS 
T-BILL RATES 
Am, = a + b.Atb, 
LAGGED 
T-BILL RATES 
Am, = a + b.Atb,., 
a 
b 
n 
d.f. 
R-SQUARED 
THREE-MONTH 
BILL 
5.35 
.72 
102 
100 
.50 
SIX-MONTH 
BILL 
5.10 
.75 
102 
100 
.54 
THREE-MONTH 
BILL 
5.28 
.73 
101 
99 
.51 
SIX-MONTH 
BILL 
4.99 
.76 
101 
99 
.56 
The structure of the simulation study performed is as follows: There 
are 101 hedge periods considered in this part of the study for the case of 
the lagged mortgage rate and futures price series. During the first hedge 
period, interest rates are allowed to move within the given bounds. The 
value of the unhedged mortgage and the mortgage portfolios covered with the 
option strategies will thus change. During the subsequent period, the 
exercise is repeated starting with the actual mortgage rate at the 
beginning of the period as reported in Chapter 6. Similarly, for each of 
the remaining hedge periods, the study begins with the mortgage rate 
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reported in Chapter 6 and allows for a random change in rates within the 
given bounds and measures the change in the unhedged and "covered" mortgage 
portfolios. The sum of the changes in value for all of the hedge periods 
is then reported as the change in value for the entire period under study. 
The exercise is then repeated 42 times. 
Return distribution for the "worst case" scenario 
Under the worst case scenario, interest rates increase by the maximum 
allowed. This means a maximum rate hike of 1 percent per hedge period. 
The value of the mortgage portfolio, hence, drops during each of the hedge 
periods as discussed in the introduction to Chapter 7, and so does the 
price of the futures contract. The buy-put hedging strategy limits the 
losses to the extent of the paid premium and the sell-call strategy softens 
the loss by the amount of premium received. The results for the entire 
period under study are summarized in Table 7-2. Minimum and maximum 
returns to each strategy for the entire period under study are presented in 
the first and second columns respectively, and the next two columns in 
Table 7-2 show the mean return and the standard deviation of returns for 
the unhedged as well as those for mortgages hedged with the three option 
strategies. 
As is shown in Table 7-2, the mean return for the worst case scenario 
is -5.396 points, or a loss of $5,396.^® Since mortgage values fell in 
every hedge period as a result of higher rates, there was a continuous loss 
throughout the entire period under study as is shown by the annual return 
distribution. Table 7-3. The maximum loss (minimum return) for the entire 
period under study is -6.362 points, occurring in 1991, and the minimum 
loss (maximum return) for the entire period happened in 1984 at -4.227 
points. Although rates increased by a constant 1 percent per hedge period, 
the standard deviation of changes in values (returns) is .679 points. 
Mean expected return and mean capital gains are used 
interchangeably in this chapter. 
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Table 7-2. Comparison of the unhedged mortgage position under the worst 
case scenario of changes in interest rates to various hedged 
positions...lagged relationship 
STRATEGY MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN GAIN GAIN OF 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED 
MORTGAGE -6.362 -4.227 -5.396 0.679 
MORTGAGE E<F 
SELL CALL 
OPTION 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-5.363 
-5.760 
-6.501 
0.654 
-0.612 
-1.702 
-1.490 
-2.594 
-3.460 
0.954 
0.871 
0.824 
MORTGAGE 
BUY PUT 
OPTION 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-5.376 
—4.064 
-3.855 
-0.695 
0.508 
1.555 
-2.795 
-1.593 
-0.601 
0.852 
0.849 
0.951 
MORTGAGE 
SELL CALL 
BUY PUT 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-1.280 
-0.781 
-1.932 
3.087 
3.340 
3.762 
1.102 
1.200 
1.326 
0.892 
0.867 
0.926 
It may seem that in the case of a continuous increase in interest rates, 
there should not be a standard deviation to returns. However, since the 
starting mortgage values at the beginning of each period were quite 
different in response to different initial mortgage rates, and because a 
given change in interest rate does not translate into an equal change in 
mortgage value as determined from the Thorndike Encvclooedia of Banking and 
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Table 7-3. Annual return distribution and the minimum-maximum pairs for 
the hedged and unhedged mortgage positions under the worst case 
scenario of changes in interest rates...at the-money options 
reported only 
STRATEGY MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN GAIN GAIN OF 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED 1983 -4.578 -4.289 -4.462 0.085 
MORTGAGE 84 -4.594 -4.227 -4.423 0.129 
85 -4.986 -4.506 -4.730 0.180 
86 -5.861 -5.226 -5.610 0.188 
87 -6.296 -5.676 -5.939 0.225 
88 -5.872 -5.570 -5.691 0.101 
89 -6.218 -5.450 -5.871 0.285 
90 -6.140 -5.777 -5.992 0.103 
91 -6.362 -6.212 -6.294 0.050 
MORTGAGE 1983 -2.476 -1.342 -1.870 0.337 
+ 84 -3.016 -1.555 -2.081 0.431 
SELL CALL 85 -3.022 -1.523 -2.331 0.410 
OPTION 86 -2.726 -0.612 -1.730 0.643 
87 -5.760 1.695 -2.810 1.044 
88 -3.254 -1.671 -2.626 0.450 
89 -4.218 -2.434 -3.290 0.508 
90 -4.584 -2.694 -3.419 0.509 
91 -4.116 -3.696 -4.026 0.165 
MORTGAGE 1983 -2.815 -0.961 -1.716 0.743 
+ 84 -3.452 -1.405 -2.280 0.549 
BUY PUT 85 -3.098 0.508 -1.572 1.005 
OPTION 86 -3.497 -0.590 -1.709 0.878 
87 -4.064 0.033 -1.770 1.212 
88 -2.843 -0.816 -1.706 0.584 
89 -1.818 0.036 -1.061 0.647 
90 -1.864 -0.440 -1.228 0.412 
91 -1.288 -0.105 -0.877 0.416 
MORTGAGE 1983 -0.721 1.586 0.876 0.623 
+ 84 -0.781 0.920 0.062 0.425 
SELL CALL 85 -0.239 3.055 0.827 0.966 
+ 86 -0.229 3.340 2.171 0.749 
BUY PUT 87 -0.811 2.740 1.359 1.014 
88 0.652 2.107 1.359 0.489 
89 0.688 2.044 1.520 0.407 
90 0.621 1.919 1.345 0.369 
91 0.962 2.004 1.397 0.361 
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Financial Tables. Revised Edition, there remained a standard deviation to 
returns of the worst case scenario.^' 
The sell-call strategy lowered the loss from the unhedged mortgage 
portfolio by 52 percent to -2.594 points. As expected, the decrease in 
loss in the amount of $2,802 is very close to the average premium paid for 
the call options, $2,788. The standard deviation of returns was increased 
by 25 percent to .871 points. The maximum loss under this hedging strategy 
is -5.760 points occured in 1987, and the minimum loss is -.612 points, 
occuring in 1986. 
The buy-put strategy performed very well under the worst case 
scenario. The average loss of the unhedged position was lowered to -1.593 
point, a decrease of approximately 70 percent, while the standard deviation 
increased by 28 percent. The minimum return of the position was -$4,064 
and the maximum was actually a moderate profit of $508. 
The sell call-buy put hedging strategy created much improved returns 
at a cost of 28 percent higher variability. The mean return from the 
mortgage position hedged with buying put and selling call options was a 
profit of $1,200, an increase of 122 percent. Annual return distribution 
results show that the continuous loss from the unhedged mortgages were 
transformed into a profit for every year in the period under study for this 
hedging choice. 
The use of options with an exercise price other than the current 
futures price created return distributions that are consistent with the 
above results. The in-the-money call, E<F, and put, E>F, improved the 
returns without much adverse effects on the standard deviations. 
For example, in January 1983, mortgage value as found from 
Thorndike was 70.884 percent of par to yield 13.354 (the current rate at 
that time). A 1 percent increase in rates lowered the mortgage value to 
66.594 percent of par, a loss in value equal to $4,289. Starting with a 
mortgage value of 90.041 percent of par, in January 1987, to yield the then 
current 10.354 percent rate, an increase of 1 percent in rates would cause 
a fall in mortgage value in the amount of $6,008 to 84.033 of par. 
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The mean return of the call strategy with the smaller exercise price is 
-1.490 points, a loss smaller than the at-the-money call position by 1.104 
points at the expense of .083 points higher variability. The overall 
reduction of loss compared to the unhedged mortgage is 3.906 points or 72 
percent, but the standard deviation, at .954 points, is higher by 
approximately 40 percent. This means an increase in variability by .275 
points which may 
not be alarming due to the fact that the standard deviation of returns for 
the unhedged mortgage were quite low to begin with. For the in-the-money 
put, the mean return is a loss of -.601 points, smaller than the loss of 
the unhedged position by 4.795 points and better than the at-the-money put 
by .992 points. The variability is higher than the call with E=F by .102 
points and larger than the unhedged position by .272 points. 
Return distribution for the "best case" scenario 
Under the best case scenario, interest rates decline by 1 percent per 
hedge period, thus raising the mortgage value as shown for the entire 
period under study in Table 7-4 as well as raising the futures contract 
price. The call strategy, in this case, would set a limit on the gains and 
the put strategy should lower potential gains to the extent of the premium 
paid. 
The mean unhedged return for this period is a gain of 5.938 points 
with a corresponding standard deviation of .755 points. On an annual 
basis, the unhedged mortgage portfolio exhibits a positive mean return for 
every year in the period 1983-91 as is shown in Table 7-5. The minimum 
return, occuring in 1984, is 4.620 and the highest gain is 7.012 in 1991. 
Hedging with the call option in this case lowers the return 
considerably. The mean return, $1,506, is lower by $4,430 and the standard 
deviation of returns is higher at $941. Minimum and maximum returns are 
both much smaller. The maximum return from this position is only $3,319 
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Table 7-4. Comparison of the unhedged mortgage position under the best 
case scenario of changes in interest rates to various hedged 
positions...lagged relationship 
STRATEGY MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN GAIN GAIN OF 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED 
MORTGAGE 4.620 7.012 5.938 0.755 
MORTGAGE 
SELL CALL 
OPTION 
E<F -2.341 2.381 0.610 0.956 
E=F -1.135 3.319 1.506 0.941 
E>F 0.147 4.475 2.640 0.916 
MORTGAGE 
BUY PUT 
OPTION 
E<F 2.345 6.003 4.093 0.822 
E=F 1.314 5.456 3.296 0.876 
E>F -2.436 4.628 2.287 1.038 
MORTGAGE 
SELL CALL 
BUY PUT 
E<F -4.282 0.897 -1.225 1.031 
E=F -4.251 0.959 -1.127 1.012 
E>F -5.435 1.288 -1.001 1.089 
with the minimum return actually well on the negative side at -$1,135. 
During three of the hedge periods starting in 1985, and two periods 
beginning in 1987, the institution incurred a loss by engaging in this 
strategy. The largest loss of -$1,135 occurred for the hedge period of 
October 1985 to April 1986. The much larger premia of in-the-money calls 
made the results less desirable, mean return of only $610 with standard 
deviation of $956. 
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Table 7-5. Annual return distribution and the minimum-maximum pairs for 
the hedged and unhedged mortgage positions under the best case 
scenario of changes in interest rates...at-the-money options 
reported only 
STRATEGY MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN STANDARD 
CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL DEVIATION 
GAIN GAIN GAIN OP 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED 1983 4.701 5.038 4.899 0.098 
MORTGAGE 84 4.620 5.059 4.855 0.150 
85 4.964 5.484 5.201 0.200 
86 5.749 6.453 6.177 0.210 
87 6.254 6.937 6.542 0.248 
88 6.140 6.466 6.270 0.108 
89 5.590 6.848 6.465 0.317 
90 6.362 6.760 6.599 0.114 
91 6.845 7.012 6.935 0.057 
MORTGAGE 1983 0.775 2.824 1.742 0.857 
+ 84 0.884 3.319 2.097 0.602 
SELL CALL 85 -1.135 2.803 1.275 0.485 
OPTION 86 -0.892 2.838 1.554 0.745 
87 -0.341 3.179 1.834 0.932 
88 1.344 2.827 1.981 0.376 
89 0.202 1.320 0.633 0.327 
90 0.098 2.032 0.948 0.308 
91 0.969 2.256 1.463 0.399 
MORTGAGE 1983 1.937 3.507 2.689 1.022 
+ 84 1.868 3.835 2.874 0.530 
BUY PUT 85 1.862 3.718 2.617 0.476 
OPTION 86 1.314 4.078 2.404 0.693 
87 1.801 5.546 3.719 0.882 
88 2.725 4.044 3.450 0.344 
89 3.261 4.598 3.954 0.316 
90 3.687 4.663 4.254 0.267 
91 3.899 4.876 4.227 0.339 
MORTGAGE 1983 -1.426 0.474 -0.469 0.535 
84 -0.606 0.959 0.117 0.465 
SELL CALL 85 -3.978 0.053 -1.310 1.309 
+ 86 -4.251 -0.862 -2.219 0.839 
BUY PUT 87 -2.281 0.590 -0.989 1.035 
88 -1.588 0.014 -0.840 0.462 
89 -2.278 -1.389 -1.877 0.246 
90 -2.317 -0.294 -1.397 0.556 
91 -1.684 -0.775 -1.230 0.309 
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The buy-put strategy lowered the mean return by $2,669 which as 
previously shown in Figure 6-9 (page 94) is close to the average put 
premium of $2,627 points. The rise in standard deviation was not as 
dramatic as was for the sell-call strategy, a 16 percent increase to $876 
compared to the 25 percent increase in variability for the call position. 
During none of the hedge periods did the S&L lose any money, although the 
minimum return was at a low of $1,314. Since in this period of rising 
prices the put was generally not exercised, the higher average premia of 
the in-the-money option lowered the mean return to $2,287 with a 
corresponding 37 percent increase in standard deviation. 
The combined put-call strategy is not desirable under the best case 
scenario. The mean return from this strategy is a loss of -$1,127 and the 
banker loses money in 88 of the 101 hedge periods. In the years 1986 and 
1989-1991, in fact, there was never any profits despite declining rates 
when this strategy was utilized. The mean return was positive only in 
1984, but the standard deviation was also 2.5 times as large in the same 
year as compared to the unhedged position. In general, the standard 
deviation for the entire period was raised by 49 percent to $1,012. 
The above two cases represent extreme interest rate changes and may 
not be likely to happen often. During the period 1983-1991, mortgage rates 
increased in 40 of the 101 six-month hedge periods, and declined in 61 
periods. The increase in rates was larger than 1 percent per six-month on 
9 occasions: 4 hedge periods starting in the latter part of 1985, 2 in the 
mid-1986 and two in the spring of 1989. The largest six-month increase in 
mortgage rates, 1.625 percent, was for the hedge period November 1985 to 
May 1986, followed by 1.470 percent for the hedge period starting in 
October 1985 and 1.450 percent for the period starting in December of the 
same year. The mortgage rate declined by 1 percent only between April and 
October of 1987. 
During the same period, 1983-1991, the three-month Treasury bill rate 
increased by more than 2.5 percent in only 2 of the 101 hedge periods 
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considered, and declined by more than that amount on 5 occasions. The six-
month T-bill rate climbed over the 2.5 percent mark 3 times and deceased by 
a larger magnitude in six periods. Even allowing a tighter cap of 2 
percent annually on short term interest rates, the increase in rates 
surpassed the ceiling only 4 times for the three-month bill and also 4 
times in the case of the longer term security. The floor cap was reached 
on 9 occasions for the three-month and 11 times for the six-month bill. 
The study of these adverse cases in necessary, however, both because 
of the possibility of occurrence and more importantly due to the boundaries 
they set for the return distribution of various strategies. Table 7-6 
shows the lower and upper bounds for the mean return with and without 
options hedging. The minimum and maximum returns are also presented for 
each case. It is noticeable that the range of returns has decreased 
dramatically when the FRM portfolio is hedged with options on futures. 
Return distribution for the general simulated case 
The general case of changes in interest rates is considered next by 
simulating a rate change within the rate cap of +1 percent and the floor of 
-1 percent per hedge period. So, starting with the actual mortgage rate at 
the beginning of each period, rates are adjusted upward or down by a 
simulated amount for the 102 cases of the contemporaneous and the 101 
hedge periods of the lagged relationships.The mean and standard 
deviation of returns are reported in Table 7-7, and the minimum and maximum 
net capital gains are shown in Table 7-8. Finally, the annual return 
distribution for the unhedged mortgage and the hedged portfolios are 
depicted in Table 7-9. 
As an additional exercise, and for comparison purposes, the 
return distribution for the contemporaneous hedge of the mortgage 
portfolio, corrected for autocorrelation is also calculated in this 
section. 
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Table 7-6. The limits of return for the unhedged and hedged mortgage 
positions...at-the-money options 
LOWER UPPER RANGE 
BOUND BOUND 
UNHEDGED 
MORTGAGE 
MEAN 
MIN\MAX 
-5.396 
-6.362 
5.938 
7.012 
11.334 
13.374 
MORTGAGE 
+ 
SELL CALL 
OPTION 
MEAN 
MIN\MAX 
-2.594 
-5.760 
1.506 
3.319 
1.088 
9.079 
MORTGAGE 
+ 
BUY PUT 
OPTION 
MEAN 
MIN\MAX 
-1.593 
-4.064 
3.296 
5.456 
4.889 
9.520 
MORTGAGE 
+ 
SELL CALL 
+ 
BUY PUT 
MEAN 
MIN\MAX 
-1.127 
-4.251 
1.200 
3.340 
2.327 
7.591 
The lagged and the contemporaneous series resulted in very similar 
outcomes, thus for continuity purposes, only the lagged relationship is 
discussed in the rest of this section. 
The unhedged mortgage portfolio under simulated changes in rates has 
a mean return of $170 for the entire period under study, and the standard 
deviation of returns is $3,286. The minimum and maximum returns are 
-$6,358 and $6,975 respectively. 
Hedging with options on financial futures lowers the standard 
deviation considerably for all three strategies and for all exercise 
prices. The best results in lowering the variability occurred when a 
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Table 7-7. Return distribution for the hedged and unhedged mortgage 
positions resulting from simulated changes in interest 
rates...entire hedge period under study 
CONTEMPORANEOUS 
RELATIONSHIP 
LAGGED 
RELATIONSHIP 
STRATEGY 
MEAN 
RETURN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
OF 
RETURN 
MEAN 
RETURN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
OF 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED MORTGAGE 
BEST CASE 
WORST CASE 
SIMULATED 0.170 3.286 0.170 3.286 
MORTGAGE 
SELL CALL 
OPTION 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
0.902 
0.934 
0.912 
1.154 
1.583 
2.080 
1.052 
1.098 
1.056 
1.228 
1.725 
2.300 
MORTGAGE 
+ 
BUY PUT 
OPTION 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-0.781 
-0.715 
-0.568 
2.217 
1.692 
1.279 
-0.963 
-0.911 
-0.743 
2.461 
1.849 
1.354 
MORTGAGE 
+ 
SELL CALL 
BUY PUT 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
0.025 
0.122 
0.247 
0.945 
0.937 
1.004 
0.028 
0.126 
0.252 
1.001 
0.985 
1.055 
combined strategy of selling at-the-money calls and buying at-the-money 
puts was undertaken. 
The standard deviation of returns was lowered by 70 percent to $985 
with only a 25 percent drop in the mean return. Combining the in-the-money 
put with out-of-the-money call actually increased the mean return despite 
68 percent lower variability. 
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Table 7-8. Minimum and maximum values for the hedged and unhedged mortgage 
positions resulting from simulated changes in interest 
rates....entire hedge period under study 
CONTEMPORANEOUS 
RELATIONSHIP 
LAGGED 
RELATIONSHIP 
STRATEGY 
MEAN 
RETURN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
OF 
RETURN 
MEAN 
RETURN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
OF 
RETURN 
UNHEDGED MORTGAGE 
BEST CASE 
WORST CASE 
SIMULATED -6.358 6.975 -6.358 6.975 
MORTGAGE 
SELL CALL 
OPTION 
E<F 
E=P 
E>F 
-2.987 
-3.599 
-4.138 
3.626 
3.968 
4.422 
-2.962 
-3.595 
-4.185 
3.839 
4.126 
4.619 
MORTGAGE 
BUY PUT 
OPTION 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-4.759 
-4.037 
-4.747 
4.820 
4.159 
3.362 
-4.933 
-3.231 
-4.828 
4.873 
4.129 
3.249 
MORTGAGE 
SELL CALL 
BUY PUT 
E<F 
E=F 
E>F 
-3.203 
-3.070 
-3.762 
2.345 
2.408 
2.600 
-3.201 
-3.059 
-3.849 
2.431 
2.519 
2.686 
When used individually, the sell-call or buy-put strategies performed 
similarly in lowering the standard deviation of returns, 1.437 points lower 
for the put and a 1.561 points drop in the case of the call. The mean 
return was considerably lower than that of the unhedged mortgage when the 
put strategy was employed, and was increased by a large amount for the 
sell-call position. The new returns are -$911 and $1,098 respectively for 
the put and call strategies. 
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Table 7-9. Annual return distribution for the hedged and unhedged 
mortgage positions resulting from simulated changes in 
interest rates...at-the-money options reported only 
CONTEMPORANEOUS LAGGED 
RELATIONSHIP RELATIONSHIP 
MEAN STANDARD MEAN STANDARD 
STRATEGY YEAR RETURN DEVIATION RETURN DEVIATION 
OF OF 
RETURN RETURN 
UNHEDGED 1983 0.123 2.381 0.123 2.381 
MORTGAGE 84 0.017 2.407 0.017 2.407 
85 0.211 2.607 0.211 2.607 
86 0.147 3.000 0.147 3.000 
87 0.137 3.235 0.137 3.235 
88 0.144 3.044 0.144 3.044 
89 0.525 3.354 0.525 3.354 
90 0.166 3.291 0.166 3.291 
91 0.177 3.342 0.177 3.342 
MORTGAGE 1983 1.129 1.154 1.115 1.132 
+ 84 0.964 1.349 0.946 1.295 
SELL CALL 85 0.813 1.451 0.866 1.363 
OPTION 86 1.697 1.486 1.688 1.402 
87 0.994 1.829 1.043 1.724 
88 1.260 1.580 1.166 1.536 
89 0.543 1.338 1.292 1.297 
90 0.349 1.682 0.676 1.630 
91 0.448 1.514 0.473 1.487 
MORTGAGE 1983 -0.759 1.373 -0.827 1.286 
+ 84 -0.872 1.370 -0.902 1.313 
BUY PUT 85 -0.931 1.380 -0.983 1.305 
OPTION 86 -1.436 1.608 -1.471 1.527 
87 -0.955 1.878 -1.052 1.771 
88 -0.822 1.612 -0.909 1.564 
89 -0.151 1.809 -0.295 1.760 
90 -0.284 1.578 -0.435 1.542 
91 -0.260 1.744 -0.057 1.559 
MORTGAGE 1983 0.255 0.641 0.215 0.634 
+ 84 0.144 0.311 0.105 0.271 
SELL CALL 85 -0.135 1.028 -0.111 0.914 
+ 86 0.110 1.311 0.113 1.231 
BUY PUT 87 0.377 1.129 0.358 1.027 
88 0.338 0.699 0.312 0.652 
89 -0.197 0.900 -0.179 0.868 
90 0.112 0.785 0.114 0.739 
91 0.134 0.729 0.074 0.718 
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The $741 drop in the mean return when the put is purchased, may be 
looked upon as the cost of lowering the standard deviation of return by 
hedging with the at-the-money put option. While it may seem like hedging 
with call options actually enhances profits, closer analysis of Table 7-7, 
reveals that the lower limits of return allow for a smaller loss in the 
case of the put hedging while providing for greater upper bounds on profits 
when compared to hedging with the call option. 
Moreover, the minimum loss is smaller in the case of covering the FRM 
with puts and the maximum gain is higher for this strategy. These results, 
combined with the fact that financial institutions' goal is primarily to 
protect their mortgage value from falling, may point to the put strategy as 
the more advisable choice. Buying put options sets a limit on losses while 
the sell-call choice only lowers the potential loss if interest rates 
increase. 
The re-examination of the worst case scenario outcome show that 
buying the put resulted in much smaller losses than selling the call, 
-$2,594 versus -$4,593. In addition, with more relaxed caps or no cap at 
all on interest rate changes, the loss from the unhedged FRM or mortgage 
plus call option would be unlimited. So, if the purpose of the banker is 
to curb the negative effects of rising interest rates, buying put options 
on financial futures to cover the FRM portfolio is recommended. 
THE FRM-ARM Rate Differential 
The previous simulation study shows that hedging the interest rate 
risk of a FRM portfolio with options on T-bond futures is quite beneficial 
in lowering the variability of returns. Moreover, with the primary purpose 
of protecting mortgage value from declining, hedging the FRM with 
purchasing put options on financial futures provides similar benefits to 
offering ARMs. A hypothesis is thus formed to suggest that the difference 
between the FRM and the ARM should not be higher than the cost of hedging 
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with put options if the two strategies performs similar functions. This 
hypothesis is further analyzed in this section. 
Comparison of FRMs and ARMs 
ARMS as a group may be compared to FRMs in terms of their 
characteristics and intended functions. FRMs offer the borrower the right 
to retain the mortgage if rates increase and the option to refinance if 
interest rates decrease. This is similar to a call option. ARMs are 
designed to protect mortgage loan investors from rising interest rates 
subsequent to origination and the resulting decline in mortgage value. A. 
question may arise as to the possibilities of declining rates and the fact 
that ARMS prohibit the potential advantage of this situation. It may, at 
first, be argued that ARM investors are no worse than FRM lenders since 
borrowers have the option to refinance at lower rates, making FRMs 
equivalent in this case to ARMS except for the initial contract rate. 
However, since most FRMs have at least some origination fee and 
discount points, refinancing an existing high-rate FRM with a new lower-
rate loan is not costless. By industry standards, rates may need to drop 
by 2 or 3 percentage point before refinancing becomes a financially 
reasonable option for the borrower. In other words, fixed-rate loans have 
"sticky" rates in the case of moderately falling yields, but ARMs have 
their rate adjusted. In fact, if the implicit "call option" characteristic 
of FRMs could have been revoked by lenders in terras of requiring large 
prepayment penalties, the superiority of FRMs over ARMs under moderately 
falling rates would be evident. However, "since prepayment penalties are 
unpopular with borrowers and illegal in many states, some lenders have 
substituted large up-front discount points and/or origination fees to lower 
the possibilities of refinancing FRMs prior to their original maturity. 
Substantial similarities, then, exist between fixed rate mortgages 
T. Clauretie, 1986: 77. 
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and adjustable rate mortgages with interest rate caps and floors. Mortgage 
lenders/investors will earn below market returns on both instruments should 
rates rise more sharply than expected, while interest rate floors on ARMs 
and costly "calls" of FRMs will cause lenders to earn above-market rates of 
return if interest rates decline more than expected. Because of these 
similarities, the fundamental determinants of the spreads between the 
market rates of interest and the fixed and adjustable mortgage rates should 
be the same. Moreover the relationship between the two mortgage rates 
should be easily deducible based on the same determinants. 
The mortgage markup from short-term rates is largely determined by 
the slope of the term structure of interest rates and the longer-run 
volatility in short-term rates. "The more upward-sloping is the term 
structure, the more lenders expect rates to rise; and the more averse 
lenders are to increases in rates, the greater will be the markup on the 
fixed or capped adjustable mortgage rates. Moreover, even if the term 
structure is relatively flat, high long-run volatility in short term rates 
means a reasonable likelihood of significantly higher interest rates during 
some future periods. So, the higher is long-run rate volatility, the 
greater is the markup."®^ 
Setting looser rate caps on ARMs, introducing ARM rate floors, and 
making the implicit FRM call option more costly through larger refinancing 
fees, modifies the relationship between the markup and its determinants. 
The looser are the caps and the more costly is the "call" or the prepayment 
option, the less the markup will be for a given slope of the term structure 
and level of long-run volatility. With loose caps, lenders lose less 
relative to market rates when rates rise; with costly FRM prepayment and 
ARM floors, lenders gain relative to market rates when rate decline. The 
decrease in markup varies with the slope of the term structure and the 
® Michael Asay, "Pricing and Analysis of Common Adjustable rate 
Mortgages," Mortgage Banking. December 1984: 61. 
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long-run volatility in rates. Pricing mortgages, then, depends crucially 
on the assumptions made regarding possible future interest rate paths, as 
well as the terms of mortgage contract. 
The difference between the adjustable mortgage rates and those on 
fixed rate mortgages, in the current study, is discussed in terms of 
hedging the interest rate risk of the FRM portfolio with options on 
financial futures. As shown in the previous empirical studies, in addition 
to offering ARMs, the risk of declining mortgage value as a result of 
higher interest rates may be successfully hedged by purchasing put options 
on T-bond futures contracts. Figure 7-1 is a reproduction of Figures 6-5 
and 6-9 and may be used to compare the two strategies in the simplest case 
of no interest rate caps and floors. As discussed earlier, since the 
purpose of insuring the mortgage value may be achieved through either 
offering ARMs or covering FRMs with put options, the rate differential 
between the two mortgage types should be no larger than the cost of option 
hedging. For example, if the cost of covering $100,000 of mortgage value 
with put options were $4,000 annually, the maximum markup of the FRM 
relative to the ARM should be 4 percent per year ($4,000/$100,000 = .04). 
The remainder of this section explores the above idea in some detail. 
The experiment scenario and comparative results 
It is assumed that the S&L may purchase one at-the-money put option 
contract on T-bond futures in the month preceding the start of a one-year 
hedge period, an anticipatory hedge. Once expired, the option may be 
rolled over to cover the remainder of the year. The amount of the mortgage 
to be hedged with one put option is determined based on the hedge ratio 
technique developed earlier. A one-to-one hedge translates to the coverage 
of $100,000 of mortgage value with one option while the employment of the 
optimal hedge ratio,n", means covering (1/n*) ($100,000) with the same 
contract. For the current study, the optimal hedge ratios of .7993 and 
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Mortgage value 
Net Capital Gain 
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Figure 7-1. Net capital gain from the uncapped ARM position versus net 
capital gain from the FRM covered with the buy-put strategy 
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.8991, the uncorrected and corrected for autocorrelation ratios of the 
lagged series respectively, are used. The optimal hedging choice in this 
case, then, is to cover either $111,222 or $125,109 of mortgage value with 
a single put option contract. 
Two cost structures are considered. The ex-ante cost simply 
considers the sum of the option premia for the options used in the annual 
hedge as the hedging cost. The ex-post cost adjusts the above simple cost 
by the possible benefits of exercising the option(s). If neither of the 
options is exercised during the course of the year, the two cost structures 
are identical. If,on the other hand, one or both options are exercised, 
the resulting gains are subtracted from the option premia to determine the 
net cost of hedging the FRM portfolio. The following example shows the 
calculation of the two hedging costs. 
On February 15, 1988, one at-the-money put option with maturity of 
September 1988 and exercise price of 92 was purchased at the cost of 3.625 
points, or $3,625. In September of the same year, the option was exercised 
for a gain of $3,188 and a net profit of -$438. In the same month, another 
at-the-money option was purchased for $2,766 to cover the FRM portfolio for 
the next six months. In March of the next year, the option was out-of-the-
money and expired unexercised for a net loss of -$2,766. The ex-ante 
hedging cost for the year was $6,391 ($3,625+$2,766), and the ex-post cost 
of the hedge was $3,203 ($3,625+$2,766-$3,188). If these options were used 
to hedge $100,000 of mortgage portfolio, the ex-post cost, for example, 
would translate to 3.203 percent annually. Hedging the optimal mortgage 
amounts would lower the cost to 2.880 percent and 2.560 percent 
respectively for the uncorrected (n"=.8991) and corrected (n'=.7993) hedge 
ratios. So, if the mortgage portfolio was hedged with put options on 
financial futures, the annual cost in percentage terms would fall in the 
2.560 to 3.203 percent range depending on the hedge amount. For reference 
and comparison purposes, the fixed mortgage rate during February 1988 was 
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at 9.900 percent and the three-month T-bill rate was 5.690. A 1.5 percent 
margin between the T-bill rate and the rate set on the ARM would then lead 
to a 2.710 percent difference between the fixed and adjustable mortgage 
rates and a 2 percent margin would cause 2.210 percent annual rate 
differential. 
The average annual hedging cost in percentage terms are reported in 
Tables 7-10, 7-11, and 7-12 for the three hedge ratios. The results 
emphasize the following facts. 
First, the cost of hedging in percentage terms declines as the one-
to-one hedge is replaced by optimal hedging. This is expected as the 
movement from the one-to-one hedge ($100,000 of mortgage value) to the 
optimal hedge ratios of .7993 ($111,222 of mortgage value) and .8991 
($125,109 of mortgage value) represents more cost effective hedges—the 
same hedging cost is incurred to cover a larger dollar value of mortgage 
portfolio. Second, the result of hedging with the next in-the-money option 
for each of the three hedge ratios shows a rise in hedging cost. Recall 
from Table 7-7 that hedging FRMs with in-the-money puts provides for a 
better coverage in terms of improved mean and standard deviation of returns 
as compared to the at-the-money option. The improved coverage, however, 
demands a higher cost. Similarly, smaller coverage may be obtained by 
purchasing out-of-the-money puts at a lower cost. Finally, the comparison 
of the ex-ante and ex-post costs show a decline in hedging cost for every 
year in the study. In some cases, at-the-money hedges of 1983 and 1989 for 
example, hedging the fixed rate mortgage portfolio with put options on 
financial futures would be costless if the exercise of the option is taken 
in to account. Since the true cost/benefit of option hedging includes the 
possibilities of exercise, the ex-post cost will be used in the reminder of 
this section. 
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Table 7-10. Average annual cost of covering $100,000 of mortgage value 
with one put option contract on financial futures (one-to-one 
hedge ratio) 
YEAR EX-ANTE COST EX-POST COST 
E<F E=F E>F E<P E=P E>F 
1983 2.600 4.240 6.371 0.569 -0.417 -1.694 
1984 2.796 4.411 6.523 2.605 3.906 5.609 
1985 3.988 5.699 7.723 3.592 4.921 6.445 
1986 5.440 7.078 9.418 2.444 2.117 1.686 
1987 4.310 5.685 7.551 2.670 2.681 2.092 
1988 3.897 5.462 7.395 3.441 4.548 5.327 
1989 3.326 4.947 6.651 0.359 -0.296 -1.112 
1990 3.166 4.817 6.855 2.716 3.304 3.659 
Table 7-11. Average annual cost of covering $111,222 of mortgage value 
with one put option contract on financial futures (uncorrected 
hedge ratio for the lagged series) 
YEAR EX-ANTE COST EX-POST COST 
E<F E=P E>F E<F E=F E>F 
1983 2.338 3.812 5.728 0.512 -0.375 -1.523 
1984 2.514 3.966 5.865 2.343 3.512 5.043 
1985 3.586 5.124 6.943 3.230 4.425 5.795 
1986 4.891 6.364 8.468 2.197 1.903 1.516 
1987 3.875 5.111 6-789 2.401 2.410 1.881 
1988 3.504 4.911 6.648 3.094 4.089 4.789 
1989 2.990 4.448 5.980 0.323 -0.266 -1.000 
1990 2.847 4.331 6.163 2.442 2.970 3.290 
Table 7-12. Average annual cost of covering $125,109 of mortgage value 
with one put option contract on financial futures (corrected 
hedge ratio for the lagged series) 
YEAR EX-ANTE COST EX-POST COST 
E<F E=F E>F E<F E=P E>F 
1983 2.078 3.389 5.092 0.455 -0.333 -1.354 
1984 2.235 3.526 5.214 2.083 3.122 4.484 
1985 3.188 4.555 6.173 2.871 3.934 5.151 
1986 4.348 5.658 7.528 1.953 1.692 1.347 
1987 3.445 4.544 6.035 2.135 2.143 1.672 
1988 3.115 4.366 5.910 2.751 3.635 4.258 
1989 2.658 3.954 5.316 0.287 -0.236 -0.889 
1990 2.531 3.850 5.479 2.171 2.641 2.925 
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Table 7-13 summarizes the results for the purpose of comparing the 
FRM-ARM rate differential to the ex-post cost of hedging with at-the-money 
puts. The FRM series is the same as the one used in the previous empirical 
studies. The ARM is constructed very simply by adding a margin to the 
three-month Treasury bill rate and is used mainly for illustration 
purposes. No assumptions are made on various features of the ARM. 
The results of the table are analyzed by performing the appropriate 
tests on the following three sets of hypothesis: 
Hg: m, = m, m, = mj m, = m, 
H^: m, =}= "Ht mi > mj m, < 
Table 7-13. Comparison of the FRM-ARM rate differential and the 
ex-post cost of hedging mortgage portfolio with at-the-
money put options on T-bond futures 
FRM-ARM EX-POST COST OF OPTION HEDGING 
MARGIN 
1.5 PERCENT 2 PERCENT 1:1 
HEDGE RATIO 
UNCORRECTED CORRECTED 
1983 2.495 1.995 -0.417 -0.375 -0.333 
1984 2.344 1.844 3.906 3.512 3.122 
1985 2.223 1.723 4.921 4.425 3.934 
1986 2.098 1.593 2.117 1.903 1.692 
1987 1.979 1.479 2.681 2.410 2.143 
1988 1.832 1.332 4.548 4.089 3.635 
1989 1.768 1.268 -0.296 -0.266 -0.236 
1990 1.737 1-237 3.304 2.970 2.641 
where m, is the mean cost of the hedging strategy and m; is the mean annual 
difference between the adjustable and fixed rates. The appropriate test 
statistics used was of the following form: 
t = {x,xi} / { [(ni-l).s,^ + (n^-l) .S5,^]/[ni+ni-2]*[l/n,+l/n2] }"= 
where x, and Xj are sample means, and s,^ and s,^ are sample variances. 
The above tests were preceded by an analysis of variance test of the 
following form to validate the equality of population variances. 
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Ho; var, = var; 
H,; var, =j= var^  
The statistic used was: 
f = sf / 8%: 
where s,^ and Sj^ are sample variances for the hedging cost and the FRM-ARM 
rate differentials respectively. 
In cases where the null hypothesis of equal variances was rejected, 
the Mann-whitney U-test of equal distribution with the following test 
statistic was used.®' 
U = n,n2 + [ni(ni+l)]/2 - sum (R,) 
u'= n,n2 - u 
where n, and nj are the sample sizes, and sum(R,) is the summation of the 
ranks of sample 1, the hedging cost. 
The above tests were applied to the outcomes of the study with the 
following conclusions. The difference between the fixed mortgage rate and 
either of the adjustable rates were smaller than the cost of the one-to-one 
and uncorrected optimal hedges for 1984, 1985, and 1990 and equal for 1986 
and 1987. The results for the corrected optimal hedge differed only by the 
fact that the difference between the FRM rate and the rate on the ARM with 
the 1.5 percent margin was larger than the hedging cost, although it was 
smaller if a 2 percent margin were used. On a monthly basis, the rate 
difference was smaller than the cost of hedging on 64 of the 96 periods for 
the 1.5 percent ARM and on 65 occasions for the 2 percent margin. 
Additional information on the structure and the uses of the Mann-
Whitney U-test may be obtained from R. D. Mason, and D. Lind, Statistical 
Techniques in Business and Economics, seventh edition, Homewood, Illinois; 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1990. 
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The above results suggest that the difference between the fixed and 
adjustable rate mortgage rates indeed are not larger than the cost of 
hedging FRM portfolios with put options. In other words, it may cost the 
mortgage banker more if option hedging were to replace hedging with ARMs. 
This may in fact point to the efficient pricing of the two mortgage types 
in relation to one-another. However, further study of the hypothesis is 
needed before conclusive statements may be made. There is a great deal of 
difference among adjustable mortgage loans. The existence of the annual 
and life-time interest rate caps and floors, for example, as well as the 
greater possibility of default for borrowers of ARMs may complicate the 
determinants of rate differentials between the two mortgage types. 
Moreover, hedging with put options may represent "over-insuring" the 
portfolio since the potential for gain in a declining rate environment is 
not eliminated with the use of this strategy as it would for the ARM 
hedging. The hedging cost under the current study, then, may be an over-
estimation of the cost of converting the risk structure of a FRM portfolio 
to one similar to that of an ARM. 
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The study of Chapter 6 suggests that hedging mortgage portfolios 
with financial futures and options is quite beneficial in improving the 
mean-standard deviation estimates. 
For the combined series, a simulated sample with no trend in the 
price of either mortgages or futures despite substantial variation in both 
prices, the results show that assuming no broker' fees, futures hedging 
lowers the variability of returns substantially although the mean return is 
identical to that of the unhedged mortgage, zero on average. Hedging with 
the sell-call strategy is also quite successful in lowering the standard 
deviation, and, it increases mean return by a large amount as well. The 
buy-put strategy for the period under study creates a loss for the benefit 
of lower variability in returns. Finally, the synthetic futures position, 
sell call-buy put, provides for returns similar to that of futures hedging 
although standard deviation estimates are slightly higher. 
For both the put or call strategies, the employment of the in-the-
money option magnifies the return outcomes, higher gains for the call 
strategy and larger losses for the put position. Selling the in-the-money 
call, however, lowers the variation of returns while buying the put with 
larger exercise price increases the variability as compared to the at-the-
money option. The buy-put sell call strategy is not recommended for other 
than at-the-money options since the resulting standard deviation is higher 
than that of the unhedged position. 
In general, hedging with T-bond futures and options on such futures 
contracts, lowers the variability of return in all cases of hedging, for 
both a contemporaneous or a lagged (anticipatory) hedge, and for at-the-
money, as well the next near-the-money options with the exception of near-
money synthetic futures hedges. 
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The original series of mortgage and futures prices represented a 
declining interest rate environment and rising mortgage values. Futures 
hedging under this scenario lowered potential gains for the benefit of 
lower variation of returns. Mean return was much closer to zero when the 
mortgage portfolio was hedged with futures and the standard deviation of 
returns were much lower. 
The call strategy provided for both a considerable decrease in 
variation and an increase in returns. In fact, as the position diagram 
predicted, there was a positive return in the case of the sell-call hedge 
for both hedge relationships, and all exercise prices and hedge ratios. 
The standard deviation of returns were also lower under all circumstances, 
by as much as 63 percent in one case. Moreover, the call strategy also 
out-performed simple futures hedging in all cases, both in terms of mean 
return and standard deviation of returns. 
The put strategy modified the potential gains in this case by the 
extent of the paid premium. Returns were generally lower than that of the 
unhedged and the hedged-with-futures positions. Variability of returns 
were always smaller as compared to the unhedged mortgage, but showed 
various comparative results against the futures hedge. The standard 
deviation of returns under the buy-put hedge of the original series were 
between 25 percent lower and 23 percent higher than that of the mortgages 
hedged with futures. On average for both relationships and all hedge 
ratios, however, the standard deviation of returns were quite similar for 
both strategies. 
Finally, the synthetic futures position created comparative or better 
returns than the simple futures hedge, but also resulted in higher standard 
deviation. 
So, based on the current study, when interest rates are expected to 
fall leading to potentially higher mortgage and futures prices, the four 
hedging strategies are successful in lowering the risk as measured by 
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standard deviation of returns. Moreover, selling calls, or selling calls 
combined with buying puts also improve returns while selling futures or put 
options on futures contracts lowers the mean return. 
In the case of rising rates and falling values, as represented by the 
reverse series, the futures hedge performed similar to the case of the 
original series in the magnitude of changes, but with the opposite signs 
for mean returns. In other words, standard deviations were lower in all 
cases by the amount equal to the decrease for the original series, but the 
returns were increased and were near zero. The returns for the mortgages 
hedged with call options were better than those of the unhedged mortgage 
portfolios because the premium received cushioned the drop in value, and 
standard deviations were lower. When compared with the futures hedge, 
however, mean returns were generally higher, but so were the variability of 
those returns. The put strategy created large losses, generally in line 
with the average premium paid, but it also lowered the variability of 
returns by as much as 41 percent compared to the unhedged mortgage and 14 
percent compared to the futures hedge. The synthetic futures position 
lowered the mean return but increased the standard deviation as compared to 
hedged-with-futures case. 
It may be concluded from the result of the empirical study of Chapter 
6 that hedging mortgages with Treasury bond futures, and option on T.bond 
futures contracts, is generally helpful in improving the risk-return 
distributions. The hedging choice depends on the risk attitude of the 
investor and the directions of price (interest rate) movements. Of the four 
strategies considered in the current study, the futures choice seems to 
perform equally well under both decreasing and increasing interest rate 
scenarios. The call strategy performs better that the futures position 
both in terms of mean and variability of returns when interest rates 
decline, but improves the returns only at the expense of higher standard 
deviations when rates rise. The put strategy, on the other hand, limits 
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maximum losses to the extent of the premium paid, but lowers the variation 
in returns considerably when rates increase as compared to all other 
strategies. The sell call-buy put strategy performs much better, in terms 
of mean return, than the simple futures hedge if rates decline and much 
worse if interest rates increase. On average, however, the mean return 
from the two strategies are quite comparable, but the synthetic futures 
results in higher variability of returns. 
The empirical study of Chapter 6 showed the benefits of hedging 
mortgage portfolios with purchasing put options on financial futures in an 
increasing interest rate environment. The position diagrams further 
suggested that the risk structure of a FRM may be manipulated to resemble 
that of an ARM with the buy-put strategy. If the S&L aims in deterring the 
risk of lower mortgage value, this hedging strategy seems quite suitable 
for the purpose. 
The results of the empirical study of Chapter 7 even further explored 
this idea. The FRM portfolio was subjected to random changes in value in 
response to simulated interest rate variations. 
The worst case scenario, when interest rates increased by the maximum 
allowed, shows a substantial decline in the value of the unhedged mortgage 
portfolio, with little variability, however, due to the constant nature of 
the changes. Both the call and the put strategies reduced the losses by a 
large amount for a small increase in the standard deviation. In the 
declining price environment, the put strategy did better than the call as 
expected from the theory and the position diagrams. The synthetic futures 
created a large gain. The use of the in-the-money options improved the 
returns although it also increased the standard deviation of returns. 
The best case scenario of maximum declines in interest rates also 
resulted in expected outcomes. Large gains of the mortgage portfolio were 
modified by the put and call options. In this case, however, in-the-money 
options, with substantially higher average premia, lowered the return as 
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compared to the at-the-money option. Variability of returns were higher in 
all cases. 
The two extreme rate change examples set the limit on gains or losses 
of the hedged and unhedged mortgage portfolios, while the general case of 
interest rate change further examined the hedging strategies. Standard 
deviation of returns were lowered considerably for all three hedging and 
for all exercise prices, in one case by as much as 70 percent. When used 
individually, the sell-call or buy-put strategies performed similarly in 
lowering the variability of returns, while the call position created a 
profit and the put caused a loss. The synthetic futures position was most 
successful in lowering the standard deviation of returns and generated 
returns that were significantly near-zero as compared to the other two 
strategies. 
Although the above exercise showed that all three strategies perform 
well as hedging instruments, the buy-put strategy was pursued in the 
remainder of Chapter 7 where the pricing of the two mortgage types and 
their relationship were considered. The reason for choosing this 
particular hedging strategy was the fact that the financial institutions' 
primary goal, in this case, was to protect their mortgage value from 
falling, and this purpose is best served with a buy-put option strategy as 
was predicted by position diagrams and proved by the empirical study. 
Mortgage pricing techniques follow either the options pricing 
principles based on the claims given up by the lenders or the borrowers; or 
simulation methods that perform "what if" experiments on ARMs based on 
assumptions of rate change. The literature examined in this study pointed 
to the fact that due to substantial similarities that exist between capped 
ARMS and FRMs with large up-front fees to prohibit refinancing, the 
fundamental determinants of the spread between the fixed and adjustable 
mortgage rates and their relationship to short term market rates of 
interest are the same. 
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The last part of the empirical work in the current study examined the 
difference between the fixed and adjustable mortgage rates in terms of the 
hedging cost of "converting" the FRM to an ARM with regard to its interest 
rate risk characteristics. The ex-post cost of the hedge, option premia 
adjusted by gains from the exercise, was compared to the difference between 
the fixed and adjustable mortgage rates. Several hypothesis regarding the 
two costs were tested on an annual and monthly basis. The results 
suggested that the rate differential between the two mortgage rates is 
generally not larger than the cost of hedging. 
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